Upjohn Press

Upjohn Research home page

1-1-1980

Minimum Level of Unemployment and Public Policy
Frank Cook Pierson
Swarthmore College

Follow this and additional works at: https://research.upjohn.org/up_press
Part of the Labor Economics Commons, and the Public Policy Commons

Citation
Pierson, Frank C. 1980. Minimum Level of Unemployment and Public Policy. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn
Institute for Employment Research. https://doi.org/10.17848/9780880995832

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-Share Alike 4.0 International
License.

This title is brought to you by the Upjohn Institute. For more information, please contact repository@upjohn.org.

The
o

o

_ _ LevdLof
Unemployment
and
Riblic Iblicy
Frank C» Herson

The
'O

O

_ T LeveLof
Unemployment
and
ftibliclbliey
Frank C. Pierson
Swarthmore College

THE W.E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE FOR EMPLOYMENT RESEARCH

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Pierson, Frank Cook, 1911The minimum level of unemployment and public policy.
1. Unemployment United States.
Full employment policies. I. Title.
HD5724.P475
339.5'0973
ISBN 0-911558-76-4
ISBN 0-911558-75-6 (pbk.)

2.

United States
80-26536

Copyright
1980
by the
W. E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE
FOR EMPLOYMENT RESEARCH
300 South Westnedge Ave.
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49007
THE INSTITUTE, a nonprofit research organization, was established
on July 1, 1945. It is an activity of the W. E. Upjohn Unemployment
Trustee Corporation, which was formed in 1932 to administer a fund
set aside by the late Dr. W. E. Upjohn for the purpose of carrying on
"research into the causes and effects of unemployment and measures
for the alleviation of unemployment."

The Board of Trustees
of the
W. E. Upjohn
Unemployment Trustee Corporation
Preston S. Parish, Chairman
Mrs. Ray T. Parfet, Vice Chairman
Charles C. Gibbons, Vice Chairman
D. Gordon Knapp, Secretary-Treasurer
E. Gifford Upjohn, M.D.
Mrs. Genevieve U. Gilmore
James H. Duncan
John T. Bernhard

The Staff of the Institute
E. Earl Wright, Director
Saul J. Blaustein
Judith K. Drawer
Phyllis Buskirk
H. Allan Hunt
John R. Mekemson
Car la J. Noe
Jo Bentley Reece
Robert A. Straits
Wayne R. Wendling
Jack R. Woods

in

The Author
Professor Pierson has devoted most of his professional
career to teaching and research work in the labor field, along
with various government and arbitration assignments in the
same area. He joined the Economics Department of Swarthmore College in 1940, served as Vice-Chairman of the Third
Regional War Labor Board during World War II, subse
quently was a research associate at various universities and
institutes and was active both as an arbitrator in private in
dustry and as a consultant to several government agencies.
He is Joseph Wharton Professor Emeritus of Political
Economy at Swarthmore College.
He is the author of a variety of studies in the labor and
manpower field including Community Wage Patterns, 1952;
New Concepts in Wage Determination (co-editor), 1957; The
Education of American Businessmen (with others), 1959;
and Community Manpower Training Programs for the
Disadvantaged, 1972.

IV

Foreword
While the problem of cyclical joblessness dominates public
policy discussion at the present time, structural unemploy
ment is being increasingly recognized as one of the nation's
most serious domestic problems. Persistent high levels of
"prosperity" or structural unemployment are attributable to
seemingly intractable structural imbalances within the
economy. As Professor Pierson notes, the key policy prob
lem centers on the use of aggregative and structural policies
to reduce total unemployment to the 4-5 percent range and to
bring the hard-to-employ into the economic mainstream
without inducing increased inflation.
This study focuses on the role of the federal government in
reducing persistent joblessness that prevails at relatively high
levels even during periods of high employment or prosperity.
Professor Pierson concludes that, while differing in degree,
both cyclical and structural unemployment should be ad
dressed in periods of high as in periods of low employment.
The author concludes that the most critical issue to resolve is
how to balance short-run and long-run goals for the
economy in the selection of public policy alternatives.
Facts and observations expressed in the study are the sole
responsibility of the author. His viewpoints do not necessar
ily represent positions of the W.E. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research.
E. Earl Wright
Director
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Chapter 1
Dimensions of the Problem
In the last decade, unemployment has again become one
of the country's most serious unresolved problems. Mass
unemployment as it was known in the 1930s can perhaps no
longer be considered a serious threat, an outcome for which
Keynes and his followers deserve primary credit. The full
employment prospect implicit in their doctrines, however,
has faded. The broad consensus among economists today is
that if reliance is placed on Keynesian macro-expansion
policies alone, the jobless rate cannot be pushed below 5 per
cent, perhaps not even below 6 percent, of the nation's labor
force without unleashing severe inflationary pressures.
Compared to the Great Depression such projections hard
ly appear alarming, but the economic and social repercus
sions of even small changes in the jobless rate can be ex
tremely serious. A rise in the jobless rate of one percentage
point, say from 4 to 5 percent, would add about a million
persons to the jobless rolls and, barring temporary offsets,
would reduce real GNP by nearly 3 percent. More serious
still, the kind of unemployment that persists into periods of
general prosperity falls much more heavily on certain groups
than on others: those with low incomes, few skills, and little
education. In addition to the loss of their output, society
must also bear the heavy direct and indirect costs of the add
ed welfare expenditures, police protection, and
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neighborhood deterioration associated with concentrated
joblessness of this type. Most damaging of all, persons who
cannot even find stable jobs in boom periods can hardly be
blamed for becoming completely discouraged and defeatist
about their personal worth as well as their role in the life of
their communities.
This study is primarily addressed to the problem of pros
perity, as opposed to recessionary, unemployment. The
former is attributable to persistent structural imbalances
within the economy, the latter to either cyclical or longer
term shortfalls in aggregate demand relative to aggregate
supply in the economy as a whole. The distinction between
structural and aggregate demand joblessness has admittedly
become quite blurred since failure on either front greatly
complicates effective action on the other. To the degree ag
gregate imbalances prove intractable, structural imbalances
will become more serious, and if the latter prove to be
unyielding, the task of aggregate demand management
becomes correspondingly more difficult. Parallel action on
both fronts is, therefore, clearly required if success on either
is to be achieved. Nevertheless, the corrective measures to be
taken at the structural and aggregative level will differ
radically.
Prosperity Unemployment
Controversy soon emerges when discussion of these two
aspects of unemployment goes beyond the level of
generalization. The crux of the question is how can ag
gregative and structural policies be meshed so that
unemployment can be brought down to the 4-5 percent
range. The usual answer is that, on the aggregative level, the
economy has become increasingly inflation prone and, on
the structural level, larger sections of the nation's labor force
have become increasingly cut off from stable job or career
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opportunities. The main purpose of this study is to assess the
merits of this pessimistic but widely accepted view and, more
particularly, to examine its implications for public policy.
The pessimists' view has now become part of the conven
tional wisdom, so much so that only the briefest summary is
needed here. If, as recent experience attests, prices begin to
rise sharply even when the unemployment rate is as high as 6
percent or more, the scope left to fiscal and monetary policy
as a means for reducing unemployment will be sharply
reduced. Indeed, to the extent serious inflation has become
permanent and essentially irreversible over a given two- or
three-year period, any effort to lower unemployment by ex
pansionary fiscal-monetary means will, in this view, tend in
the longer run to raise rather than lower the jobless rate.
The alternative approach to the prosperity unemployment
problem, directly attacking major structural barriers to jobs,
has led to a hardly less pessimistic conclusion. While differ
ing in emphasis and specific findings, the conclusion of most
investigations is that the many public and private efforts
since the early 1960s to remove such barriers have yielded but
the barest results. The main differences among these in
vestigations depend on the weight which is placed on improv
ing existing job market conditions as opposed to more farreaching reforms, the former relying chiefly on private
market processes and the latter on various types of govern
mental intervention. Both seem generally agreed, however,
that the problem itself lies beyond any quick or even distant
solution.
The upshot is that the trade-off between unemployment
and price stability, the well-known Phillips Curve, is now
seen to be much more adverse, not only in terms of its shape
but in terms of its location as well, than when first developed
in the mid-fifties how adverse, however, remains an unset
tled question, with most estimates of the minimum level to
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which unemployment can be reduced by aggregative and
structural policies without setting off a serious rise in the in
flation rate ranging from 6 percent to as low as 4 percent.
The choice of public policy measures for dealing with
unemployment that persists into periods of general prosperi
ty largely turns on where the effects of fiscal-monetary ex
pansion are assumed to fall within this range of values. The
general conclusion emerging from the discussion of this issue
in the following chapter is that the inflationary impact of
macroeconomic measures to achieve and maintain full
employment, as the latter term is usually defined, has been
exaggerated and that, quite aside from efforts to remove
structural barriers to employment, there is good reason to
believe that the jobless rate could be reduced by such
measures to 5 percent or even less without affecting the rate
of inflation in any significant way.
This finding, if valid, puts the question of the structural
barriers to unemployment in a quite different light from the
way it is usually viewed. Since the unemployment-prone
groups, consisting of lesser skilled, lesser educated workers,
are especially benefitted by any general lowering of the
unemployment rate, structural unemployment could be ex
pected to fall by well over one-half if it turned out that the
national jobless rate could be reduced to 5 percent by
macroeconomic demand policy without incurring serious in
flationary consequences. This in turn would mean that ef
forts to bring the hard-to-employ into the mainstream of job
opportunities could be concentrated much more intensively,
and presumably more successfully, on the needs of the par
ticular groups involved. An evaluation of these efforts, con
sidered from this perspective, constitutes the chief subject of
this inquiry.

Dimensions of the Problem

Dimensions of the Problem
The basis for the view that the unemployment problem has
become largely intractable rests largely on the belief that
various forms of governmental intervention, however well
intentioned or even justified in any given instance, have been
carried to the point where, in the aggregate, full utilization
of the nation's labor force on a sustained basis has become
impossible. In part, this view rests on the belief that the
general role of government, particularly in its fiscal and
monetary policies, has been highly unstabilizing, so much so
that any short-run efforts to offset such unstabilizing effects
have proved ineffective and actually exacerbating. More
recently, criticism has centered on governmental interven
tions in individual markets or broader sectors of the
economy whether aimed at protecting certain producer
groups or the general public. Increasingly, investigators of
both a conservative and liberal persuasion have come to
question whether the net effects of governmental regulation
in such fields as railroads and trucking, or its efforts to con
trol environmental, health, and safety hazards in a variety of
industries have not pushed up costs unduly, thereby serving
to restrict output and employment and thus contributing to
both more inflation and more unemployment.
A similar shift in sentiment has occurred among in
vestigators of government efforts to improve the perfor
mance of particular labor markets and to protect certain
vulnerable worker groups. Again, rather than stressing the
beneficial aspects of such efforts, increasing emphasis has
come to be placed on their deleterious effects. Some of the
policies that have been most widely criticized on this score
are federal laws stipulating minimum wages and maximum
hours, protection of union organizing and strike actions, and
provision of unemployment benefits and welfare benefits.
The danger of these policies, while sometimes viewed in ex-
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treme categorical terms, is more often seen as one of degree,
with the argument often turning on how far is it possible for
government to go in providing special safeguards of these
sorts without adversely affecting the functioning of labor
markets. A major purpose of this study is to review the
available evidence concerning this important issue.
While the majority of professional investigators have
become increasingly skeptical about governmental aggregate
demand policies and individual market approaches to the
problem of prosperity unemployment, an important minori
ty hold to the view that the problem of persistent unemploy
ment can be traced not to particular government policies but
to various fundamental changes in the economy. At the ag
gregate level it is argued by members of this minority group
that pressures arising from international economic im
balances, domestic interest group demands, changes in
market trends and requirements, and shifts in factor supply
conditions have made it more difficult to maintain noninflationary expansions. At the individual market level it is
argued further that certain employees, most notably teenage
minority workers in inner cities and the least skilled, least
educated workers in economically depressed industries and
areas, have become effectively cut off from all worthwhile
job opportunities. In part, these barriers are said to be the
result of deliberate discriminatory practices but in greater
part they are felt to be the product of general cultural in
fluences and long-standing institutional relationships. Pro
ponents of this position share much of the skepticism of the
majority group regarding the effectiveness of government
measures to deal with the problem of persistent unemploy
ment but for diametrically opposite reasons. The majority
view is that the economy is generally capable of providing
adequate job opportunities if only the government would
adopt less sweeping programs and give unregulated market
processes freer rein, while the minority holds that the im-
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balances and conflicts within the economy are so serious they
will not be resolved unless there are far reaching changes in
the economy.
It is not possible within the confines of this study to make
an adequate appraisal of either of these polar positions since
both are wide ranging in nature and pertinent data are not
readily available. Rather, this investigation is limited to a
review of the public policy implications of the findings of
both groups of observers as judged by the record of prior ef
forts to deal with the problem of unemployment in periods
of high employment or prosperity. 1 To this end attention
first centers on identifying the more important
characteristics of this type of unemployment and on setting
forth the major questions that remain unanswered about it.

Four Aspects of Prosperity Unemployment
The first and probably the most important dimension of
this kind of unemployment is that it is largely confined to
certain groups and geographical areas. Viewed in
demographic terms, joblessness in high employment periods
is concentrated among youth, women, and older workers (54
years and over), particularly the nonwhite members of these
groups. Viewed in locational terms, this type of unemploy
ment is centered in certain long-depressed areas such as the
Appalachian Region, and more massively in the inner areas
of some of the country's larger cities. The same demographic
groups are dominant in the geographical concentrations of
joblessness, reflecting the more basic forces which lie behind
persistent unemployment of this sort. It should be noted that
adult white males can also find themselves without jobs in
1 In this study the terms high employment and prosperity unemployment are used inter
changeably to denote the kind of persistent unemployment that continues at relatively high
levels even in periods of sustained business expansions
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boom times but only in unusual or temporary cases. Thus
prosperity level joblessness can be viewed as largely an agesex-race problem, and policy proposals should be for
mulated accordingly.
Related to this dimension of the problem is the fact that
many of these workers face severe labor market initial-entry
or re-entry difficulties in getting stable, career-related jobs.
The key issue, particularly in generally prosperous en
vironments, is not one of finding a job as such, but rather
one of getting work with promise of some permanence and
longer term career potential. Indeed, the salient
characteristic of this type of unemployment is not so much
long periods of joblessness as short periods occurring be
tween relatively brief spells of employment. Whether such
highly unstable patterns of work stem from low productivity
because of poor work habits and inexperience, or from
discriminatory practices and institutional arrangements, or
even from personal life styles and preferences of the workers
themselves, it is clear that the most critical difficulties in
dealing with prosperity level unemployment occur when
workers initially enter or re-enter the labor market. For
many, indeed the great majority, steady work is eventually
found, albeit with a trial and error period of "shopping
around" often involved; but for a substantial minority,
steady work in anything approaching a career framework is
not attained. These are the workers in the dead-end jobs who
constitute the bulk of the so-called permanently unemployed
(or the "permanently-temporarily" unemployed) and pose
the most intractable aspect of the problem for policymakers.
Unemployment among older workers follows a quite dif
ferent pattern. Once having achieved relatively permanent
job status, a person typically remains at work until age 65
unless he or she chooses earlier retirement, and recently
enacted federal legislation extends protection from dismissal
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for older workers until their seventieth year. Unemployment
rates for such workers are comparatively low, generally run
ning below 3 percent. If, however, they lose their jobs, the
resulting unemployment is likely to prove of much longer
duration than for younger persons.
A second dimension of the prosperity unemployment pro
blem is that in the course of a broad business expansion an
increasing percentage of the unemployed population is likely
to consist of persons with loose or marginal labor force at
tachments. Teenagers, women, and workers with minimal
skills or limited work experience tend to move in and out of
the job market much more frequently than other worker
groups, entering the labor market in relatively greater
numbers in upswings and leaving in relatively greater
numbers when job market conditions turn less favorable. To
the extent this two-way movement occurs, it serves to hold
up the overall unemployment rate in expansions and lower it
in contractions. It also means that the unemployment that
persists into expansion periods will increasingly consist of
persons close to the margin between looking and not looking
for work. While hard to quantify, it is obvious that this
aspect of prosperity unemployment requires much more
selective policy approaches than the type of unemployment
that is predominant in periods of contraction.
Among workers close to the working-nonworking margin,
two general categories call for special attention by
policymakers: those who can readily find stable jobs or can
take the necessary steps to qualify for such jobs if they
choose to do so, as opposed to those who for personal or
other reasons beyond their control cannot. The welleducated, experienced job seeker who is the second bread
winner in a family clearly requires quite different assistance,
if indeed any is required at all, from the poorly educated, in
experienced job seeker who is the sole breadwinner in a low
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income, nonwhite family. Within each of these two
categories, as discussed more fully later, other subgroupings
need to be recognized. One of the important tasks of
policymakers is to identify the various groups involved more
carefully and fashion policy measures appropriate to each.
A third dimension of the prosperity unemployment pro
blem, which bears directly on the one just noted, is the in
creased emphasis that needs to be placed in periods of broad
expansion on job opportunities in the private as opposed to
the public sector. It is in such periods that the private sector,
which in any event normally provides about 80 percent of all
jobs, is in the best position to train and take on hard-toemploy workers. It is in such periods that private employers
will be most likely to have unfilled vacancies in the higher
paying, more desirable lines of work. The public sector can
be expected to continue its role of maintaining essential
training of certain low skilled workers and of providing jobs
on at least a temporary basis for such workers, but the prin
cipal aim of policy would need to shift to inducing private
firms to take on workers from the hard-to-employ category.
This is a critically important positive factor because it means
that normal market processes can be relied on to achieve
most of the tasks of bringing excluded, unemploymentprone workers into the mainstream of employment oppor
tunities. The major difficulty besetting efforts in this direc
tion in periods of business slack is that the job needs of
employers are too limited to make effective action possible,
with new placements to a considerable extent simply taking
the place of other economically vulnerable groups of
workers. As labor supply conditions tighten, however, the
focus of policy can shift from the much more difficult objec
tive of creating new job openings to facilitating the trainingrecruiting process of filling already existing openings. It
would be naive to argue from this that the plight of the
jobless can be largely forgotten in periods of general pro-
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sperity, but it would be equally unrealistic to formulate a set
of policies that does not take this as its central starting point.
Within the public sector itself an analogous shift in policy
away from federal to state and local government employ
ment would also be appropriate in periods of sustained ex
pansion. Opportunities for stable work in such periods are
more likely to be concentrated at the local rather than na
tional government level. Federal direction and support
would still be needed but implementation would be required
at the individual community, or even individual
neighborhood, level. This would in turn mean placing even
more responsibility on local public sponsors and ad
ministrative units than is provided under present federal
legislation, however difficult the meshing of centralized and
decentralized requirements is likely to be.
A fourth dimension is that the job needs of workers re
maining unemployed even in generally prosperous times will
not be met unless both they and their potential employers are
induced to participate in broadened hiring and training pro
grams in response to specific incentives and penalties. The
type of economic and social behavior sought cannot be
achieved by invoking appeals to conscience or the mere
likelihood of eventual success. The advantages and disad
vantages of the proposed patterns of action must be seen to
be reasonably immediate, clear, and assured to both the par
ticipating workers and the employers; otherwise, the kind of
sustained response necessary for the success of the program
cannot be expected. This requirement for effective action,
however, conflicts with another equally important require
ment: since the factors giving rise to the problem of prosperi
ty unemployment are deeply imbedded in the society's
economic and social institutions, the results of even the best
conceived policies are apt to be quite long delayed. Perhaps
the most important issue facing policymakers in this area is
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how this conflict in requirements can be reconciled or at least
substantially modified.
These four dimensions, along with the aggregate relation
ships adverted to earlier, constitute the principal considera
tions which need to be kept in focus in evaluating proposals
for bringing down the basic or minimum unemployment rate
in this country. Other considerations will be touched on at
later points: the rapid increase during strong expansion
periods in the labor force participation rates of certain
groups in the population (including illegal aliens!); the
lessons from English, Swedish and other European coun
tries' experiences; and the importance of such "indirect" ap
proaches as improved investment incentives, area develop
ment programs, and lowered barriers to product market
competition. Main attention in this study, however, centers
on the behavior of labor markets in periods of expanding
business and on the various direct approaches which have
been attempted or suggested for improving the performance
of such markets. The evaluation of these approaches will
turn on how effective they are in meeting the four dimen
sions of the problem outlined above.

Chapter 2
The Shifting Limits of
Demand Management
As in other aspects of modern life, the pace of change in
economic ideas has greatly accelerated in recent years. In no
other area of the subject is this more apparent than in
prevailing attitudes towards unemployment. After World
War II, a jobless rate of 3 percent or less was a generally
agreed-upon goal. In the course of the 1950s and 1960s, a
figure of 4 to 4.5 percent came to be accepted as at least an
interim target. In the early 1970s, the most widely cited
figure fell in the range of 5 to 5.5 percent, but the present ad
ministration, as required by the Humphrey-Hawkins Act,
has set its sights on the more ambitious goal of 4 percent by
1983. To realize the latter figure would require an average
annual increase in real GNP of about 4.5 percent over the in
tervening period, a decidedly optimistic assumption.
Similar changes have occurred in public attitudes towards
a second major objective of economic policy: stability of the
price level. In the early postwar period, after the inflationary
outburst attendant on World War II, the idea of a zero an
nual rate of price increase was widely and seriously discuss
ed. During the 1950s and early 1960s the most generally ac
cepted goal came to be about 2 or perhaps 3 percent. Today,
in the wake of Vietnam and the inflationary surge of the
middle and late seventies, the target has risen to well over 4
13
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percent even though this is the limiting figure set for 1983 by
the Humphrey-Hawkins Act.
Explanatory Factors
These two objectives of economic policy have had to be
scaled back over the postwar years because in both respects
actual performance over this period has been generally
disappointing. Except in times of war or the aftermath of
war, the unemployment rate has kept above 4 percent in
every year since World War II, and, more typically, at or
above 5 percent. More striking still, even in the years of
vigorous peacetime prosperity, the jobless rate has generally
held above the 4 percent figure, remaining especially high in
peacetime cyclical upswings in the late 1950s and again in the
early 1970s. The annual rate of increase in consumer prices,
on the other hand, has kept below 2 percent in most
peacetime years during this period. It is only since 1968 that
the yearly rate of increase in prices has jumped to much
higher levels. Between 1974 and 1976 the rise in consumer
prices fell from 12 percent to 5 percent per year, but a move
back towards a much higher figure has occurred in recent
years.
In good part, the lowering of the nation's sights with
respect to unemployment and inflation is simply an accep
tance of what has occurred and a tribute to the stubbornness
of the problems involved. It is a reflection, too, of the belief
that the two goals are in conflict with one another and that
some kind of compromise within the extremes is necessary.
This is the dilemma embodied in the Phillips Curve which
has recently become the center of sharp controversy among
professional experts. The great majority of economists,
however, would agree that, barring drastic institutional
changes, a reduction of the unemployment rate to the 4 per
cent level would lead to a rapid rise in the price level; in fact,
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many economists hold the view that even bringing down the
rate to 6 percent would result in an observable though not
necessarily marked rise in the rate of inflation. 1
The other side of the coin, whether lowering the annual
rate of price increases to 4 percent or less would adversely af
fect the jobless rate, is less clear although, again, the majori
ty of economists would lean toward the affirmative position.
The basis for the latter view is that the restrictive fiscal and
monetary policies which would be needed to achieve such a
modest rate of price increase would choke off job expansion
well below full employment, pushing up the unemployment
rate to unacceptable levels. As a result, pressures to avoid the
adverse consequences of unduly low rates of either
unemployment or inflation have forced a compromise
somewhere in the 4 to 6 percent "middle range" of target
figures in the unemployment-inflation relationship.
Thus, the principal factor underlying the postwar uptrend
in unemployment and the acceptance of higher unemploy
ment goals over this period lies in the fact that the American
economy, along with the other advanced industrial societies
in the free world, has become increasingly inflation prone.
The implication for policy generally derived from this fact is
that the recurrence of severe inflationary episodes in the
postwar period can largely be attributed to governmental ef
forts to achieve lower levels of unemployment. This latter
proposition, while enjoying wide acceptance, is open to
serious criticism as the later discussion shows.
The dominant issue, however, confronting
macroeconomic policymaking in recent years is the
emergence of stagflation: high inflation coupled with high
unemployment. Instead of the either-or choice originally
1. See, for example, Lloyd G. Reynolds, Labor Economics and Labor Relations, 7th ed
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1978), p 216.
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posed by the Phillips Curve, the "new" curve points to
adverse changes on both fronts and, as a consequence, a nowin position for policymakers. If, for example, consumer
prices are rising at an annual rate above 6 percent and
unemployment has also moved above this target figure,
should monetary and fiscal policies be made primarily
restrictive or expansive? If a decrease in the unemployment
rate results from an expansionary demand policy, will this
merely accentuate inflation and in the longer run force the
unemployment rate back up again? If, on the other hand, in
flation is slowed by a restrictive demand policy, will this
simply push up the unemployment level still higher? In the
context of the "new" Phillips Curve, can it even be argued
that a fall in aggregate demand will in fact significantly
reduce the pace of inflation? While clear-cut answers to these
questions are certainly not to be expected, a discussion of
some of the issues they raise is necessary to an understanding
of the problem addressed in this study.

The Unemployment-Inflation
Relationship Since World War II
The outstanding feature of business expansions in the
period since World War II was the impact of war and its
aftermath on the unemployment-inflation relationship. It
was only in war-dominated environments that the unemploy
ment rate fell below 4 percent. True, there were two
peacetime expansions, one in 1954-57 when the rate fell to
4.1 percent by the fourth quarter of 1956, and another in
1961-65 when it fell to 4.5 percent by the fourth quarter of
1965, but the rate only declined into the 3 percent-and-less
zone under war or war-related conditions. It is also worth
noting that the wartime unemployment lows were closely
geared to the relative domestic impact of the different con
flicts: in World War II the unemployment rate fell to 1.2 per
cent in 1944, in the Korean War it fell to 2.9 percent in 1953,

Limits of Demand Management

17

and in the Vietnam War it fell to 3.5 percent in 1969. While
the view that genuine full employment can only be achieved
in this country under wartime conditions is frequently
criticized, the postwar record at least lends it prima facie
credence.
The other side of this view, that major upsurges in prices
are also a product of war, seems hardly less plausible. The
financial excesses and economic strains associated with wars
have had profound effects on prices, wages and costs which
extend over long periods of time. The inflationary forces
unleashed by the successive surges in wartime expenditures,
and to a less extent by the continuing cold war outlays, gave
a pronounced inflationary tilt to the economy during the
postwar years. Between 1945 and 1972 there were four
periods when the Consumer Price Index rose at a faster an
nual rate than 2 percent: 1945-48 (+11 percent), 1950-52
( + 6 percent), 1956-58 ( + 3 percent), and 1965-72 (-1-5 per
cent). In terms of percentage point increases, as shown in
Table 2-1, these four periods accounted for roughly 84 per
cent of the increase in consumer prices in the 1945-72 period,
providing the major explanation of the inflation during these
years.
Three of the four intervals were dominated by wartime or
immediate postwar developments. If inflation as a serious
problem is defined as a rise in prices in excess of 2 percent
per year, it is clear that in the 1945-72 period it was almost
wholly a war-related phenomenon, the one exception being
the 1956-58 episode. It follows that the full employment
achieved in the war periods was gained at the cost of serious
price-wage instability later on. Over this twenty-five year
period, on the other hand, the pursuit of full employment in
peacetime environments did not generate serious inflationary
pressures. Thus the onset of such pressures was due to the exegencies of wartime which in turn generated full employment
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or over full employment conditions. Aggregate demand in
the latter sense needs to be viewed in quite a different light
from aggregate demand which results from a full employ
ment policy pursued in peacetime if for no other reason than
that the positions and future outlooks of business, workers
and the buying public are so different in the two en
vironments.
Table 2-1
Percentage Point Increases in the Index of Consumer Prices for Selected
Periods, 1945-1972
Selected
periods
1945-48
1950-52
1956-58
1966-72
Total point increase
during selected periods
Total increase over entire
1945-72 period

Percentage
point
increases

Percentage share of
1945-1972
total increase*

18
8
6
28

25
11
8
39

-

60

84

54-125

71

CPI indexes
(1967 = 100)
547281 97 -

72
80
87
125

*Differences in figures due to rounding
Source: U S Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

The view, therefore, that demand management can no
longer be used as the major weapon for bringing down the
unemployment level in this country rests almost wholly on
the experience of the relatively few years that have elapsed
since 1972. Not surprisingly, scholars remain divided as to
the weight that should be given various factors in explaining
the emergence of stagflation, the persistence of severe infla
tion in the face of relatively high levels of unemployment,
during this period. Two general explanations have received
the most attention. The first holds that the federal govern
ment's fiscal and monetary policies have proven seriously
unstabilizing, leading to excessive expansions as in 1972 and
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1978 followed by contractions as in 1974 or slowdowns as in
1980. These cyclical distortions, it is argued, have fed into a
longer-run type of imbalance in which workers, firms and
other major groups come to expect a continued rise in prices
and act accordingly, thereby building a rising inflation rate
into the system even when market conditions have become
quite negative. While the term full employment is often used
rather loosely, the thrust of this line of argument is that the
government's pursuit of this objective during these years and
earlier has been the chief cause of the country's economic
difficulties.
The other general approach stresses influences stemming
from both long and short term changes that have occurred in
supply and cost conditions. A number of investigators,
notably the late R.A. Gordon and George Perry, uncovered
convincing evidence that since the mid-1950s the composi
tion of the nation's labor force has shifted towards a higher
percentage of unemployment-prone groups: young and
female workers, particularly the nonwhite members of these
two groups. These investigators concluded that this shift
alone would explain a rise of as much as a full percentage
point in the minimum unemployment rate at which infla
tionary pressures on wages and prices would begin to mount.
More recently, national attention has centered on the
dramatic increase in energy prices which occurred in 1974
and again in 1979 as a result of actions by the OPEC coun
tries. Poor harvests combined with rising world demand for
food and other raw material supplies have also generated
powerful inflationary forces in recent years. Additional up
ward pressures on unit costs have been felt in a number of in
dustries because of the spread of environmental, health,
safety and other types of regulations. As a result of these and
related developments, costs have risen in a variety of fields,
outlays for new equipment have slackened and the trend in
labor productivity has become distinctly less favorable.
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The two approaches entail radically different methods for
dealing with persistent unemployment in the face of rapidly
rising prices, the first emphasizing the need for throttling
down the expansionary demand policies of government and
the second, removing supply bottlenecks and cost-raising
practices resulting from governmental action. Lacking any
clear-cut basis for choosing one approach over the other,
policymakers can be expected to move along both lines, with
major stress on demand restraint as labor and product
markets become increasingly tight and a cyclical peak in the
economy emerges, or shifting major attention to costreducing measures if, as seems likely, long-run inflationary
pressures become the dominant problem. Beyond this rather
bland finding there are certain features of recent experience
with respect to the persistence of unemployment in strong ex
pansion periods that are worth noting.
First and most important, aggregate demand policy was
sufficiently expansionary in the 1975-78 period to bring the
unemployment rate down from 8.5 percent to 6 percent of
the civilian labor force, with total civilian employment rising
by nearly 10 million over the three-year period. When infla
tion accelerated in 1979, demand policy became increasingly
restrictive but not so aggressively as to cause a rise, at least in
the short run, in the unemployment level. Maintaining a
relatively steady uptrend in aggregate demand after 1975
proved more effective in opening job opportunities for nonwhite males 20 years of age and older than any other
demographic group, reducing their unemployment rate by
three percentage points from 11.7 to 8.6 percent between
1975 and 1978. There was also a three percentage point drop
during these years among nonwhite females in the 16-19 year
age range, but among the other unemployment-prone
groups, white and nonwhite females 20 years old and over,
the drop in unemployment during this cyclical expansion
period was disappointingly small. As in previous upswings,
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the vital role played by expansionary monetary and fiscal
policies in bringing down both the overall jobless rate and
the jobless rate among the structurally unemployed was
clearly evident.
Second, as the workings of the Phillips Curve would
predict, the same expansionary policies served to heighten
the inflationary surge in prices that occurred between 1976
and 1979, but how much of the inflation should be attributed
to the fiscal and monetary policies of the federal government
as against external shocks to the economy remains a matter
of controversy. The clearest instance of the important role of
aggregate demand policy came in 1978 when the annual rate
of increase in consumer prices other than for food and
energy, the so-called basic inflation rate, jumped from 6.4 to
8.6 percent, a rise of some two percentage points over the
previous year. Actually, both fiscal and monetary policies
moved towards restraint during 1978 but it is generally
agreed that the expansionary moves of the three preceding
years had their major inflationary impact in the 1978-79
period. It was during this period that markets for certain ma
jor types of labor became quite tight and upward pressures
on wages relative to productivity became more pronounced.
As the foregoing indicates, the hardest argument to
answer against using demand expansion policies to push the
unemployment rate below 6 percent, but also the vaguest, is
that the impact of such policies can be long delayed and that
their ultimate effects may prove to be cumulative in nature.
This line of contention is sometimes broadened to suggest
that, in the face of these policies, the attitudes of workers,
employers and consumers towards inflation change and the
entire wage, price and spending level increases as a result.
Whatever the precise explanation, it is obvious that in view
of recent experience, policymakers will have to give much
more weight to longer-run effects of aggregate demand
changes than previously thought.
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Third, and this sharply modifies the point just noted, the
inflation which took hold in this country in the course of the
1970s appeared to develop a life of its own quite unrelated to
any short term countermoves in aggregate demand policy.
Whether such countermoves would prove an effective, much
less an efficient, way to reduce the inflation rate even in the
longer-run is open to serious question. The weight of opinion
among investigators is, in fact, it would not. Differences in
emphasis abound, with some investigators stressing the im
portance of worker, employer and public expectations about
the future course of prices while others stress the after effects
on unit costs and per capita real incomes of past increases in
prices. Nevertheless, there is general agreement that the in
flation of the 1970s got built into the economy in a way that,
short of severely restrictive fiscal and monetary policies
maintained over several years, could perhaps be slowed but
certainly not reversed by usual demand management. George
Perry, for example, in his investigation of the problem, con
cluded that if unemployment were raised 1 percent above the
5.5 percent level and if there were no serious external shocks
to the economy, it would take three years to reduce the infla
tion rate by one percentage point, and the extra point of
unemployment would cost over a million jobs and some $60
billion in real output each year. He concluded:
The evidence is that inflation would slow only
gradually in response to holding back aggregate de
mand, and that the cost in lost employment and output
per point of disinflation would be large. 2
The economic and political difficulties besetting contrac
tions in aggregate demand as a policy for bringing down the
inflation rate are widely recognized, but precisely why this is
so remains a matter of controversy. A key element in this
2. George L Perry, Slowing the Wage-Price Spiral: The Macroeconomic View, Brookmgs
Papers on Economic Activity, 2 (1978), pp. 285-286.
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controversy is whether the American economy has entered a
long term slowdown in investment, technological im
provements and labor productivity, or whether the rise in the
inflation rate is due to shorter term, ad hoc supply-cost in
fluences such as shifts in the relative size of demographic
groups or the price actions in 1973 and 1979 by OPEC. In
any event, the record is clear that during most of the 1970s
the basic inflation rate was on an upward trend that would
have continued for a number of years even if aggregate de
mand policy had been considerably less expansionary. The
upshot was that any additional inflationary influence at
tributable to demand policy expansion came on top of an
already high basic inflationary rate, thereby pulling the
overall rate up to an unacceptable level. This in turn led to
increasing pressure to rein in any expansion in aggregate de
mand well before full employment, as usually defined, was
attained. As a consequence, the sustained rise in aggregate
demand that was needed to draw down the major categories
of structural unemployment was effectively precluded.
Fourth, the previous analysis suggests that since a step-up
in inflation on top of an already high basic rate of price in
crease can occur at almost any level of unemployment, the
effort to identify some minimum noninflationary unemploy
ment rate becomes largely beside the point. Despite repeated
efforts to determine what this minimum figure is, compared
to what it was, say, twenty years ago, the estimates remain
too imprecise to serve as a guide to fiscal and monetary
policies. The principal difficulty is that there is no way of
determining the effect of shifts in labor force participation
rates, the so-called "interaction" effect. 3
3 According to a review of recent studies of the subject, the interaction effect accounts for
as much as one-half of the total increase of about 1 percentage point that appears to have
occurred in the 1976 vs. the 1956 unemployment rate. Joseph Antos, Wesley Mellon, and
Jack E. Tnplett, "What is a Current Equivalent to Unemployment Rates of the Past,"
Monthly Labor Review, March 1979, p. 39
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Even more important, in an environment like the 1970s,
the pace of inflation may prove as unacceptably high when
the unemployment level is 7 percent as when it is 5 percent. If
the long term trend in inflation holds to 6 percent or more,
almost any degree of aggregate demand stimulus will be seen
as inducing serious inflationary pressures even if unemploy
ment is running well above 6 percent. Supporters of this view
will doubtless argue, and with considerable justification,
that it is extremely difficult to determine when cost-push as
opposed to demand-pull price pressures are the dominant
factor in determining the pace of inflation. Given this uncer
tainty it would be only prudent to avoid any sharp upward
moves in the fiscal and monetary aggregates even though
labor and product markets remain relatively loose. Indeed it
follows that policy should aim at decreasing the rate of in
crease in demand expansion before the point is reached
where a cost-induced inflation becomes converted into a
cost-and-demand one.
The case for beginning to taper demand expansion
relatively early on in cyclical upswings also rests on the fact
noted earlier that the effects of restrictive demand policies
are often long-delayed and, more particularly, if the restric
tions are both too late and too sweeping, the economy can be
forced into a severe recession. Contrariwise, if total demand
rises slowly and begins to taper early, the necessity for a
sharp cutback later becomes less likely.
This approach to demand policy, of course, has to be ap
plied somewhat flexibly, depending on the type of cyclical
expansion involved and on the longer term prospects for the
economy. In line with traditional macr economic analysis,
the closer the economy approaches its full employment
potential, the stronger the case becomes for slowing the pace
of demand expansion. Reliable estimates of the economy's
short term potential at any given moment of time are admit-
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tedly hazardous, whether expressed in terms of the minimum
inflation level of unemployment or the gap between actual
and potential production. At the same time, the implication
for demand management of a given jump in the annual rate
of inflation certainly differs if the unemployment level is in
the 6-7 percent as opposed to the 4-5 percent range.
The other side of this approach to policymaking, however,
is no less important: demand expansion, while slowing,
would need to continue at a sufficiently high rate to prevent
any significant rise in the general unemployment level and,
even more, to induce a significant reduction in joblessness
among the structurally unemployed. If demand in later
phases of an expansion is not maintained close to rates
prevailing in earlier phases, effective action to reach the
hard-to-employ is likely to prove abortive, since their job
status largely depends on the length and strength of a par
ticular expansion. This could mean using demand stimulus
to push the overall unemployment rate as low as 5 or even 4
percent, a policy that would only be defensible if employed
under special circumstances and with a great deal of care.
The fact that there is no clearly defined noninflationary
minimum level of unemployment adds considerably to the
flexibility of aggregate demand policy but certainly does not
lessen the need for restraint in such policy as low levels of
unemployment are approached. As developed in later
chapters, this is clearly not a sufficient condition for dealing
with the problem of structural unemployment, but it is a
necessary one. It underscores, too, the point noted earlier
that a given rate of inflation calls for very different demand
management policies if labor markets become extremely
tight from those called for if they remain relatively loose.

Conclusion
In recent years there has been increasing acceptance of the
view that government demand management has proven

26

Limits of Demand Management

singularly ineffective as a means for reducing unemployment
without causing serious inflation. This view rests on a series
of assumptions which, to varying degrees, remain largely unproven.
First, it assumes that any significant rise in the rate of in
flation is attributable to an increase in the level of aggregate
demand. Careful investigations of inflations, especially
those of recent origin, do not support this simple type of ex
planation. Increasing weight, instead, is being given to
developments on the supply side such as adverse cost trends
and external shocks to the economy. While aggregate de
mand is still given a prominent role, exclusive attention to
this aspect of the inflationary process is now considered
quite misleading.
Second, it assumes that the continuation of an inflationary
process, quite aside from its sources of origin, is the result of
an increase in aggregate demand. Recent investigators,
however, have shifted the focus of attention to certain long
term influences such as trends in labor productivity and the
emergence of institutional arrangements with respect to
wage-setting which have given inflationary developments a
life of their own. Again, this serves to break any close link
between upward or downward shifts in aggregate demand
and the underlying, largely predetermined rate of inflation.
To this extent, expansionary aggregate demand policy can be
given a broader, not a narrower, role in bringing down the
unemployment rate.
Third, this view assumes that any significant rise in the in
flation rate has been caused by overstimulative fiscal or
monetary actions of the federal government. Even if ag
gregative demand changes are seen as controlling in this
regard, it does not follow that such changes are solely or
even primarily the result of federal countercyclical demand
policies. Other sources of demand influence may be no less
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involved, among them budgetary actions on the part of state
and local governments, policy moves of private lending in
stitutions, business decisions with respect to inventory ac
cumulations and capital projects, household spending deci
sions and shifts in international financial relationships.
Whether a particular change in federal fiscal and/or
monetary policies should be viewed as the crucial variable
among all the welter of determinants, both public and
private, bearing on the level of aggregate demand calls for
careful appraisal of any given situation or period. Unless it is
argued that the federal government, in failing to take suffi
cient corrective action, is responsible for every marked in
crease in the inflation rate, whatever its source, a much more
guarded explanation is indicated.
Fourth, this view assumes that in undertaking an expan
sionary demand policy, the federal government's only goal is
to achieve full employment. While the rhetoric surrounding
some fiscal and monetary moves lends a certain plausibility
to this interpretation, other purposes such as a stronger
defense posture, aid to farmers, slum clearance, an improved
highway system and protection of small business are in the
aggregate likely to be of equal or greater importance. The
fact that a full employment condition, induced by expan
sionary moves to achieve purposes of the latter sort, may
have serious inflationary consequences needs to be clearly
distinguished from a full employment policy in which none
of these purposes is necessarily involved. Seen in this light,
the effort to achieve full employment has been widely
criticized on grounds that are not actually deserved.
The conclusion emerging from this discussion is that ag
gregate demand policy, if implemented along lines outlined
earlier, can reduce the unemployment level to at least the 5
-5.5 percent range without inducing serious inflationary con
sequences. While not markedly less than the usual estimates
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made by others, the difference is large enough to have im
portant implications for policies aimed at the problem of
prosperity unemployment. The reasons for this conclusion
will be made clear in succeeding chapters.

Chapter 3
Reducing Frictional and
Seasonal Unemployment
Unemployment not attributable to a general deficiency in
demand can be divided into structural and frictional types of
joblessness. Chief attention in terms of policy has quite ap
propriately centered on the structural elements of unemploy
ment, but the frictional elements also deserve consideration
in any analysis of the prosperity unemployment problem.
Even under a condition of full employment in which total
job openings equal total job seekers, some unemployment
will exist because the matching of job openings and job
seekers is not instantaneous. The time it takes for an
employer and a job applicant to find each other and agree on
terms entails temporary periods of joblessness which at any
one time will affect millions of workers, perhaps as many as
2 or 2.5 percent of the country's labor force. The total size of
this group of workers apparently does not vary much over
the cycle, but its composition and character changes sharply
as the economy moves from low to high levels of activity.
It is generally accepted that labor markets in this country
do a relatively poor job of matching job seekers and job sup
pliers. In a number of other countries, notably England,
Germany and Sweden, the process of allocating workers to
available job openings is handled with considerably more ef
ficiency than here. These countries are much smaller than the
29
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United States, their economies less diverse, their populations
more homogeneous, and the role of government con
siderably more important. Whether because of these or other
factors, workers and employers in these countries are much
readier to rely on public administered labor exchanges to fill
new jobs than in the United States.
Particularly in the case of Sweden, a quite comprehensive
set of policies has emerged over the past thirty years to assist
unemployed or underemployed workers find openings,
secure mobility grants, and thus iron out employment be
tween areas and industries. These selective measures are
often addressed to both structural and aggregate demand
types of unemployment, but their main purpose is to reduce
frictional unemployment.'
In the 1960s, turnover rates in manufacturing (total
separations per 100 employees) ran 70 percent to 100 percent
higher in this country than in West Germany, Great Britain
or Italy. In the boom year of 1973, employment in the
United States averaged 84 million persons per month, but
about 100 million persons worked at some time during the
year. During the same year, unemployment averaged 4
million persons per month, but more than three times this
number experienced some unemployment in the year. 2 While
an inescapable feature of changes in methods of production,
in the needs and preferences of both workers and employers,
and in the search times involved in reconciling their
preferences, this extremely high movement into and out of
jobs and into and out of the labor force seems both
economically and socially wasteful. Indeed, if the average
job search-recruiting period could be cut from four weeks to
1. For an illuminating account of Swedish experience in this regard, see the essay by Rudolf
Meidner and Rolf Andersson in Manpower Programs in the Policy Mix, Lloyd Ulman, ed.
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), Ch. 5.
2 Economic Report of (he President, 1975, pp. 88 and 101.
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two weeks through improved matching procedures, the
amount of frictional unemployment would be cut in half.
The case for action along these lines is especially strong in
periods of prosperity when the role of demand deficiency as
a determinant of unemployment lessens, and the relative im
portance of the frictional component in whatever unemploy
ment still obtains necessarily increases. George Perry has
estimated that, at a national unemployment rate of 6 per
cent, a prime age male (twenty-five to thirty-four) would
take an average of 6.6 weeks to find a new job, but an
average of only 4.3 weeks if the national unemployment rate
were 3 percent. 3 Since there is little prospect of the national
unemployment rate even approaching the latter figure in
peacetime, careful consideration should be given to adopting
measures deliberately aimed at improving the job searchworker recruiting process at higher rates of unemployment.

Characteristics of Frictional Unemployment
As the foregoing suggests, the nature of frictional
unemployment changes as the national unemployment rate
varies. At the 2-3 percent level, vacancies approach or even
exceed the number of job applicants at prevailing wage rates.
In a dynamic economy where job seeking and worker recruit
ment are largely a matter of individual choice, imbalances in
labor markets will still obtain even in these highly favorable
circumstances, but most such imbalances will be temporary
and limited. Even if particular workers are involuntarily
displaced, with a modicum of search effort they will be able
to find comparably attractive openings; so it is largely a mat
ter of personal preference which of a variety of openings
they choose. Employers, on the other hand, will face
3. George L. Perry, Unemployment Flows in the U.S. Labor Market, Brookmgs Papers on
Economic Activity, 2 (1972) cited in Reynolds, Labor Economics and Labor Relations, p.
128
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somewhat longer search times than in periods of looser
markets and may have to lower hiring standards accordingly.
The imbalances occurring under these conditions constitute
frictional unemployment in its pure form, and, so far as
public policy is concerned, can be largely left to the deter
mination of market influences.
Especially in prosperities, much of the mobility is essen
tial, in both a short-run and long-run sense, to the
economy's effective performance. One of the striking
features of the long expansion of the 1960s was the fact that
the voluntary quit rate in manufacturing rose from 1.3 per
100 employees in 1960 to 2.7 in 1969 while the layoff rate fell
from 2.4 to 1.2 over the same period; in the recessionary
years after 1969 the opposite pattern developed. 4 The limited
data available indicate that rates of voluntary quits do not
become very high even in prosperities, but to the extent interjob movements are genuinely voluntary, they play a crucially
important role in the economy.
As unemployment rates rise above this minimum level, im
balances are not ironed out so quickly. As soon as the jobless
rate begins to move up and labor markets loosen, in
terferences begin to appear in the matching process. The
resulting unemployment can still be appropriately classified
as frictional as long as the number of vacancies and job ap
plicants remain, on an overall basis, roughly equal, but the
matching task now becomes subject to a variety of tem
porary and minor impediments. The need arises for fuller
and more extensive information on job openings, for longer
commuting trips to places of employment, and for rather
different combinations of skills on the part of job ap4. U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Earnings, Vol. 11 (June 1965), Table D-1,
p. 55, and Vol. 22 (May 1976, Table D-1, p. 109, cited in Gordon F. Bloom and Herbert R
Northrup, Economics of Labor Relations, 8th ed., (Homewood, IL- Richard D. Irwm,
1977), p. 243.
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plicants. It is not possible to determine exactly when such in
terferences no longer are frictional and become structural in
nature, but as long as they are readily removable they can
still be treated as falling in the former category.
A chief factor explaining why it is so difficult to bring
down the frictional unemployment rate relates to the nature
of the search-recruitment process itself. Job matching in
labor markets is often a complicated, highly personalized
procedure affected by a variety of conditions, requirements,
prospects and individual worker-employer preferences. This
is reflected in the diverse, often individualized, ways
employers and job seekers "find" each other. A survey of 20
middle-sized cities during the last six months of 1974 found
that 80 percent of all job finders applied directly to
employers, while 70 percent spoke to friends and relatives
and 60 percent consulted with business associates. The
Employment Service, on the other hand, was consulted by
only 28 percent of all job finders. 5 The very variety of
methods characteristic of labor markets in this country
would make it extremely difficult to achieve much more
orderly patterns of job search even under the most pros
perous conditions.
A principal theme of recent investigations of frictional
unemployment is that this type of unemployment is marked
by a continually changing composition of workers who
either have recently been employed or have just come into
the labor force. The flow of workers into and out of employ
ment of this nature gives rise to, and is the product of, a twosided search process which incurs important costs for both
the job seeker and the hiring firm but which provides impor
tant mutual benefits as well. The principal question facing
5 U.S. Department of Labor, Recruitment, Job Search, and the United States Employ
ment Service, R & D Monograph 43 (1976), pp. 1-57. A job finder typically used more than
one method of search.
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the job seeker is whether the gain that may derive from a
longer and wider search will more than outweigh the lost
earnings, travel expenses and other costs involved. Similar
considerations having to do with costs of recruitment,
screening and placement versus the expected productive
value of the individual who is finally hired apply to the
employer's search.
Viewed in this light, unemployment of a frictional nature
is a valuable, indeed necessary, component of labor market
activity. Since, according to this view, a major part of the
unemployment experienced in periods of prosperity is of this
nature, the concern of public policymakers in such periods
should, it is argued, be limited to making the search process
as effective and efficient as the added costs entailed would
justify: more complete data on job opportunities and job ap
plicants; readily accessible facilities for bringing "buyers and
sellers" together; and fuller information on other possible
openings and applicants as well as on less immediate con
siderations such as commuting costs, industry prospects and
labor supply trends.
It follows from this view, too, that most unemployment in
periods of prosperity is a matter of personal choice on the
part of the workers and employers involved: job applicants
who cannot find suitable work in an acceptably short time
will either have to cut back their asking wage or remain out
of work; employers who cannot find suitable workers in an
acceptably short time will either have to raise their wage of
fers or not secure the additional workers they desire. Since
job vacancies tend to rise in prosperous periods relative to
unemployed workers and job applicants, it follows that the
search process will on average entail less time in such periods
than when business conditions are generally slack.
While providing important insights into labor market
behavior and the nature of unemployment, this view has led
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to few if any useful recommendations for public
policymakers. In the first place, the data reveal a marked dif
ference between workers with limited skill, education and
job experience as against those with more of these attributes.
For the former, a pattern of frequent job changes, punc
tuated by periods of unemployment or withdrawal from the
labor force, is much more typical than for the latter. In his
study of the relatively prosperous 1972 economy when
unemployment averaged only 5 percent, George Perry found
that teenagers of either sex experienced an average of nearly
two jobless spells a year as against men over 45 who had an
average of only one spell every four to five years. Between
these two extremes the frequency of unemployment spells
declined steadily as the age of workers of either sex increas
ed, but the average duration of such spells varied in the op
posite direction. 6
It could be argued that a worker experiencing such fre
quent spells of joblessness is following a perfectly rational
procedure: sampling different jobs until the best available
opening is found, a condition that is most likely to obtain
when business activity is at a high level. This doubtless ap
plies to considerable numbers of teenagers. A roughly
similar line of argument appears to hold good for employed
women since they move into and out of the labor force more
frequently than men and labor force entry and re-entry in
volves a high probability of becoming unemployed. 7
On the other hand, such rapid movements into and out of
unemployment may well be involuntary in the sense that the
workers are subject to insurmountable barriers which limit
them to some one, low-level type of work. In such instances,
6. Perry, Unemployment Flows in the Labor Market, p. 260.

7. S.T Marston, Employment Instability and High Unemployment Rates, Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, 1 (1976), pp 170-178 His data cover the relatively pros
perous years from 1967 to 1973.
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job turnover entails little or no cost either to the workers or
employers involved since in market terms the jobs, work en
vironments and workers themselves tend to be almost com
pletely homogeneous at the very lowest skill levels. Abnor
mally high rates of job turnover of this sort, therefore, are
likely to reflect structural limitations surrounding the job
search process rather than frictional elements as normally
defined.
Quite aside from these considerations, serious question
has recently been raised about the importance of frictional
unemployment in relation to total unemployment. Earlier in
vestigations had suggested that much of the latter consisted
of persons suffering relatively frequent but brief spells of
joblessness. A recent study by Kim B. Clark and Lawrence
H. Summers, however, revealed that in 1974, when the
overall unemployment rate was relatively low, only 36 per
cent of unemployment was attributable to persons finding a
job within three months. Indeed, when account is taken of
movements into and out of the labor force, these in
vestigators concluded that the average person unemployed at
a point in time in this kind of economic environment will ex
perience almost six months of joblessness during a year.
Finally, they concluded that, rather than being widely
dispersed among the population, unemployment is highly
concentrated, with over half of all joblessness traceable to
persons out of work for more than six months in a year.
Thus, the concentration of joblessness is far greater than
would be expected from normal turnover; according to the
Clark-Summers study, the latter "accounts for at most 1.5
points or about 25 percent of unemployment at high employ
ment levels." 8 Based on a detailed review of the evidence,
they concluded that if the counting of the unemployed were
8 Kim B Clark and Lawrence H. Summers, Labor Market Dynamics and Unemployment:
A Reconsideration, Brookmgs Papers on Economic Activity, 1 (1979), pp 16-17. The term
"high employment" refers to an unemployment rate of 6 percent
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limited to all those persons with less than five weeks of
unemployment during the year, the measured unemployment
rate would fall only from 6 percent to 5.75 percent, but if the
counting were limited to those with six months or more
unemployment, the jobless rate would fall from 6 percent to
3.5 percent. 9
This finding is admittedly somewhat altered, however,
when the evidence is put into a cyclical as opposed to a noncyclical context. Thus, in 1969 when the overall unemploy
ment rate was only 3.5 percent, unemployment per person
averaged a little over 12 weeks per unemployed person as
against nearly 19 weeks in 1975 when overall unemployment
was 8.5 percent. Similarly, the proportion of the labor force
unemployed for only one to four weeks stood at approx
imately 3.5 percent in both 1969 and 1975 but the proportion
unemployed 15 weeks or more came to only 2 percent in 1969
as against 9.1 percent in 1975. Not surprisingly, the data for
1974, when unemployment was 5.6 percent, fell roughly mid
way between the 1969 and 1975 patterns. 10
Much of the controversy over the distinction between
voluntary, short term and involuntary, long term unemploy
ment turns on where the minimum non-inflationary rate of
unemployment proves to be; if the minimum level, for exam
ple, turns out to be as low as 5 percent, the part played by
voluntary unemployment resulting from interjob movement
would account for a much larger proportion of total
unemployment than if the level turns out to be as high as 6
percent. As indicated in the preceding chapter, the relative
importance of voluntary unemployment in the frictional, job
search sense, as opposed to involuntary unemployment due
to limited aggregate demand and/or structural barriers, can
9 Ibid , p. 72
10. Ibid., Table 4, p. 36
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be significantly affected by small changes in the noninflationary minimum unemployment level.
Since it is highly probable that the minimum sustainable
unemployment rate will remain above 5 percent for the
foreseeable future, it follows that public policy should
primarily be aimed at reducing the barriers which result in in
voluntary unemployment among particular demographic
groups. This does not mean that efforts to improve the short
term allocation performance of labor markets should not
continue but that the major thrust of policy should be
directed towards the elimination of more permanent and
fundamental barriers to employment over which severely
disadvantaged job seekers have no control.
Regarding the latter objective, the characteristics of an ef
ficiently functioning system of labor markets open access
to job opportunities, active bidding by both buyers and
sellers, shifts in demand and supplies in response to changes
in market conditions and the other features of a fully com
petitive environment provide a sound framework for
public policymaking. Indeed, the principal guide to such
policy might well be to make it possible for those members of
disadvantaged groups who are now largely excluded from
most of the established labor markets to become active par
ticipants in them. The salient feature of such markets,
especially in periods of general prosperity, is a widening of
opportunities for upward mobility on the part of workers,
whether employed, unemployed or outside the labor force,
who have the qualifications, incentive and initiative to take
advantage of them. In periods of sluggish business when ap
plicants are running ahead of vacancies, programs designed
to help workers meet these requirements are likely to face
almost insurmountable difficulties; it is in periods of sustain
ed expansion, as already indicated, that such programs have
the greatest chance of success and should be pressed most
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vigorously. While higher skill levels would be involved, prin
cipal attention would need to center in these circumstances
on helping workers overcome barriers to first-level, relatively
unskilled jobs which are likely to lead to stable, long term
careers.
Policy measures aimed at promoting the upward, or in
deed lateral, mobility of disadvantaged groups would need
to be closely integrated with general programs designed to
promote the more efficient allocation of labor, on the one
hand, and specific programs to help disadvantaged workers
overcome structural barriers to employment on the other.
This twofold aspect of the work of the Employment Service
and other agencies seeking to improve the performance of
labor markets is examined in the next section of this report.

Role of the Employment Service
Most discussions of efforts to improve job allocation pro
cedures in this country center on the limitations of the
federal-state Employment Service (ES) and how it might be
strengthened. Many of the problems besetting the Service
can be traced to the fact that, while funding is provided by
the federal government, day to day administration rests with
the states subject only to general federal guidelines.
Historical reviews of ES emphasize that, since its
establishment in 1933, it has been subjected to a bewildering
series of policy mandates ranging from helping employers
find qualified workers, to providing manpower information
and services to a broad spectrum of workers, to providing a
still wider range of services to the lowest qualified category
of workers. These changing goals have been superimposed
on its responsibility, established in the 1930s, to administer
the work test for unemployment insurance claimants. Given
these changing, and to a considerable extent overlapping,
mandates it would be surprising if it could be shown that ES
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has had any observable effect on the level of unemployment,
the one policy goal under consideration here. There are cer
tain functions of ES, however, which clearly bear on this
goal, especially in periods of prosperity, so the question of
whether these functions might be strengthened deserves at
tention.
The relevant ES activities are (1) providing workers and
employers with basic current information on job openings
and job applicants, (2) assisting workers in choosing careers
and implementing career plans, (3) referring workers to job
and training opportunities in the public sector pursuant to
the WIN welfare and other government programs, (4) serv
ing as a link between schools and other community institu
tions on the one hand, and job and training opportunities on
the other. Besides the obvious difficulty that in many states
and localities ES has not been given adequate funds and per
sonnel to carry out these and other responsibilities effective
ly, are there other steps that could be taken to make ES more
effective in lessening frictional unemployment?
The central problem facing ES is that it has not been able
to win wide acceptance among company recruiters and job
applicants, a result that can be attributed chiefly to the fact
that it has become so closely identified with the handling of
unemployment insurance claims and with the placement of
unemployed, lower skilled workers in entry-level jobs.
Ironically, by concentrating so much of its attention on
unemployed and unemployment-prone workers, ES has
tended to undercut its capacity to deal effectively with the
more general jobless problem. Under present circumstances,
recruiters looking for applicants for higher level jobs largely
rely on other avenues of search. Especially in periods of
prosperity, the rate of decrease in unemployment largely
depends on how rapidly and how extensively job vacancies at
these better levels are filled. As noted earlier, the effec
tiveness of public policy in reducing frictional unemploy-
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ment under these circumstances largely depends on whether
upward mobility can be extended to workers hitherto exclud
ed from entering stable, career-related jobs. If the ES is to
play an effective role in dealing with the kind of unemploy
ment that persists into expansions, it will need to focus in
creased attention on this aspect of labor market activity.
Recent developments give little grounds for optimism on
this score. The rapid rise in ES job placements from under 2
million in fiscal year 1971 to over 3 million in fiscal 1974 was
interrupted in the 1974-75 recession, resuming, but at an ap
parently lower rate, during the subsequent expansion. In
upswing periods, as noted in the 1977 Employment and
Training Report, "ES job applicants are more likely to be
young, inexperienced, economically disadvantaged, or older
workers categories that are hard to place." 11 Under the
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA),
passed in December 1973, chief responsibility for administer
ing training and related services was delegated to local and
state governments. Not surprisingly, the latter are relying ex
tensively on the ES offices to secure jobs for disadvantaged
workers. Specifically, this has meant that ES is heavily in
volved in referring workers under various recently authoriz
ed public employment programs, the same role it was earlier
assigned under the WIN program. The work requirement
emphasis in the recently proposed welfare reform legislation,
if enacted, will have a similar impact on the activity of ES.
Important as these responsibilities are, they clearly do not
lead to greater ES acceptance by recruiters and applicants
concerned with better quality jobs and personnel.
The conflict between the needs of the lowest and highest
(or lower and higher) qualified job applicants will probably
never be wholly resolved for the ES, at least given its present
11. Employment and Training Report of the President, 1977 (Washington Government
Printing Office, 1978), p 75
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limited resources. If it is required to assume both roles, as
now seems likely, every effort should be made by ES to
distinguish applicants at all levels the least as well as the
most experienced and/or qualified and to handle referrals
accordingly. Employment Service offices try to do this now,
even with respect to applicants within the least-skilled
category, but few if any have the staff resources to carry out
this function effectively. If it is assigned still broader respon
sibilities with respect to the lowest skilled category of job
seekers without corresponding additions to its resources,
general acceptance of the ES by employers and higher skilled
workers will inevitably lessen still more.

Job Banks
The principal approach adopted by ES for dealing with
this dilemma is to develop computerized job bank systems in
major localities, an effort that was launched in Baltimore in
1968. Under these systems, job orders submitted to ES are
accumulated daily and published in a job-bank book the next
day, thus making information on reported openings current
ly available on a wide basis. In the early 1970s steps were
taken to develop a nationwide job-bank network and, what
is much more ambitious, to establish computerized job
matching systems which would match up the characteristics
of workers and the requirements of jobs; implementation of
the latter program, however, has thus far been confined to
only a few states.
By computerizing job information in this way, ES hopes
most job seekers will be able to find suitable openings on
their own, permitting its staff to concentrate more attention
on difficult individual cases. The danger is that, instead of
insuring that employers will find better qualified applicants
coming from ES as a result of this systems approach, they
will find just the opposite. Much of course depends on how
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far ES can go in developing adequate counseling and other
individualized methods for dealing with the needs of dif
ferent job seekers. In good part, the outcome will depend on
whether ES can develop tighter evaluation criteria for mak
ing referrals or whether it continues to place major emphasis
on sheer numbers of placements.
Even if ES achieves marked progress along these lines in
matching up job seekers and company recruiters, the barriers
to steady employment confronting many disadvantaged
workers would remain largely untouched. To get at this
underlying issue more far-reaching measures than merely
facilitating the employment matching process will be needed,
measures which ES is generally precluded from undertaking.
There is one crucial function in this connection, however,
which is largely disregarded and which ES is in a better posi
tion to perform than any other agency: identifying
unemployed and otherwise severely disadvantaged workers
in need of individual counseling and personalized support
who should be referred to special training or other types of
programs and whose subsequent progress should be followed
on a continuing basis. Responsibility for this coordinatingreferral-follow up function is loosely handled or overlooked
altogether under present circumstances. ES has taken limited
steps in this direction in some localities; in other instances,
other agencies have made a few efforts in this direction.
Broadly speaking, however, this vitally important function
has received little attention.
An individualized program of this sort would necessarily
be limited to a relatively small number of workers. At first at
least, careful procedures would be needed to determine who
should be admitted to this special program, how relation
ships with cooperating agencies could best be implemented,
and what methods of evaluation should be applied. The
focus would presumably be on those workers, mostly young,
inexperienced or with a modicum of skills, who are most
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likely to be lost sight of as they move between home, school,
training center or other public agency, and temporary or per
manent jobs. Because of the formidable difficulties confron
ting any program of this sort, strict limits would have to be
set on the number of participants, particularly since its main
objective would be to help disadvantaged workers secure not
just any type of employment but rather jobs with definite
career potential.

Commuting and Relocation Subsidies
One of the proposals that is frequently suggested for
reducing frictional unemployment is to make it possible for
displaced or other unemployed workers to commute greater
distances or relocate in other communities where job open
ings are available. This is an important feature of employ
ment policies in a number of European countries, most
notably Sweden. Little, however, has been done along these
lines in the United States.
Insofar as local commuting systems are concerned, the
reason for this lack of attention is apparent. Adequate com
muting facilities for jobless workers is but one aspect of a
given community's transportation needs. It would be a most
unusual circumstance where a major addition or change in a
local transportation system could be justified on the needs of
such workers alone. Special situations of this sort might well
be allowed for, nonetheless. A community which could
demonstrate that changes in its transportation facilities
would significantly broaden job opportunities for an impor
tant group of disadvantaged workers should be able to apply
for special federal funding; similar provision could be made
for special situations where commuting fares would be sub
sidized in the interest of broader access to particular job
markets. Such efforts, however, could only be undertaken
on an individual, locality-by-locality basis.
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A more practical approach, which has only been tried on a
limited basis in this country, is to help jobless or
underemployed workers through job information, resettle
ment assistance, and training find positions in other
localities. Such efforts as have been made along these lines,
unfortunately, have proven rather disappointing. The initial
emphasis in the 1960s was on bringing new capital and ser
vices to high unemployment areas; thus, the focus of the
Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965 was
on extending public works grants (highways, schools, health
facilities and the like) to low-income communities and on
giving employers financial inducements to move into such
depressed areas. Effective implementation of this program
was undercut by several factors, the chief one being that
pressures to spread available funds widely in order to include
localities other than low-income areas proved too strong.
Because of the difficulties encountered, the focus soon
shifted to providing job opportunities in nearby growth
centers and helping stranded workers find jobs in such
centers through job information, resettlement assistance,
and training. As matters turned out, funds available to the
Economic Development Administration were far from ade
quate in many areas; most of the cities selected were below
200,000 in population, the minimum considered necessary
for self-sustaining growth; other nearby cities which showed
more growth potential had to be excluded; and funds ex
pended on brick and mortar could probably have been better
devoted to training, health care and the like. 12 Admittedly,
experience has been largely limited to relocation efforts in
rural localities, most notably some 60 pilot mobility
assistance projects authorized by the Manpower Develop12. Miles Hansen, "Growth Centers, Human Resources and Rural Development" (Univer
sity of Texas, Rural Labor Market Strategies Project, 1971), cited in Sar A. Levitan, Garth
L. Mangum, and Ray Marshall, Human Resources and Labor Markets (New York Harper
and Row, 1972), p. 538.
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ment and Training Act between 1965 and 1969 to help
relocate more than 14,000 unemployed or underemployed
workers and their families, chiefly from depressed rural
areas and small towns.
Despite two recommendations to the contrary by the
Department of Labor, Congress did not appropriate any
separate funds for these projects after 1969, but several were
carried forward with regular MDTA experimental and
demonstration funds. The main aim of the projects was to
help jobless, chiefly disadvantaged, workers in labor surplus
areas overcome geographical distance barriers in finding
work in strong job markets. The cost averaged about $800
per family, including about $300 for moving and settling in.
While no systematic cost-benefit analysis has been under
taken, the cost level appears to be "relatively low compared
with the possible cost to society of maintaining people in an
unproductive situation." 13
If relocation assistance grants were to be made widely
available, a number of serious hurdles would have to be
overcome. Care would have to be taken that jobs are
available in the destination locations that would be in line
with the abilities and needs of the relocatees. Workers
recruited for the program should not be at such high skill
and experience levels that relocation aid would be un
necessary nor at such low levels that the aid could not
possibly lead to permanent moves. Provision would have to
be made for a variety of supportive services, especially in the
case of severely disadvantaged workers, including help in ob
taining housing, arranging for transportation to worksites,
securing health care and accommodating to wholly new com
munity environments. Close links would have to be worked
out between the implementing organizations (presumably the
Employment Service offices) at both ends of the moves and
13. Manpower Report of the President, 1971, p. 137.
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among the relevant manpower and community service bodies
at the receiving end. The active cooperation of the hiring
firms would of course be essential. 14 Any serious effort to
use relocation grants as an important means for dealing with
hard core unemployment in inner cities, as opposed to rural
areas, would face even more formidable difficulties.
Despite the limited success of previous efforts in this direc
tion and the complications besetting them, a resumption of a
program of mobility aids deserves serious consideration.
Carefully drawn criteria, plus continuous and careful
monitoring along the lines indicated above would be essen
tial. This approach, being highly selective, could not be ex
pected to effect any marked improvement in job matching
processes in labor markets generally. Its importance would
increase, however, as job vacancies rose and instances of
labor market supply tightness multiplied. While a program
of mobility grants could probably never be a major answer
to prosperity unemployment, it deserves a place in any
serious attack on the problem.
The Carter Administration recently proposed a return to
the approach undertaken in the early 1960s under which
federal aid would be made available to localities in the for
mat of investment tax credits and business credit supports,
but this time the distribution of the funds would be limited to
"distressed communities" or pockets within such com
munities alone. It is estimated that only about a third of the
nation's communities would be eligible for help under this
proposal but this would include most of the country's largest
cities. That Congress will go along with the effort to limit the
program in this way seems doubtful. 15
14. Ibid , p 138; see also Levitan, Mangum, and Marshall, Human Resources and Labor
Markets, pp. 539-547.
15 New York Times, May 25, 1978
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Seasonal Unemployment
A number of important industries are subject to seasonal
fluctuations in employment due to intrayear shifts in either
supply or demand. The annual rise and fall in the teenage
population entering and leaving the labor force with the clos
ing and opening of schools is the principal seasonal influence
operating on the side of labor supply. Changes in climatic
conditions account for most of the seasonal instability in
agriculture and construction. Other industries such as
automobiles and clothing are affected by seasonal changes in
demand which in turn result from custom, habit or style fac
tors. While there is some indication that the seasonal element
in unemployment in a number of industries has lessened
somewhat since World War II, it still accounts for an impor
tant segment of the nation's jobless. Indeed, because of the
seasonal supply pattern of young job seekers, the overall im
portance of seasonal unemployment has probably increased
since World War II.
Calculations of the seasonal factor in unemployment are
necessarily rough. With respect to the peak prosperity year
of 1969, R.A. Gordon has estimated that seasonal
joblessness accounted for about one-fifth of the nation's
total unemployment or about 0.7 of that year's overall rate
of 3.5 percent. 16 Using data on layoffs in manufacturing be
tween 1958 and 1969, the only sector for which data are
available, Daniel Hamermesh found that the seasonal factor
accounted for about 31 percent of the total variation in
layoffs or roughly .62 percentage points of an unemploy
ment rate of 4 percent. 17 When the national unemployment
16 Lloyd Ulman, ed., Manpower Programs in the Policy Mix, essay by R A. Gordon, p.
25 The estimate was based on a method previously developed by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
17. Daniel S. Hamermesh, Jobless Pay and the Economy (Baltimore. Johns Hopkms
University Press, 1977), p 71.
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rate is higher, the relative importance of seasonal unemploy
ment would be less, although the absolute amount of
seasonal joblessness would be somewhat greater than these'
estimates would indicate.
Any private or public effort to reduce seasonal unemploy
ment would have to come to grips with the fact that the
sources of this type of employment instability are diverse and
are the by-product of long-standing conditions and prac
tices. The seasonality factor in major branches of retail
trade, automobile manufacture, clothing and the like have
become imbedded in traditional patterns of the production
and distribution system. Hiring practices in the longshoring
industry based on the daily shape-up and reliance on casual
labor, for example, contributed to the high degree of
seasonability of employment in this field; it took many years
of union pressure before recruitment was decasualized and
employment in longshoring became stable. The problems
besetting such stabilizing efforts are well illustrated in con
struction, a field long plagued by seasonal unemployment.
While weather conditions are the principal element bear
ing on the seasonality of construction employment and
unemployment, other influences such as annual "moving
days" and the presence of many small, weak firms incapable
of using advanced building methods, are also important. The
custom of fixed leasing dates and the practice of letting con
tracts in the spring have also been cited in this connection. 18
The technology and administrative skills are available to
reduce seasonality in employment in the industry, as World
War II experience made clear, but short of extreme shortage
conditions, the higher costs of winter operations and the like
pose serious barriers to improvement. In a careful study of
18. William Haber and Harold M Levmson, Labor Relations and Productivity in the
Building Trades (Ann Arbor, MI: Bureau of Industrial Relations, University of Michigan,
1956), Ch 4.
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the industry, Daniel Mills emphasized the importance of job
opportunities for construction workers in other industries
during the winter months, as well as in the construction in
dustry itself; he concluded that reductions in seasonality oc
cur when construction demand is high and labor supply con
ditions generally are tight, a largely unintended outcome
resulting from peak season shortages and delays. 19
Any serious effort to reduce seasonality in construction by
increasing the level of work done in winter months would re
quire changes in collective bargaining agreements, contrac
tor practices and architects' specifications, as well as in con
tract enforcement activities on the part of the unions and, in
the case of public works, on the part of the government.
Mills argues that the most promising approach is for public
owners to require, except in unusual cases, that work pro
ceed through the winter months and to adopt appropriate
specifications for temporary heating, lighting, and
enclosure. A similar effort, after being reconciled with col
lective bargaining agreements, could be made in the private
sector so that the requirements and specifications for winter
work would be included in bid documents. 20
The example of construction makes clear why attempts to
reduce seasonal unemployment have yielded such meager
results. While an aspect of frictional unemployment, the
sources of seasonal joblessness differ from industry to in
dustry and any serious effort to limit this type of unemploy
ment would require collaborative effort by the particular
employers, unions and public bodies involved. No overall
national program which attempted to cover all major in
dustries would seem feasible. Where conditions in particular
industries give promise of success, efforts to reduce seasonal
19. Daniel O. Mills, Industrial Relations and Manpower in Construction (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1972), p. 129.
20. Ibid., pp. 129-132.
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unemployment would of course deserve public support, but
it would not be appropriate to make such efforts a major
focus of policy action with respect to the problem of persis
tent unemployment.

Conclusion
With certain reservations, the policy conclusion reached
about seasonal unemployment can be applied to frictional
unemployment generally. In part, this is due to the highly in
dividualized and varied nature of this type of unemploy
ment; in part, to the voluntary, "bettering myself" element
that is frequently involved; in part to the influence of deepseated characteristics of labor markets which frequently lie
behind the more pathological patterns of frictional
unemployment.
This is not to deny that certain measures could be taken to
improve the matching process in job markets in this country,
measures such as stronger support for the Employment Ser
vice, more detailed, individualized information on job open
ings and job applicants, better counseling and coordination
of efforts to help disadvantaged workers quality for careeroriented jobs, and expansion of programs to provide mobili
ty assistance grants. These, however, are not policies which
would get at the essential characteristics and underlying con
ditions of persistent unemployment outlined in the opening
chapter. Much of frictional unemployment, especially in its
more pathological forms, is an outgrowth of what are actual
ly structural barriers to employment, and it is the elimination
or reduction of these barriers to which public policy must be
chiefly addressed.

Chapter 4
Reducing Structural Unemployment
Structural unemployment, the principal subject of this
study, has been the source of much controversy partly
because it defies clear-cut categorization. Indeed, some
highly respected economists question the validity of the con
cept altogether, viewing all unemployment that is not the
result of a deficiency in aggregate demand as falling in the
frictional category.
Unemployment can be said to be structural in nature if ag
gregate demand is high enough to provide jobs at prevailing
wages for everyone seeking work but job openings remain
unfilled because of a persistent mismatching of skills or
geographical locations. If the mismatching is resolved volun
tarily through mutual search by workers and employers in a
reasonably short period of time, say eight or ten weeks, the
resulting unemployment falls in the frictional category. The
unemployment becomes structural, however, if the mis
matching cannot be resolved by such voluntary action and
the job seekers are required to develop new skills or change
their place of residence but are effectively precluded from
doing so. In the former instance the workers choose to re
main unemployed because of the likelihood, hopefully, of
finding suitable work, while in the latter their unemployment
is involuntary in the sense that they cannot overcome the
barriers that bar them from such work.
53
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The traditional view is that any unemployment resulting
from mismatching within a given labor market, assuming an
adequate level of aggregate demand, would be frictional in
nature whereas it would be structural if the mismatching
were between markets. While a useful distinction, it should
be kept in mind that even within a given market, in
terferences and barriers having to do with lack of requisite
skills, personal attributes, restrictive practices or even inade
quate commuting facilities, may result in structural im
balances between buyers and sellers. The main point,
however, is that even though job seekers may only be subject
to frictional unemployment within a given market, they may
be faced with structural unemployment between markets.
While obviously not always precise, the distinction can be a
crucially important one, particularly in the case of workers
in the lowest skill, poorest paid occupations. Movement be
tween jobs requiring little education, specialized training and
prior work experience in a particular locality may only entail
frictional unemployment in this sense, but if the workers are
effectively confined to this relatively narrow, lowest skill
type of work by reasons of barriers they have little or no
hope of overcoming, structural unemployment, or more ac
curately, structural misallocation of employment, is present
between markets. It is structural barriers resulting in
misallocations of this sort which are of central importance to
dealing with the problem of prosperity unemployment.
The unemployed inner city teenager who lacks basic
educational skills and any meaningful work experience, or
the one-time textile worker who has been left stranded in a
New England town, are prototypes of this type of
joblessness. But what of the Grade-A Machinist who cannot
find work at his customary level but would do so if he were
willing to accept a Grade-B classification or move to a dis
tant city? Presumably the answer would turn on whether the
barrier is surmountable by action of the individual involved,
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but this often involves a qualitative judgment. If oppor
tunities are present to choose among a roughly homogeneous
cluster of jobs, or to acquire the necessary qualifying skills
and experience to do so within a feasible period of time, no
structural component is involved; a structural component is
only present when the means for making such choices, while
perhaps available to some, are not available to others.
The clearest examples, of course, are those in which the
two groups of job seekers are indistinguishable from one
another except for some characteristic unrelated to actual
job performance (color, sex, religion), but the exclusion can
be basically structural even though performance-related dif
ferences are present if the means for overcoming or bypass
ing such differences are not available. Indeed, the principal
feature of structural unemployment is not that certain
workers are blocked from job opportunities within a
specialized field of competence or limited geographical area
but that they are effectively precluded from taking the
necessary steps to gain access to a somewhat broader field or
market area. While difficult to identify, this distinction is
crucial to an understanding of structural unemployment.
A related source of ambiguity grows out of cost and pro
ductivity considerations. If particular workers are excluded
from certain jobs even though cost and productivity com
parisons are in their favor, a structural imbalance would
seem evident. What if, however, the cost comparisons are
unclear, or the excluded workers can be brought up to the
productivity norm only after expensive training outlays are
made, or the adverse cost comparisons are due to the at
titudes of fellow workers, to considerations of plant morale,
or other such semiobjective factors? In these circumstances,
the important test is whether the excluded workers are given
meaningful opportunities to prove their immediate and/or
potential worth. If restrictive or screening procedures are
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adopted which, in effect, preclude certain workers from
showing what they are capable of doing, a structural im
balance is involved since concrete evidence of their relatively
poor performance or limited potential is lacking.
Even if there is such evidence, further questions need to be
asked as to whether the resulting comparisons are themselves
the product of basic structural barriers of one kind or
another. From the viewpoint of the individual employer, the
inferior-superior performance test may well be decisive
unless offset by public subsidies, tax credits, and the like, but
from the viewpoint of society, the issue of why this outcome
occurred, and whether the personal or social benefits which
would be derived from resolving the problem would
outweigh the costs of doing so, still needs to be faced. Much
would depend on the nature of the underlying im
balance the deeper and more pervasive it is, the less likely
corrective action would yield benefits in excess of costs. On
the other hand, much would also depend on whether the
society placed a high or low priority on the benefits sought (a
problematic value judgment) and on whether the proposed
corrective action would "work" (a problematic cost-benefit
calculation). The difficulties posed by considerations of this
sort need no underscoring.
Finally, while the unemployment resulting from structural
imbalances is involuntary in nature, confusion often still
arises as to where and how the line between voluntary and in
voluntary unemployment should be drawn. One variation of
the traditional or classical view is that the major cause of a
continuing imbalance in a given labor market is simply that
the wage rate is being held above the equilibrium level and
that if suppliers were willing to reduce their wage offers, or
were forced by competition or other influences to do so, the
imbalance would be removed. This variation marks an im
portant departure from the more general traditional view,
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noted at the outset of this chapter, that all unemployment is
the result either of inadequate aggregate demand or frictional influences, a view that rests on the assumption that
labor markets, and indeed all markets, function under condi
tions of perfect competition; if it is assumed that noncompetitive conditions, whether imposed by workers,
employers or government, are present, limiting unemploy
ment to these two categories becomes quite unrealistic for no
other reason than that the element of voluntary choice on the
part of job seekers is not likely to be present.
Without attempting to settle this highly abstruse point
here, it is clear that wage distortion can be a serious impedi
ment to achieving a balanced condition in particular labor
markets. In fact, from the viewpoint of those workers for
tunate enough to keep their jobs, high, rigid wage rates can
serve as an exclusionary device to prevent competitive bid
ding for any available openings by other workers, thereby
perpetuating the favorable rates of pay. Whether this is a
major source of structural unemployment is an issue taken
up in the next chapter; the point emphasized here is that
wage rates and related cost elements can be held at levels
which, consciously or unconsciously, exclude certain
workers from effectively bidding for jobs in just the same
way as would outright bars to employment.
The other point deserving emphasis is that even though
wage-distortion unemployment may in some sense be con
sidered voluntarily induced, this is only likely to hold for
very narrowly defined labor markets. Within such markets,
as noted earlier, rapid turnover and frequent spells of
unemployment can properly be viewed as voluntary, i.e.,
frictional, in nature. Between related markets or submarkets, however, the barriers to mobility are much less like
ly to be, in any meaningful sense, voluntarily maintained. If
wage barriers are present, they are apt to be but external
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aspects of other types of market interferences, and it is only
in this broader context that the relationships between wage
costs and structural unemployment can be fully understood.
If effective steps are to be taken for dealing with this
aspect of the prosperity unemployment problem, it is essen
tial that the individuals involved be carefully identified so
that their needs and abilities can be made clear. Given the
complexities just described, however, it is hardly surprising
that there is considerable confusion on this score. For one
thing estimates of the extent of structural unemployment
vary considerably depending on where the nonacceleration
inflation level of unemployment is assumed to fall. Accord
ing to Lloyd Reynolds, frictional unemployment at full
employment can be assumed to be about 4 percent, and
structural unemployment about 1 percent, of the nation's
civilian labor force, with unfilled vacancies also amounting
to about 1 percent of the labor force and the rate of price in
crease holding steady at roughly 5 percent per annum. 1 In
terms of 1980 labor force projections, this would yield an
estimate of only a little over 1 million structurally
unemployed.
Efforts to build up an estimate from major categories of
structural unemployment are more firmly based but are still
open to question. The first category consists of the long term
unemployed; if this category is defined to include workers
unemployed 27 weeks or more, there were only about
300,000 structurally unemployed workers (roughly threetenths of 1 percent of the civilian labor force) in the high
employment year of 1973, but if the definition is limited to
workers unemployed only 15 weeks or more, the total comes
to about 800,000, roughly 1 percent of that year's civilian
labor force. In the somewhat less prosperous year of 1978,
1. Reynolds, Labor Economics and Labor Relations, p. 132.
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the group unemployed 27 weeks or more came to a little over
1 percent, and the group unemployed 15 weeks or more to
nearly 2.5 percent, of the 1978 civilian labor force. 2
The second category consists of discouraged workers,
those who have dropped out of the labor force because they
have lost all hope of finding any suitable work. This type of
unmeasured (as opposed to measured) unemployment,
however, is associated almost wholly with periods of cyclical
downswing and persistent business slack, not with periods of
rising business and general prosperity. Indeed, in the latter
periods the overall supply of labor increases rapidly as many
persons who had previously not been working, chiefly
women and teenagers, enter the labor force in search of
employment. In the Vietnam War years between 1963 and
1967, for example, it has been estimated that the additional
workers drawn into the labor force totaled 1.9 million, of
whom more than a million were women. Similarly, in the
relatively prosperous years 1967-1971, the proportion of
total unemployment accounted for by discouraged workers
has been put at substantially less than 1 percent of the
civilian labor force. 3 At a 5-6 percent level of unemployment
it seems unlikely that, out of a total labor force of 100
million, more than 700,000 would fall in the discouraged
category.
Still a third category consists of part time workers who
want full time work but cannot find it because of economic
conditions. Since these workers do have jobs but are in
voluntarily limited to less than full time work, the generally
accepted procedure is to consider such workers as only half
2. Employment and Training Report of the President, 1979 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1980), Appendix Tables A-l and A-26.
3. William G. Bowen and T. Aldnch Fmegan, The Economics of Labor Force Participa
tion (Princeton, NJ: Pnnceton University Press, 1969); Jacob Mincer, "Determining Who
Are the Hidden Unemployed," Monthly Labor Review, 96 (1973), pp. 27-30.
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unemployed. 4 Again, as in the case of the discouraged
category, this type of unemployment becomes relatively
unimportant in periods of general prosperity; in 1978, for ex
ample, it amounted to less than a fifth of a percentage point
of the civilian labor force (see table 4-1). 5
The fourth and last category consists of workers who are
involuntarily confined to low-level, unstable jobs and as a
consequence have only intermittent work even in periods of
high employment. Unfortunately, there are no published
statistics on the extent of this type of work since the problem
of measurement is virtually insurmountable. Many of the
workers having these highly unstable jobs, especially white
women over 20 years of age and white teenagers, hold inter
mittent jobs of this sort voluntarily in the sense they face
other virtually equivalent options and remain outside the
unemployed category in the official figures. On the other
hand, many others, especially nonwhites, have intermittent
work and still fall within the official definition of measured
unemployment in a given year. While adequate data are lack
ing, there is little doubt that the uncounted portion of the
"virtually unemployed" is of significant size even in periods
of general prosperity.
Summarizing the available evidence, estimates of the total
number of the structurally unemployed at the general jobless
level of 5 percent fall between 2.5 and 3.5 million depending
in large part on whether long term unemployment is defined
as 15 weeks or more as against 27 weeks or more. However
the outlook is viewed, it is evident that the problem of struc
tural unemployment will continue to be a formidable one
even in periods of high employment. It is no less clear that
any attack on the problem, to be effective, calls for breaking
4. Julius Shiskin, "Employment and Unemployment: The Doughnut or the Hole?"
Monthly Labor Review (February 1976), pp. 3-10

5 Employment and Training Report of the President, 1979, Table A-33.
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Table 44
Categories of Unemployment, Selected Years 1973-78

Civilian Labor Force
Total unemployed

1973

Thousands
1975

1978

88.7

92.6

100.0

Percent of
Civilian Labor Force
1973
1975
1978

4.3

7.8

6.0

4.9

8.5

6.0

Unemployed 15 weeks
and over

.8

2.5

1.4

.9

2.6

1.4

Unemployed 27 weeks
and over

.3

1.2

.6

.3

1.3

.6

1.3

1.9

1.7

1.5

2.0

1.7

--

--

.7

--

--

.7

1/2 of unemployed parttime for economic
reasons
Discouraged workers at 5
percent unemployment

Source: Employment and Training Report of the President, 1979, Tables A-l, A-26 and
A-33.

down this large demographic group into smaller, more
homogeneous categories. While the preceding discussion has
gone some distance in identifying the structurally
unemployed and the severely disadvantaged employed, the
workers involved form too large and ill-defined a group for
policymaking purposes; further decomposition is therefore
necessary even though quantitative estimates of their relative
size are not possible.
The three groups who chiefly make up the structurally
unemployed teenagers, women and adult males with
serious background deficiencies, particularly the nonwhite
and other minority members of these three groups possess
a wide diversity of characteristics and capacities. The same
holds true of other workers who confront special job finding
difficulties and who form a fringe around these main groups:
those 20-24 years old, those over 55 years old, the physically
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handicapped, and workers in isolated, depressed areas. For
policy to be effective, attention needs to be given to the ways
in which each of these groups is affected by the various bar
riers limiting employment opportunities of the hard-toemploy. This study is largely confined to the first three of the
groups just mentioned.
Four Barriers Confronting
the Structurally Unemployed
The structurally unemployed are subject to a number of
different barriers, some serious and at least in the short run
quite irremovable, others much less difficult to surmount.
The most important of these barriers are four in number: im
pediments to competitive wage determination and disincen
tives to work associated with nonwork sources of income;
discrimination in hiring and promotion procedures; deficien
cies in general education and in job or career training; and
finally, lack of work experience. For policymaking purposes
the most pressing need is to consider these four barriers both
individually and as a group with a view to determining as
clearly and as objectively as possible what is the relative im
portance of each and how each can be most effectively ap
proached.
The first barrier, distortions in wage rates and im
pediments to effective job search, is easily explained, more
difficult to identify and extremely hard to remedy. The
assumption underlying this view of structural unemployment
is that many of the hard-to-employ are quite ready and
prepared to take on the responsibilities of a job but are
discouraged or blocked from doing so by a variety of noncompetitive, or explicitly anticompetitive, impediments: in
flexibly high wage rates, restrictive hiring and promotion
standards, overly generous inducements not to work and the
like. It follows from this view that structural unemployment
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would be substantially lessened if these limitations on com
petitive labor market behavior could be removed.
The second barrier, discriminatory labor market behavior,
is far more complex and intractable than the first but at the
same time much closer to underlying factors that give rise to
structural unemployment. Sometimes it takes a clear, un
mistakable form but more frequently it is intermixed with
quite defensible purposes or needs; sometimes it is closely
correlated with differences in worker efficiency, but more
often the relationship to efficiency differences is extremely
loose; even where efficiency differs, the effects of such prior
"institutional" forms of discrimination as inadequate
schooling or particular family backgrounds are clearly evi
dent but extremely difficult to pin down. Since labor market
discrimination has so many facets and is so deeply imbedded
in historical developments and social attitudes, quick results
from any effort to attack structural unemployment by this
route can hardly be expected.
The third barrier, deficiencies in general education and in
training in specific skill of job requirements, poses less dif
ficulties than discriminatory labor market behavior, but far
more difficulties than restrictive wage practices and job
search disincentives. If structural unemployment were large
ly limited to experienced workers who have been displaced
by technological or other market developments, the assump
tion which largely underlay the government's manpower
programs of the late 1950s and early 1960s, the difficulties
besetting the general education-specific training route would
have been far less. Since it is now clear that this type of
unemployment centers on persons who lack fundamental
educational and work skills, the hurdles are seen to be far
more formidable. Recent experience, as the subsequent
discussion shows, points to certain promising lines of action,
but the overall prospect is hardly reassuring.
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The fourth and final barrier, closely related to the one just
noted, is lack of prior work experience. This is the most im
portant immediate hurdle which new entrants to the labor
market, notably teenagers just out of school, confront, but it
also poses serious difficulties for adult women and older men
who are seeking reentry to the labor market after long
absences. It is sometimes argued that almost any kind of job,
whatever its content, duration or source, can provide an
essential first step in dealing with this barrier, but if the work
is for only brief periods and makes little or no substantive
demands, it is unlikely to provide any meaningful entry or
reentry preparation. At least it is clear that for persons from
severely disadvantaged backgrounds, work at this lowest
level often proves to be dead-end in terms of any career
potential. Thus for such persons it is now recognized that job
experience alone, even if it entails some substantive
elements, rarely provides entry to any longer term career op
portunities.

A Possible Overall Strategy
All of the structurally unemployed face at least one of
these four barriers and some, notably nonwhite teenagers,
face all four. The critical issue confronting policymakers is
how to devise an effective set of programs which can be
adapted to the different and changing needs of these various
groups. The closer the individual is to being fully job-ready,
the more straightforward and immediate the policy approach
can be; the further removed the individual is, the more com
plex and long term the policy has to be.
Before turning to an analysis of specific policy issues, the
question of how an approach along these lines can best be
adapted to an environment of business expansion and high
employment needs to be faced. As a starting point it is worth
emphasizing that in any broad and sustained business expan-
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sion, increasing numbers of job opportunities at entry level
and above are opening up for a widening spectrum of job
seekers. Special measures are still required to bring the dif
ferent structurally employed groups into the mainstream of
employment opportunities, but the policies can be more
limited and more closely linked to usual market requirements
than in recessionary or even sluggish expansionist periods.
This not only means that such policies will be likelier to
succeed in these circumstances but also as a practical matter
that the test of meeting competitive, regular work re
quirements in the private and public sector will become ap
plicable to increasing numbers of the structurally
unemployed. Likewise, as business conditions improve, the
role of the private as opposed to the public sector can be ex
pected to become increasingly important. This is not,
however, a policy emphasis that can be adopted abruptly.
Even in relatively strong expansions, special demand sup
ports will be needed to meet the job needs of these different
unemployment-prone groups.
Adapting such a strategy to structurally unemployed
workers would entail difficult and controversial borderline
decisions, but on both macro-stability and micro-efficiency
grounds, the shift in policy emphasis indicated by an expan
sionist environment seems clear and compelling. Under con
ditions of general prosperity those workers who by reason of
skill and experience are most job ready would increasingly be
able to find openings with a minimum of assistance. In such
cases, specialized training in a new skill, for example, or
removal of an entry barrier to a particular line of work,
would be all that would be necessary.
For those further removed from entry into regular work,
considerably more effort would need to be expended in
determining what barriers are involved and in carrying
through effective support actions. Thus, for some, the dif-
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ficulty may have to do with a basic educational deficiency,
for others with personal family problems, for still others
with lack of physical proximity to any job opportunities.
Once carefully examined and assessed, the difficulties beset
ting job seekers in this intermediate group are apt to be
relatively clear-cut since persons in this category possess the
basic motivations and innate capacities to handle regular
jobs. The benefits deriving from any supportive action,
however, will probably take considerably longer to realize
than in the case of the first group of job seekers because of
the differing nature and scope of their difficulties.
Those in the third category, the still less job-ready group,
are not only likely to confront at least some of the barriers
facing the first two groups but also to lack essential
psychological or intellectual attributes needed for regular
employment. In their case, any effective remedial action will
doubtless entail more long term, individualized treatment.
Unless society were to decide to accept the risks and costs of
disregarding the special needs of job seekers in this group,
much preparatory effort would be required before they
could move into regular work situations, and each of the
preparatory steps would need to be closely monitored. The
uncertainties and difficulties besetting any serious effort
along these lines need no underscoring.
The final category are those workers who are subject to
various types of discriminatory labor market practices. Since
these practices are generally interwoven with such other fac
tors as hiring test procedures, wage progression structures,
and educational requirements, most of the workers subject
to labor market discrimination are also in one or more of the
other groups that are vulnerable to structural unemploy
ment. Nonetheless, this aspect of their disadvantaged status
warrants separate attention in any canvas of possible policy
approaches.
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Under conditions of high employment, then, the case for
greatly narrowing the focus of government efforts to deal
with structural unemployment becomes very strong. These
efforts could proceed along the following lines: first, identify
those workers who are most in need, presumably chiefly on
income-level grounds; second, group these workers by their
degree of readiness to enter a career or to do regular work;
and third, tailor the various subsidized training jobs and
related approaches that now exist to the special needs and
circumstances of each group. The important distinction to
keep in mind is that in a high employment environment, a
massive governmental attack on structural unemployment
would be inappropriate; rather it would be more realistic to
limit public effort to those workers in this category who can
benefit from training and special work programs, relying on
welfare or other forms of assistance to meet the needs of
those who cannot meet this standard. Added perspective is
given to these recommendations when viewed against the ex
perience of other industrialized countries.

The West European Experience
In most respects, a public policy approach to structural
unemployment along these lines would differ quite sharply
from the pattern followed by most West European govern
ments. Outwardly, the differences are not striking; as in this
country, their programs are built around labor market infor
mation systems, job placement and counseling, career train
ing and development, subsidies to induce private employers
to hire the hard-to-employ, and job creation aids largely
oriented towards depressed areas and economically disadvantaged groups. The underlying thrust of the West Euro
pean programs, however, has been quite different. Until
recently, government efforts to deal with unemployment in
this country have centered almost entirely on aggregative de
mand policies, with scant attention to removing structural
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barriers to employment. In the case of most West European
countries, the overall unemployment rate has until recent
years held well below the American rate, even to the point
where large numbers of foreign workers have been brought
in to meet unfilled demands. In those countries, such nonfrictional unemployment as existed was clearly structural in
nature, calling for intensive, highly individualized support
measures in the case of very severely disadvantaged workers,
and broad training or human development measures in the
case of less disadvantaged groups. As a result, the overall
coverage of their structural policies is considerably broader
than in this country, eligibility requirements for participa
tion are less stringent, and the content of their programs is
more diverse and far-reaching.
The other striking difference grows out of the greater cen
tralization of authority that has developed in West European
countries both within major industries and with respect to
the powers exercised by their central governments.
Historically, there has emerged a much higher degree of
coordination between employer and union policies than in
this country, as well as a greater acceptance of government
participation and leadership in the formulation of such
policies. This has meant that the hard-to-employ are not
treated as a group apart from the working population as a
whole, the pattern prevailing in the United States, but rather
as one of many groups needing special aids and general
development measures. It is too early to judge whether the
West European countries will meet the recent increase in
their unemployment rolls by expanding these same human
resource programs or by resorting to more sweeping ag
gregate demand measures, but the evidence to date suggests
that they will hold to the former course. 6
6. Recent European Manpower Initiatives, Special Report No 3 (Washington: National
Commission for Manpower Policy, 1975).
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Should this country adopt essentially the same approach
as West Europe to structural unemployment? Clearly, the
differences in the two environments, both economic and
social, are too great to make any such outcome possible. If
the major recommendations developed,in this study were
adopted, however, American policy would move a con
siderable distance towards the West European pattern, the
focus as at present remaining on the needs of the hard-toemploy but only as part of a more comprehensive and long
range program of human resources development.

Five Policy Approaches
Public policy approaches to these four barriers are pro
ceeding along five main lines, with some approaches overlap
ping others in relation to a particular barrier. Even where a
given approach is limited to a single barrier, it is now
generally agreed, the results to date have at best been mixed.
In at least a few instances, however, the criticisms appear to
be too extreme.
Policy efforts addressed to the first barrier, formal and in
formal noncompetitive impediments to job entry and work
disincentives resulting from unemployment insurance and
other income support programs, are beset with innumerable
uncertainties and controversies in determining when such
restrictions and practices are and are not justified. The sec
ond policy approach, an outgrowth of the national effort to
protect the civil rights of all the nation's citizens, is aimed at
reducing and eliminating discriminatory barriers to employ
ment, especially as they relate to women and minority
groups. Recent experience indicates that the antidiscriminatory approach to the structural unemployment
issue is beset with serious difficulties, raising the question of
whether efforts in this direction, whatever their merits on
other grounds, can ever provide a successful focus for effec
tive action against structural unemployment.
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There remain three other major approaches: efforts to
strengthen educational-vocational preparation for work
careers, direct job creation efforts in the public and private
sector, and finally, public and private training programs in
specific skills and related job requirements. Each of these
last three approaches typically contains elements of basic
employment preparation, direct job training and work ex
perience in various combinations and, taken togethei, have a
direct or indirect bearing on all four of the barriers noted
earlier. While each warrants separate discussion, in policy
terms they have become so closely interrelated they form a
single group; as such, they constitute the country's major
thrust in dealing with structural unemployment among the
seriously disadvantaged. The remainder of this study is ad
dressed to an assessment of these five approaches to the
problem.

Chapter 5
Noncompetitive and Work
Disincentive Barriers
The simplest and in many ways most intellectually appeal
ing explanation of unemployment in periods of general pros
perity can be traced to traditional competitive market
analysis. According to this view, if labor in a given market
remains unemployed at existing wage rates, adjustments in
those rates will insure that everyone looking for work will
eventually find it, assuming incomes are determined by com
petitive conditions alone. If such conditions do not obtain,
either noncompetitive restrictions or nonmarket deter
minants of income are presumably involved and may well
call for corrective action.
Noncompetitive barriers in labor markets, the first of
these two influences, take many forms. Union restrictions in
the hiring and placement of workers may impede freedom of
entry. Requirements in the way of prior experience and train
ing may be set so high that many qualified job applicants are
effectively excluded. Costs associated with private pension
programs, health plans and other fringe protections, quite
aside from similar benefits required by law, may also
discourage new hires. High, rigid wage rates, whether posted
by public or private action, can have a similar effect on job
entry.
71
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Behind these direct impediments lie many more indirect
and roundabout forms of interferences with competitive ac
cess to job opportunities, including collusive price and
market strategies of employers and government regulations
which restrict competitive adjustments in rates and costs.
Merely to enumerate some of the more important barriers
that may develop in labor and related markets is enough to
show how difficult any action along these lines, to be at all
effective, must be. In good part, this follows from the fact
that the results of such action, especially as they relate to
structural unemployment, would probably not be evident for
long periods of time. Indeed, other developments might well
occur that would obscure their impact altogether.
Moreover, what may seem to be an arbitrary and unwar
ranted restriction to a job applicant may appear to an
employer or union as essential to maintaining minimum
standards of performance or to meeting widely accepted
criteria of equity. A limitation that was once needed, as in
the 1930s, to prevent the complete demoralization of an in
dustry's system of wage rates and working conditions may be
rendered economically indefensible by subsequent shifts in
production methods or consumer preferences. More impor
tant, restrictions on job entry are apt to be the product of
powerful but narrow group interests whose first obligations
are to their own members. Exclusion of newcomers, if need
ed to preserve hard-won gains, would therefore appear to
these groups to be quite appropriate if not absolutely
necessary.
In the face of these difficulties and uncertainties it is hard
to see how this approach could be used as the center piece of
any successful program for dealing with structural
unemployment. Even if, for example, wage rate distortions
could be shown to be a major cause of this type of
unemployment, what criteria would be used to determine
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where and how such distortions should be rectified? If wage
rigidities in certain industries, such as basic steel or
chemicals, are part and parcel of an industry's system of
pricing and marketing practices, would it be either sensible
or feasible to limit remedial action to the wage element
alone? If a broader strategy were pursued, would the effects
filter through to affect job opportunity levels in any signifi
cant way? Concerted attacks on even relatively clear-cut bar
riers to job entry such as high fringe benefit levels, excessive
hiring or performance standards, and direct labor supply
restrictions would pose hardly less serious difficulties.
In deciding on any course of action along these lines, at
tention needs to focus on those impediments to job entry
which bear most heavily on the hardest-to-employ groups
but which at the same time are most likely to yield to policy
intervention in periods of general prosperity. Much attention
of late has been given to possible adverse effects on employ
ment of increases under the federal minimum wage law.
Since this impediment bears directly on the job prospects of
major groups of the structurally unemployed, it warrants at
tention here.

Federal Minimum Wage Legislation
Ever since passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, controversy has continued about the possible
dislocating effects of setting a national minimum wage. In
itially the law set the basic rate at 25 cents per hour with time
and a half for any work over 40 hours per week. The latter
provision still obtains but the basic minimum has been
periodically raised and in 1980 stood at $3.10 an hour. Under
recent legislative action, the rate is scheduled to rise to $3.31
an hour by 1981.
Equally important, coverage since the 1930s has been
greatly expanded to include large numbers of workers in
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retail trade, services, agriculture and domestic work as well
as all nonsupervisory employees of federal, state and local
governments. The potential employment effects of raising
the national wage minimum has obviously become more
serious as the coverage of the law has been widened to in
clude more low-wage workers. The 1966 amendment, for ex
ample, extended coverage to an additional 8 million retail,
hospital, hotel, restaurant, laundry and construction
employees, while the 1974 amendment brought 1.5 million
domestic workers and half a million additional retail and ser
vice workers under the protection of the law. These fields in
clude many traditionally low-paying firms that hire lowskilled workers, many of them teenagers and nonwhites who
have little work experience and who suffer relatively high
rates of unemployment. In total numbers, the 1974 amend
ment extended the Act's coverage to some 56 million
workers.
Two major criticisms are leveled against this legislation:
first, it heightens inflationary pressures and second, it results
in increased unemployment. The former issue, which can be
touched on only briefly in this study, has received much at
tention in recent years but little in the way of systematic
analysis. 1 Such work as has been done indicates that the ef
fects of increases in the federal minimum wage on the
general price level have until recently been practically in
discernible but that in the economic environment of the
1970s this has become less true. As noted in chapter 2, the
spread of government regulations, including those which in
duce wage increases, has tended to make any inflation, once
underway, more persistent. In early 1978, for example, wage
increases accelerated markedly, though briefly, at a time
when unemployment was still somewhat above 6 percent. In
1. Two long term projects sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research and the U.S Department of Labor should help meet the latter need.
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its analysis of this development, the Council of Economic
Advisers concluded that the 15 percent rise in the minimum
wage which occurred in January 1978 raised the rate of in
crease of the adjusted hourly earnings index from 7.9 percent
to 9.2 percent on an annual basis; the other main factor to
which it attributed most of the upswing in the pace of wage
increases in early 1978 was the speed in the increase in total
employment along with the equally rapid drop in unemploy
ment. For 1978 as a whole, compensation per hour went up
from a 7.6 percent increase in 1977 to a 9.8 percent rate in
1978. This step-up in the pace of wage increases, combined
with a continued slowdown in the rate of increase in produc
tivity, resulted in a substantial rise in unit labor costs, with
the rate of increase of such costs in the private nonfarm sec
tor rising from 6.3 percent in 1977 to 8.9 percent in 1978. 2
These factors, among which the higher minimum was clearly
visible if not central for the year as a whole, served to push
up prices still higher and helped imbed the inflationary pro
cess more deeply into the economy.
The conclusion seems inescapable that any serious effort
to lessen inflationary pressures will require a significantly
lower rate of increase in minimum wages than is provided
under existing legislation. It also is evident that, to be effec
tive, any such move would need to be coupled with similar
cutbacks in a wide variety of other government regulations
including: reductions in protective tariffs in steel, textiles
and the like; elimination of regulations in trucking, shipping
and communications; relaxation of price supports in
agriculture and in subsidies for the maritime industry; and
the dismantling of many other cost-raising types of govern
ment interventions. Similar questions have been raised about
government controls aimed at protecting not particular pro2 Economic Report of the President, 1979 (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1980), pp. 52 and 66
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ducer groups but the more general public such as those deal
ing with environmental pollution, dangerous food additives
and occupational hazards. In their case, the issues become
far more complex, however, because of the important social
benefits which these public-oriented types of regulations are
felt to entail. The fact remains that if a broad scale attack on
inflation is mounted, the rapid pace of increase in the
minimum wage rate of the past few years would have to be
reduced.
The second line of criticism, that this legislation has bar
red hard-to-employ groups from jobs, bears directly on the
problem of structural unemployment. In this regard, there is
now virtual unanimity among investigators on two
somewhat conflicting points: first, whatever other benefits
may derive from this legislation, any substantial increase in
the minimum wage relative to the general wage level tends to
reduce employment opportunities for the least skilled and
the least experienced; second, however, any decrease in the
minimum wage relative to the general wage level, unless it
were quite substantial, would have little effect on job oppor
tunities for the hard-to-employ. The first point is especially
applicable to periods of business contraction when demand
for labor is generally shifting downward relative to supply
while the second is most clearly evident in periods of business
expansion. Both points, however, are by-products of the
same underlying principle: the level of job openings for the
least skilled, least experienced workers are far more depen
dent on overall demand-supply conditions than on changes
in the relative wage rate for this type of work. In expansions,
the job finding prospects of such workers will largely turn on
whether the rise in aggregate demand reaches a level at which
employers are induced to take them on in substantial
numbers. Contrariwise, their job finding difficulties in
periods of general decline will largely turn on how far ag
gregate demand falls below aggregate supply. In neither in-
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stance, barring the most extreme hypothetical assumptions,
will a change in relative wages significantly alter the out
come.
This leaves one general circumstance when the wage for
this type of labor relative to other types has major employ
ment effects, i.e., when longer term supply-demand condi
tions for the least skilled, least experienced workers become
markedly adverse. In this kind of a setting, employers face a
more or less permanent rise in the relative cost of hiring such
workers if their wage is forced upward through legislative ac
tion. This is what has been happening for much of the past
25 years. As often pointed out, this has been especially true
of the 1970s when a sharp rise in the number of women and
young people seeking jobs coincided with a marked
slowdown in the longer term growth rate of the economy.
The subsequent rise in unemployment among these hard-toemploy groups was largely the result of these two
developments. The increases in the federal minimum wage
which occurred during this period, while apparently not a
major causal influence, aggravated an already difficult con
dition.
Empirical Findings
Of the many statistical studies that have been made of the
employment effects of increases in the minimum wage,
almost all conclude that this legislation has made it more dif
ficult for teenagers, nonwhites generally, and perhaps
women to find work opportunities. At the same time, the
majority of these studies conclude that other factors are con
siderably more important in explaining the relatively high
unemployment level among these groups.
One of the earliest studies to emphasize the adverse
employment effects of minimum wage legislation was con
ducted by Arthur F. Burns; he found that an increase of 25
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cents in the statutory legal minima is associated with a rise of
8 percentage points in nonwhite unemployment. 3 In a later
study, Jacob Mincer concluded, "No more than a third of
the employment loss in the covered sector appears as
unemployment, while the bulk withdraws from the labor
force." 4 He found that the largest disemployment effects are
observed for nonwhite teenagers, followed by nonwhite
males (20-24), white teenagers, and white males (20-24).
In a careful review of a variety of statistical studies of this
problem and his own analysis of the data, Edward Gramlich
concluded that a 25 percent increase in the minimum wage
would lower employment of low-wage teenagers (those
receiving less than the minimum before the increase in ques
tion) by 10-15 percent. Comparable effects would
presumably be felt by other workers who had previously
been receiving wages below the minimum. The impact would
be substantially less on teenager employment as a whole or
on other groups that are particularly prone to unemploy
ment. 5
Except in the case of very marked increases, changes in the
minimum wage have apparently had only minimal
disemployment effects. This is due in good part to the fact
that, while a higher minimum has had adverse effects on
teenager employment, it has been followed by a rise in the
number of full time jobs for women, suggesting that in these
circumstances employers substitute unskilled women for
teenagers. This is worth noting since women represent
3. Arthur F. Burns, The Management of Prosperity (New York- Columbia University
Press, 1966), p. 48.
4. Jacob Mincer, "Unemployment Effects of Minimum Wages," Journal of Political
Economy (August 1976), pp. 87-106.
5. Edward M. Gramlich, Impact of Minimum Wages on Other Wages, Employment, and
Family Incomes, Brookmgs Papers on Economic Activity, 2 (1976), pp. 409-451. For a con
venient summary of recent studies, see American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, Minimum Wage Legislation (Washington 1977).

Work Disincentive Barriers

79

roughly half of all low-wage workers, outnumbering
teenagers in that category by a ratio of about 5 to 3. 6
In terms of policy choices, the critical relationship involv
ed is the national minimum as a ratio to the average wage
level or, what is often used in its place, to the average wage in
manufacturing. This ratio, as indicated in Figure 5-1, has
usually varied between 40 and 50 percent. As long as the na
tional minimum is held towards the lower end of this range,
few serious employment effects seem likely, but as it ap
proaches the upper end, employment opportunities for lowpaid workers, especially teenagers, would become fewer.
While far short of a cure-all, there is little question but what
the employment situation of teenagers and perhaps other
low-wage workers would have been at least somewhat better
if the increases in the minimum wage had been kept lower
than those recently enacted. The case for these increases
must therefore be made on other than employmentexpansion grounds for the structurally unemployed.
These empirical findings, while generally supportive of the
position that minimum wage legislation has been a relatively
unimportant factor in explaining structural unemployment
in this country, do not of themselves settle the issue one way
or the other. There are further considerations, however,
which go a long way towards doing so.
First, prospective population trends over the next 10-15
years should gradually alter the unemployment problem
among the hard-to-employ, especially young persons. The
last of the postwar baby boom will pass through their
teenage years by 1981 and the youth population will decline
thereafter in relative and absolute terms through the 1980s.

6 Gramlich, Impact of Minimum Wages, p 443.
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Figure 5-1
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In summarizing the projected trends, Adams and Mangum
concluded:
The effect of this influx of young people, however,
has already begun to dissipate and will largely disappear
in the 1980s. The teenage labor force, in turn, is ex
pected to decline from its level of 8.8 million to 7.9
million in 1985. 7
This puts the issue of the employment effect of the
minimum wage in a quite different light. During the 1960s
and 1970s the ratio of youth to adult unemployment nearly
doubled from its base of three to one which obtained during
the 1950s. By 1975, the ratio of youth to adult unemploy
ment already appeared to have returned to its historical base.
The structural element in youth unemployment of course still
remains, but any adverse effects attributable to minimum
wage legislation have now been substantially removed and
may soon disappear altogether.
Second, it can still be argued that the minimum wage has
adverse employment effects with respect to particular lowwage groups such as young nonwhites, women or indeed any
group whose wage is below the statutory minimum. This
argument applies especially to young nonwhites since their
numbers will decline only slightly during the 1980s and there
is every indication their unemployment rate will remain inor
dinately high.
A closer look at the labor force status of these different
groups, however, raises serious questions about this line of
analysis. With respect to women, for example, there is no
evidence that their employment status has worsened as a
result of the minimum wage; in fact, as already noted, it ap
pears that the number of full time jobs for women has been
7. Arvil V. Adams and Garth L Mangum, The Lingering Crisis of Youth Unemployment
(Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1978), p. 127
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increased rather than decreased by this legislation as
employers have substituted unskilled women for teenagers. 8
As to young people generally, it is important to remember
that, while over 40 percent are employed in any given year,
the great majority are enrolled in school and any work they
do consists of temporary jobs during the summer combined
with part time work during the school year. The adverse ef
fects of the minimum wage on such persons, if in fact they
occur, constitute a far less serious cost than if they were full
time workers. Unemployment among the latter group,
especially among nonwhites in inner-city areas, poses ex
tremely serious problems, but that the minimum wage is a
major impediment even in their case seems unlikely. Lower
ing the minimum wage would cut across the entire range of
low-wage labor, not just young, out-of-school job seekers,
so the latter would still be at the end of the labor queue in
competing for available openings. Proposals to establish a
special lower minimum rate for this particularly hard-toemploy group deserve consideration but, administrative dif
ficulties aside, there is little evidence to indicate that merely
reducing the applicable rate would alter their employment
status to any significant degree. For young school dropouts,
especially nonwhites in inner-city areas, the barriers to
employment are the product of a complex of factors in
cluding deficiencies in skill training, basic educational
preparation and inadequate work experience, to say nothing
of employer flight from particular localities and the general
deterioration of whole inner-city areas. At the very least,
even if a lower special group rate were established, emphasis
would still need to be placed on dealing with these more fun
damental factors.
Third, as suggested above, an effective attack on the pro
blems of hard-core unemployment has to be carefully
8. Gramhch, Impact of Minimum Wages, p. 443.
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tailored to the needs of the particular groups involved with
sufficiently concentrated, sustained efforts regarding the
most hard-to-employ to make meaningful outcomes possi
ble. What the specific ingredients of such an approach would
be is impossible to say if for no other reason than because of
the varying characteristics of the different groups involved.
The element common to the members of all these groups,
however, is an inability to meet and maintain minimum per
formance standards of employers, whether in the private or
public sector. In a very short-run sense, the wage is of course
one determinant involved, but the principal barrier in a more
basic sense is a lack of essential employable qualities. In
deed, this is precisely the factor that distinguishes the hardto-employ from other unemployed groups. It follows that
any program that does not make this factor its primary focus
cannot hope to succeed.
The foregoing considerations apply with special force in
periods of business expansion and rising employment. The
main hope for the hard-to-employ acquiring stable jobs is in
such periods which in turn makes it doubly important they
can qualify for such openings as they develop. Seen in this
light, emphasis on the applicable wage, whether determined
by legislative action or other means, has little relevance to
the central issues involved.

Work Disincentive Barriers
Increasing attention has been given in recent years to the
charge that an important part of structural unemployment is
attributable to government policies, particularly with respect
to unemployment insurance and various assistance pro
grams. This is said to follow from the fact that these pro
grams make it possible for workers to "go on the dole" in
stead of taking whatever jobs are available. As recent in
vestigations make clear, this turns out to be a most com-
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plicated issue, making any sweeping conclusion impossible.
Only a few of the most important findings can be noted here.
There is no question but what government income support
programs tend to discourage job seeking and job holding
among groups that are particularly subject to structural
unemployment. Common sense leads to no other conclusion.
If someone can receive a monthly check without working
that is larger or even merely somewhat smaller than what
could be gotten from working, why bother to look for a job?
The issue, then, is how much of the country's unemployment
can be attributed to this feature of the government's income
support system.
A full answer to this question would require a detailed
review of the present system of income supports in relation
to incomes received from working and an analysis of how
workers respond to this relationship under different cir
cumstances. Before considering the unemployment in
surance and public assistance programs in these terms, some
general observations are worth noting.
As in most other aspects of the structural unemployment
problem, the nature of this issue is greatly altered when the
economy moves from low to high unemployment. When
jobs become scarce and those that exist are not likely to last
long, nonwork sources of income become the principal
means of livelihood for increasing numbers of people. In
ducements to seek out job openings decline while incentives
to "stretch the rules" and qualify for some type of income
support program become greater. The opposite tends to oc
cur when job openings multiply and the unemployment rate
falls. This is not to say that such programs do not aggravate
the jobless problem in periods of low unemployment; in fact,
their relative importance increases at such times because
most of the unemployment that remains in prosperities is of
a frictional and structural nature, the types of unemploy-
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ment most directly affected by income support programs.
Nonetheless, it becomes far easier to prevent abuses of these
programs when jobs are plentiful than when they are scarce.
Much controversy, however, exists over what constitutes
abuses of the present system of supports and how far society
should go in preventing them. Is a mother who is'the sole
support of a couple of children under the age of six, or even
ten or twelve, "abusing" the public assistance program by
choosing to stay home rather than take a job? Is a person on
unemployment insurance who holds out for a job offer at a
wage rate comparable to what was received on the last job
guilty of malingering? How detailed and intensive should
government investigative efforts be in tracking down those
who no longer qualify for benefits? The answers to these and
similar questions turn largely on personal values and social
outlooks, making clear that the country's income support
programs will remain controversial simply because they
reflect such a variety of personal views.
Any assessment of the effects on unemployment of these
programs will largely depend on whether the issue is ap
proached from the viewpoint of achieving more competitive
labor market conditions or, alternatively, from the view
point of achieving a higher minimum level of income for
everyone, another instance of the perennial conflict between
efficiency and equity. If efficient allocation of labor is the
goal, the case for severely limiting the coverage of income
support programs as well as the level and duration of
benefits becomes very strong. If a "decent" minimum living
standard for all is the goal, the associated costs of inefficient
labor markets may well seem acceptable.
In recent years, however, a rather different approach to
income support programs has emerged which should go
some way at least towards reconciling these two objectives.
According to this view, such programs need not necessarily

86

Work Disincentive Barriers

discourage job seeking or work effort as long as care is taken
to insure that incomes are significantly increased from work
ing, even if some part of a person's income still comes from
nonwork sources. Controversy continues over how high the
income support minimum should be, how much net gain
from working should be allowed, where the cutoff in support
payments should come as incomes rise, and how much
pressure or coercion should be brought to bear on "ablebodied" relief recipients to take jobs, but the basic idea of
combining income supports and work incentives is now
widely accepted. These considerations apply particularly to
the country's welfare programs, which are taken up in the
concluding section of this chapter, but they also have an im
portant bearing on the possible work disincentive effects of
the nation's unemployment insurance system.

Unemployment Compensation System
The country's first line of defense against the hardships
associated with unemployment is the federal-state unemploy
ment compensation system established under the Social
Security Act of 1935. Historically, coverage was limited
primarily to industrial and commercial workers, but protec
tion has since been extended to include agricultural workers,
domestics, and other groups as well. At the same time, as
wages generally have increased, benefit levels have been rais
ed through cooperative federal-state action. Even excluding
the extra unemployment compensation attributable to the
1973-1975 recession, unemployment benefits rose from $3
billion in 1965 to $9 billion in 1977.
The major purpose and effect of the law is to lessen the
impact of unemployment on those who involuntarily lose
their jobs by providing them with cash benefits (usually
about 50 percent of prior earnings) for relatively brief
periods (usually about 25 weeks, though Congress has been
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quick to extend benefits during periods of rising unemploy
ment). 9 One of the principal advantages of the system is that
it is automatically countercyclical to the extent that benefits
paid out increase in recessions and decline in expansions.
Thus between 1973 and 1975 the number of first benefit
recipients rose from about 5 to 11 million and total benefits
from about $4 to $12 billion. 10 It has been estimated that
unemployment insurance has cushioned about 10 percent of
the declines in GNP that have occurred since 1948 and that
the unemployment rate would have risen 3.63 percentage
points, as against the actual rise of about 3.3 points that oc
curred on average during these periods. 11 This estimate
assumes that even though the taxes on employer payrolls that
finance unemployment benefits tend to move procyclically,
since in most states they are tied to individual company per
formance by the so-called merit rating mechanism, the tax
rate adjustments involved occur too slowly to have much of
a destabilizing effect. While the main countercyclical effect
of unemployment benefits was felt in recessions, especially
steep recessions, this meant that the unemployment rate in
the subsequent expansion periods was also probably
somewhat less.
In recent years, a number of economists, notably Arthur
Burns and Martin Feldstein, have argued that certain
features of the unemployment insurance system have an
adverse effect on the unemployment level. As already in
dicated, their general finding that payment for not working
lessens incentives to find new work is unassailable, but how
important this effect is remains in doubt. After a careful
review of the literature, Daniel Hamermesh concluded that if
9 In the 1970s, emergency bills extended the duration of benefits to as much as 65 weeks.
10. Employment and Training Report of the President, 1977, p. 270. Not all the increases
were due to automatic adjustments in payments.
11. Hamermesh, Jobless Pay and the Economy, pp. 60-64
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the unemployment rate were 4 percent in the absence of the
unemployment insurance system, the presence of the system
raises the rate to about 4.5 percent. Other investigators put
the effect at slightly under this amount. 12 Contrary to
popular impression, however, this outcome cannot be at
tributed to the rise in benefit rate levels; since 1956, the years
when the level of unemployment in high employment periods
rose markedly, the ratio of average unemployment benefits
to average weekly earnings only increased by 2.7 percentage
points. Essentially the same holds for the lengthening in the
period unemployment benefits can be received which now
stands at 26 weeks in most states and 39 weeks in a few
others; extensions beyond 39 weeks have been permitted but
only on a temporary basis and apply to periods of recession
rather than to periods of high employment. Even assuming
that the longer duration of benefits has served to increase the
unemployment level in periods of high employment, it is im
portant to consider whether lengthening search times for
locating new and presumably "better" jobs do not carry im
portant benefits for workers, employers and the general
public. While some investigators have concluded that longer
benefits to individuals have led to higher subsequent earn
ings when employed, others are skeptical whether the rela
tionship can be quantified. 13 All that can be safely concluded
is that the benefits of longer job search offset some portion,
conceivably all, of the adverse effects of the system on job
seeking behavior.
The main adverse effects of the system on unemployment
in high employment environments can be traced to the
broadening coverage of the law, first in 1954, when Congress
extended the size of covered employers to those with four or
12 Ibid , p 52. See also, Arnold Katz, ed , "The Economics of Unemployment InsuranceA Symposium," Industrial and Labor Relations Review (July 1977)
13. Katz, ed., Economics of Unemployment Insurance, pp. 433-434.
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more employees for 20 weeks a year, then in 1970, to covered
employers of one or more employees for 20 weeks a year as
well as to most nonprofit organizations and finally in 1976,
to almost all of the remaining nonprofit organizations and
even some agricultural workers and household domestics.
Today, the federal-state unemployment compensation
system covers over 95 percent of the country's employed
wage and salary employees.
The result has been that many lower skilled workers in
relatively unstable jobs are now eligible for unemployment
benefits. As a consequence, so it is argued, more persons
with unstable job patterns (i.e., who are jobless prone) have
entered the labor force and thereby pushed up the unemploy
ment rate. This again raises the vexatious question of the
hitherto "discouraged workers" who become encouraged
during periods of strong business expansion to seek paying
jobs. The fact that many such workers become job holders
and job seekers in such periods is clear enough, but whether
the prospect of unemployment benefits plays an important
part in their behavior is not. Lacking any evidence to the
contrary, it seems likely that other and more immediate in
centives such as next month's pay check play a far more
significant role.
There is one aspect of the matter, however, which war
rants special attention, namely the tendency of the
unemployment insurance system to promote greater
seasonal, and possibly even greater cyclical, instability in
employment and output. This follows from the fact that
both workers and employers can, at least to some extent,
adapt their work behavior and production schedules to take
advantage of the system's benefit provisions. Estimates of
this effect are, however, subject to innumerable qualifica
tions. On the assumption of an unemployment rate of 4 per
cent, Hamermesh estimated that this feature of the system
has increased the overall rate by about .075 percentage
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points. If firms were taxed exactly in proportion to their
relative unemployment level (i.e., if the experience rating
system were perfect), no increase from this source would oc
cur. 14
Summing up, neither systematic research investigations
nor recent experience support the view that the unemploy
ment insurance system has significantly raised the country's
unemployment level in high employment periods. Any pro
nouncements or findings to the contrary call for most
cautious treatment or as concluded in a recent symposium on
the subject:
The apparently strong empirical evidence reported
here that UI increases unemployment must be weighed
against the many pitfalls and still unresolved conceptual
issues encountered in measuring UI total benefits. 15
As regards the effect of specific features of the unemploy
ment insurance system on unemployment, some further
strengthening of the experience rating basis of taxing
employers in the direction just noted and a general tightening
of the work test requirements in a number of the states
would seem in order. Similarly, any marked rise in highemployment periods in the present benefit-to-wage ratio
would seem imprudent. On the other hand, such sweeping
proposals as making unemployment benefits subject to tax
or shifting the basis for experience rating from the firm to
the individual would not be warranted. Not only would such
moves be highly questionable on general economic and social
grounds, but also when viewed in more narrow terms their
contribution to lowering the unemployment rate would most
likely prove insignificant.

14. Hamermesh, Jobless Pay and the Economy, p. 71
15 Katz, ed , Economics of Unemployment Insurance, p. 437.
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Income Support Programs
The effects on the unemployment rate of income support
programs on behalf of the nation's poor are even more dif
ficult to pin down than the employment effects of the
unemployment insurance system. There are presently over 40
programs which provide such supports. Broadly defined, aid
to the poor should include social insurance and medicare,
since they provide important benefits to low income groups,
but attention here is limited to welfare or means-tested pro
grams. 16
The current debate over the nation's welfare programs
centers largely on the aid to families with dependent children
program (AFDC), although the food stamps and medicaid
programs have also been receiving increasing attention.
AFDC rolls have swelled dramatically since the early 1960s;
between 1965 and 1975, for example, total benefit costs rose
five times and the number of recipients two and a half times.
In July 1976, there were 11 million recipients of whom only
about 5.5 percent fell in the unemployed-father category. 17
In more recent years, however, there has been relatively little
growth in the welfare rolls.
Three factors were primarily responsible for this increase:
the number of families with children headed by women rose
sharply, standards of eligibility were loosened, and the pro
portion of those eligible claiming payments more than
doubled. In fiscal 1977, total expenditures on AFDC came to
about $10 billion of which a little over half was provided by
the federal government and the balance by state and local
governments. Since it is highly probable that the level of
16. In fiscal 1976 social insurance benefits including unemployment compensation con
stituted over 50 percent of total income after taxes and transfers of the lowest quintile of
the income distribution Joseph Pechman, ed., Setting National Priorities: The 1978
Budget (Washington Brookings Institution, 1977), p. 252
17. Ibid., p 256.
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AFDC benefits will be raised still higher in the years ahead
and that its coverage will be extended to include even more
working persons on low incomes, the question of the effects
of this massive program on the unemployment rate is of
critical importance.
While a number of aspects of this issue remain unclear, the
evidence on certain points is quite firm. First, a substantial
proportion (probably over 60 percent) of individuals official
ly defined as poor, are incapable of working, 44 percent be
ing children, 11 percent aged, and 5 percent nonaged adults;
beyond this is an additional percentage accounted for by
women with very young children. 18
Second, poor people capable of working are prepared to
work where there is some tangible gain involved and, in the
case of welfare mothers, where minimum family needs can
be met. Even under the existing welfare system, about 30
percent of the families leave AFDC within a year and 60 per
cent within three years. 19 In fact, 22 percent of the heads of
poor families were found to have worked at least part time
and 13 percent full time during the year in fiscal 1978.
Moreover, even the proportion of working mothers on
welfare who were in the labor force rose from 19 percent in
1961 to 28 percent in 1973. Several controlled experiments in
New Jersey and elsewhere have shown that work done by
male heads of households would only be reduced by about 5
to 10 percent with the introduction of cash welfare benefits.
The reduction for wives and teenagers, however, two groups
that are heavily represented among the structurally
unemployed, would be considerably greater. 20
18 Ibid., p 258
19 Sar A Levitan, Martin Rein, and David Marwick, Work and Welfare Go Together
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkms Press, 1973), p. 50
20. Pechman, ed , Setting National Priorities The 1978 Budget, pp. 258-259.

Work Disincentive Barriers

93

Third, the present structure of welfare aid in this country
still discourages recipients of such aid from taking work.
Since 1969 the states have been required to exempt earnings
of $30 per month plus one-third of all additional income and
work expenses in determining an AFDC family's needs. This
leaves little incentive to seek earnings from work as a means
of supplementing income from welfare, especially since such
earnings are likely to be subject to Social Security tax,
federal income tax and possibly state income tax, in addition
to the possibility of disqualifying the recipient for any
Medicaid benefits whatsoever. Analysis of preliminary data
shows that a typical AFDC recipient who accepts a public
service employment job, for example, is subject to a 61 per
cent benefit reduction rate, meaning that after taking ac
count of the reduction in AFDC, food stamps, and child care
payments that result from taking one of these jobs, the recip
ient stands to increase his or her family income by only 39
percent over what would have been received in transfer
payments. A major purpose behind the Administration's
current proposals to establish a national income guarantee
plan is to reduce these overlapping features of the present
welfare system and, as a consequence, increase the incentive
for recipients to seek work.
Those advocating that all able-bodied persons on welfare
take jobs are faced with a formidable dilemma: any volun
tary program, to be successful, would require relatively high
and therefore very costly wages, while any involuntary pro
gram would entail an excessive degree of coercion. A middle
road requiring all applicants for AFDC to register in the
Work Incentive Program (WIN) has been followed since
1967. Those considered employable were ordered to be ready
to go to work or, if no jobs were available, to take training to
qualify for later jobs. Initially, emphasis was placed on the
training element, but especially since 1971 the focus has been
on the job placement provision. Helped by the general up-
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swing in business and, to a limited extent, by the more inten
sive effort to increase job placements, the number of full
time jobs obtained by WIN registrants rose from about
170,000 in fiscal 1975 to nearly 300,000 in fiscal 1976; the
total fell to a little over 250,000 by fiscal 1978. 21
Critics of the present work and training requirement fall
into two camps. There are those who argue that the greatest
possible emphasis should be placed on voluntary responses
of welfare recipients. This would entail providing them with
a wide range of job and training opportunities in both the
private and public sector at prevailing market wages, oppor
tunities that would be geared to the recipients' long term
career needs and particular capacities. Estimates of the
number of jobs that would be needed to provide work for
every able-bodied person range from 2.5 to 5 million, de
pending on the wage rate and comprehensiveness of the
coverage. 22 The distinctive feature of this group's view is not
so much the large number of jobs that would be required but
the kinds of jobs and the levels of remuneration that would
be entailed since the terms of employment would have to be
sufficiently favorable to keep the program on a voluntary
response basis.
At the other extreme are those who argue that every
welfare recipient capable of working should be required to
take a job or enter a training program even on terms that
may be considered unacceptable to the individuals involved.
21. Since March 1976, AFDC applicants have been required to register at their state
employment service office or (in the case of two states) a similar office, instead of their
local welfare agency. This has had the effect of giving them more direct access to job open
ings. Employment and Training Report of the President, 1977, p 58.See also the Work In
centive Program 9th Annual Report to the Congress, WIN: 1968-1978 (U.S. Departments
of Labor and Health, Education and Welfare, 1979; processed)
22. Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy, JOIN A Jobs and Income
Program for American Families, Studies in Public Welfare, Paper No. 19 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 60

Work Disincentive Barriers

95

They too emphasize the importance of getting people off
welfare and into work or training, but they draw the line at
providing opportunities that would attract AFDC recipients
on a purely voluntary basis. This, it is felt, would entail enor
mous expense, put people into jobs for which they are not
qualified, and in all likelihood lead to a dangerous expansion
in the role of government. The key difference in the two
views comes in the degree of coercion that would be involv
ed.
The issues raised in this controversy give no promise of be
ing resolved in the near future, but there is a strong
likelihood that a middle-road approach will finally emerge if
for no other reason than that the practical difficulties of
adhering to either of the extreme positions would be enor
mous. Such an approach would aim at providing work op
portunities for welfare recipients at whatever levels they are
qualified for and, in the case of those who refuse the oppor
tunities offered, require entrance into a training or worktraining program designed to fit them for regular employ
ment. This would involve a very substantial broadening of
the WIN program with far greater emphasis than heretofore
on making sure that job opportunities appropriate to the
skills and personal situations of employable welfare recip
ients are in fact present.
Viewed in this light the job and career needs of persons on
welfare are essentially no different from those not on welfare
who also suffer special difficulties in finding and holding
jobs. In both instances, the critical questions to be resolved
are the same: where are the job and career openings for
which they might qualify and how can they acquire the skills
and aptitudes necessary to perform these jobs and to enter
some type of career? These two questions, to which the re
mainder of this study is largely addressed, go to the heart of
the structural unemployment problem.

Chapter 6
Discriminatory Employment Barriers
In contrast to wage and related forms of exclusion as well
as work disincentives associated with income support pro
grams, discriminatory practices barring certain groups from
major lines of work because of their race, sex, age or religion
are a key element in explaining the persistence of structural
unemployment in periods of general prosperity. In fact, bas
ed on certain definitions of the term, discrimination can be
viewed as the single most important cause of such unemploy
ment.
The clearest but least important forms of discrimination in
the job market consist of explicit and direct bars to employ
ment based on personal attributes wholly unrelated to per
formance in the particular work involved, such as exclusion
of qualified nonwhites from certain lines of factory or office
work. A much more significant type of discrimination con
sists of general institutional bars to employment which limit
different groups of the population to certain fields of work,
largely excluding them from most others. The latter barrier
shows up in statistics on the occupational distribution of
nonwhites and of women, the well-known phenomenon of
"blacks' jobs" and "women's jobs," but its exact nature is
hard to identify. A complete explanation would doubtless
take account of a broad range of historical influences in
cluding the heritage of the southern plantation system, the
97
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development of the family, the country's educational struc
ture, the shift from a rural-agriculture to an urban-factory
environment, and the like. Again, the exact extent of this
barrier is hard to measure but there is no reason to doubt its
pervasiveness and deep-seated character.
Confronted with these two types of limitations, nonwhites
and women frequently face but two alternatives in a given
labor market: either accept work in the narrowly defined
lines that by longstanding custom have come to be
designated for them, or subsist on income from unemploy
ment insurance, welfare or a variety of borderline and even
illicit activities. In tightly constricted environments of this
sort, confirming attitude and behavior patterns are likely to
spread, affecting broader groups of workers, employers and
members of the general public. As a result, a virtually im
pregnable set of barriers may emerge, cutting off many nonwhite and women workers from the broader labor market,
and inducing either relatively high unemployment rates or in
creased dropout rates from the labor force.
Despite these adverse circumstances, important progress
has been made since the early 1940s in opening up career op
portunities for nonwhites and women. The tight labor
markets associated with World War II provided a powerful
thrust in this direction. Later, with the long upswing of the
1960s, both groups began to enter career lines that had been
previously closed to them. Fewer than one out of five nonwhites worked in white-collar occupations in 1964 but by
1974 about one in three were in these jobs. During this
period there was a significant drop in the proportion of nonwhites in service occupations, particularly the private
household category. Within the blue-collar field, there was a
substantial shift among such workers from the unskilled into
the operative and craft trades during this same period (see
table 6-1).
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Table 64
Employment by Occupation Group and Race, 1964 and 1974
(Percent distribution)

1964
Negro and
other races
White

1974
Negro and
White
other races

Total: Number (thousands) ......

61,922
100.0

7,383
100.0

76,620
100.0

9,316
100.0

White-collar workers
Professional and technical. . . .
Managers and administrators,

47.6
13.0

6.8
6.8

50.6
14.8

32.0
10.4

11.7
6.6
16.3
36.1
13.7
18.4
4.1
10.5
5.8

2.6
1.7
7.7
40 g
7.1
20.5
13.0
32.3
8.4

11.2
6.8
17.8
33.9
13.3
15.5
4.6
12.0
3.6

41
2.3
15.2

Occupation group

Sales workers ................

Nonfarm laborers...
Service workers. ...............
....
Farmworkers . . ....

40 2
9.4

21.9
8.9
2S 1

2.7

Source: Manpower Report of the President, 1975, p. 34.
Note: The data for 1974 are not strictly comparable with those of 1964 as a result of
changes in the classification of occupations to accord with the 1970 Census. Detail may not
add to totals because of rounding.

Important as these gains are, nonwhites remain seriously
underrepresented in the higher status occupations. In 1974,
about 15 percent of white workers were in the professional
category and 11 percent in the managerial and administrative
category as against only 10 percent and 4 percent respectively
of nonwhite workers (see table 6-1).
While nonwhites were scoring these relatively modest
gains, women during this period achieved even fewer. Be
tween 1947 and 1976 the proportion of women in the
nation's civilian labor force rose from about 17 percent to 40
percent but their concentration in the "feminine" jobs of
secretaries and typists, retail clerks, bookkeepers, teachers
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and waitresses remained nearly as great as before. 1 Women
have made some headway in breaking into such professions
as accounting, where they constitute about 24 percent of the
total, but still make up only miniscule proportions of such
professional groups as physicians and lawyers.
During the 1970s there was some further improvement in
the occupational status of nonwhites and women, particular
ly if the comparisons are limited to relatively prosperous
years when the unemployment rate stood at 6 percent or less.
Between 1969 and 1978, for example, the proportion of nonwhites (black and other) in the professional and technical
category rose from 8.3 to 11.7 percent while the proportion
in the managers and administrators category rose from 2.5 to
4.8 percent. Similarly, the proportion of women in the
former category rose from 13.8 to 15.6 percent and in the lat
ter category from 4.3 to 6.1 percent over this same period.
Similar shifts, though less clearcut, occurred in such bluecollar categories as craft and kindred workers. 2 These gains
were especially noteworthy since, in relation to 1969, labor
market conditions in 1978 were comparatively unfavorable.
Again, however, the improvements did not alter the occupa
tional distribution in favor of these groups in any fundamen
tal way.
The fact that many nonwhites and women are effectively
cut off from a wide range of employment opportunities
because of their race and sex leads directly to more structural
unemployment. Once employed, these workers are generally
not allowed to compete for any openings other than in their
restricted zones of work, even though many vacancies may
have developed in other fields. The indirect, long term ef
fects, however, are far more serious. Workers subject to
1. Manpower Report of the President, 1975 (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1976), p 32.

2. Employment and Training Report of the President, 1979, pp. 261 and 263.
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labor market discrimination see little to be gained from ac
quiring advanced skills if there is hardly any probability of
their being used. Improved work habits, closer attention on
the job, more readiness to cooperate with others these are
attributes which are associated with stable work histories and
a reasonable chance for career advancement; they have much
less, if any, meaning where jobs are highly unstable and
career progression very unlikely. In these circumstances,
employer attitudes towards such workers tend to become in
creasingly negative so that not even the first steps towards
better training and improved job performance are likely to
be taken. The attitudes of more experienced workers and
even the general public become more negative and the circle
of negative expectations and work-resistant practices is
thereby made complete.

Reducing Discriminatory Barriers
The main effort to break through these barriers by legal
means and open a wider range of job opportunities to the
disadvantaged stems from the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Under Title VII of this law, a five-member Equal Employ
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has the responsibili
ty of assuring that hiring, promotion and firing are on the
basis of ability and qualifications without regard to race, col
or, religious belief, sex or national origin. The main work of
the Commission has consisted of investigating complaints of
discrimination on a case-by-case basis and encouraging com
pliance through informal conciliation procedures. In the 31
states with Fair Employment Practices Commissions, EEOC
must defer action for 60 days until the state or local unit has
shown an inability to resolve the complaint. Prior to 1972,
legal action to implement the terms of Title VII could only be
brought by private parties or by the Justice Department, an
especially expensive and formidable procedure from the
viewpoint of lower paid workers. An important change oc-
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curred in that year when Congress authorized EEOC to bring
civil suits on its own motion. Fear of legal action and the
possibility of costly settlements has induced more willingness
among employers to agree to voluntary settlements.
The trend was accelerated when EEOC became more ac
tive in filing civil court class action cases. A significant turn
ing point occurred in 1973 when American Telephone and
Telegraph signed a consent decree providing $15 million in
restitution and back pay for several classes of female
employees and a $23 million promotion package for women
and minorities. 3 Two other actions were: (1) the 1974 con
sent decree entered into by nine major steel companies and
the United Steelworkers granting 40,000 minority and
women workers $30.9 million in back pay and establishing
goals and timetables to increase the number of women and
minority workers in areas in which they had been underrepresented; 4 (2) the 1978 settlement agreed to by General
Electric which provided $29.4 million in benefits to women
and minority workers plus $3 million to improve affirmative
action plans. 5
The Commission's impact on employment practices also
increased as it developed more precise definitions and
criteria in passing on discrimination cases. Thus, an
employer was entitled to set tests or other objective stan
dards for hiring but these must be related to job performance
and not serve merely as a discriminatory screening device.
Employers subject to Title VII are now prohibited from
recruiting through their current employees or through the
3. In 1978, the Supreme Court left standing a lower court decision upholding this decree,
thereby indicating support for affirmative action programs that remedy past discrimination
in employment even when they conflict with established union seniority systems. New York
Times, July 4, 1978.
4. Levitan, Mangum, and Marshall, Human Resources and Labor Markets, p. 454.
5. New York Times, June 16, 1978.
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union office if they get few black applicants and the racial
composition of their workforce differs significantly from
that of the community. 6 The courts have moved, though
with less success, to establish similar criteria with respect to
union participation in hiring and recruitment procedures,
notably in the building trades.
The other main legal device for putting job opportunities
on a nondiscriminatory basis is based on Executive Order
11246 which was issued by President Johnson and which
President Nixon allowed to remain in effect. The Executive
Order is administered by the Department of Labor's Office
of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC). The order covers
all employers who have federal contracts and includes com
panies with an estimated employment of 40 million persons,
about two-fifths of the labor force. It not only forbids con
tractors to discriminate on the basis of race, creed, color,
sex, or national origin, but also requires that they take "af
firmative action" to guarantee equal access.
Under this requirement, companies must make an analysis
of all major job classifications and provide an explanation
for any underutilization of minorities; they must further set
specific goals to remedy any identified shortcomings and
supply relevant data to the appropriate government
organizations on racial-occupational categories, racial
backgrounds of job applicants, job progression charts and
seniority rosters. Affirmative action under Executive Order
11246 may in given cases require still further steps on the
part of companies to increase and upgrade minority employ
ment: recruiting visits to secondary schools with high black
enrollment; advertising for employees in black community
newspapers; and special training courses for the transfer and
upgrading of black employees into all-white departments. In
6 See symposium, "Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964," Harvard Law Review (March 1971), p. 1114 ff.
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the case of the construction industry, minority employment
goals, as opposed to quotas, have been set for individual
crafts in some cities in accordance with the "Philadelphia
Plan" concept (discussed below). It should be noted that Ex
ecutive Order 11246, unlike Title VII, contains stiff sanc
tions including cancellation, termination, suspension of con
tracts and "blacklisting" of noncomplying companies. 7
The predominant view among impartial investigators is
that, while significant in individual cases, these two legal
devices have as yet had little observable impact on general
hiring and employment practices. Stress is laid on the fact
that the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division has a
very limited staff assigned to this area of work, that the
focus of both the EEOC and OFCC is still on case-by-case
dealings with individual (usually large) companies and chief
ly on mere appeals for voluntary cooperation.
In the case of EEOC, Congress has rejected efforts to
amend Title VII so that it would have the power to issue
cease-and-desist orders, thereby severely undercutting its ac
tivities. While OFCC on the other hand has sanction powers,
it has invoked them but rarely; moreover, its executive
orders refer only to government contractors and do not
directy affect unions even in situations where they are the
major or exclusive sources of labor.
Critics have put greatest emphasis on the need for drastic
administrative reforms. In late 1977, EEOC had a backlog
of 130,000 unsettled cases and two years were required to set
tle the average case. Since its inception in 1965, the agency
has had seven chairmen, three in the three years ending in
1977. OFCC also appears to have lacked any clear direction.
Enforcement procedures have been particularly weak, with
only fifteen noncomplying employers barred from getting
7 See Gordon F. Bloom and Herbert R. Northrup, Economics of Labor Relations, pp.
705-714
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more federal contracts in twelve years in the pre-1977 period.
It is also charged that while these two agencies are mainly
responsible for the government's antidiscrimination efforts,
there are in fact twenty-five separate agencies, each with its
own rules and procedures, operating in this field. In the
words of a 1976 report of the House Labor Committee's
Subcommittee on Equal Opportunities:
Our findings indicate a weak, uncoordinated and
largely ineffective enforcement effort on the part of
those agencies charged with preventing employment
discrimination. 8
Since 1977, a determined effort has been made to reduce the
backlog of cases at EEOC and to strengthen the enforcement
procedures of OFCC, but much work remains to be done.

Antidiscrimination Policies
and Structural Unemployment
While overhaul of the government's administrative
machinery in this field is clearly called for, the question at
issue here is whether even the most efficiently run program
would make a major contribution to reducing structural
unemployment within the foreseeable future. In terms of
providing a general framework for effective action, the
answer is definitely in the affirmative, but in terms of
specific lines of action, the answer appears to be quite other
wise. Except where explicit forms of discrimination are in
volved, the issues are not clearcut enough to be handled by
legal means. In attempting to apply uniform antidiscrimina
tion requirements to widely diverse work situations, the
limits where the rights and interest of injured groups also
become involved are soon reached. Other factors having to
do with the general level of employment, productivity dif
ferences, and the like have a more direct bearing on the
8. Wall Street Journal, August 26, 1977.
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nature and extent of structural unemployment. Unless these
direct factors can be substantially altered, attempts to reduce
such unemployment by antidiscrimination directives are
almost bound to fail.
What, then, are the conditions that would have to be met
if an antidiscrimination program for dealing with structural
unemployment were to be successful? First, as already in
dicated, labor markets would have to be generally tight. As
long as there is an overall slack in employment that affects
even "fully qualified, fully acceptable" workers, those view
ed as less qualified are apt to continue to be largely blocked
from employment.
Second, where jobs are to be made available to workers
who are viewed as being less qualified, certain economic in
centives and perhaps penalties will be required. This may en
tail subsidies and tax adjustments to induce employers,
unions or particular worker groups to assume the added
costs. Efforts to promote job entry by quota, however, will
almost surely encounter severe resistance, so chief emphasis
will still need to be placed on voluntary acceptance by the
parties involved.
Third, explicit provision will be needed to insure that the
productivity of such workers is brought up to the levels nor
mally required of new hires. While it is clear that many of the
factors determining job performance, such as one's
neighborhood environment, quality of educational prepara
tion, and type of previous skill training, may themselves be
the product of discrimination, it is equally clear that direct
ing employers to take on less productive workers without ex
plicit recognition of the extra costs involved can hardly prove
successful. Rather, the focus of public policy should be on
giving discriminated workers as much opportunity to in
crease their productive efficiency as workers generally, but
not to guarantee job entry regardless of performance con
siderations.
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Fourth, extensive governmental effort along a variety of
related lines aimed at reducing other barriers to employment
will be required if any real progress is to be made against
discrimination in labor markets. In some communities, par
ticularly in large metropolitan areas, a major overhaul in
transportation facilities may be necessary; in some, extensive
changes in housing patterns; in others, substantial infusions
of capital in potential growth fields accessible to hard-toemploy groups; in still others, sustained campaigns to raise
the quality of educational opportunities available to young
people from disadvantaged families. Unless there is public
acceptance of the need for strong (and costly!) actions along
these lines, legal restrictions on discriminatory employment
practices designed to reduce structural unemployment will
prove largely fruitless.

Hiring Goals, Seniority
and Apprentice Programs
The difficulties besetting present programs become clear
when attention centers on particular issues, three of which
will be noted here. The first is the use of specific goals and
timetables as a means of raising the proportion of blacks or
other disadvantaged groups in higher skilled occupations.
This has remained a highly controversial issue ever since
1967 when the Department of Labor's Office of Federal
Contract Compliance sought to require building contractors
in Philadelphia to commit themselves to specific goals of
minority manpower utilization.
Rather than impose specific quotas, the government soon
made clear that it merely required good faith effort on the
contractors' part to meet their commitment to attain certain
goals. 9 Similar efforts have been made in Chicago, Seattle
9 This was the federal district court's view of the Philadelphia Plan; see Contractors
Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Shultz, District Court, Eastern Pennsylvania
(1970), the Supreme Court refused to review this case.
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and some twenty other cities, though with greater emphasis
on voluntary agreements between union, contractor and
minority group representatives. Even in the relatively pros
perous pre-1974 years, however, a survey of 31 of 70
government-approved plans showed that less than a third of
the local unions had met their goals. Given continued slug
gish conditions in construction, it is doubtful that this record
has been improved subsequently.
However laudable their objectives, progress under affir
mative action plans will necessarily be painfully slow except
under conditions of extremely tight labor supplies. In looser
supply situations, workers who long since achieved
journeyman or related skill status will quite understandably
insist on filling whatever openings may occur. To do other
wise would mean, at least in the short run, supplanting the
more experienced and presumably more skilled with the less
experienced and the less skilled. Such bald displays of reverse
discrimination could hardly provide a solid basis for public
policy.
As to the strictly legal issues involved, much confusion ex
ists over how far private parties or the government can go in
this direction without causing reverse bias prohibited by the
1964 Civil Rights Act or by the guarantees of equal protec
tion and due process provided by the Constitution. Under re
cent rulings of the Supreme Court the principle that affir
mative action plans are legal is now quite firmly established.
True, in the 1978 Alan Bakke case, the Court held by a 5 to 4
vote that it was illegal for the University of California at
Davis to reserve 16 of the 100 places in its medical school
class for minorities, but in the 1979 Brian Weber case the
Court, by a 5 to 2 vote, held that a voluntary affirmative ac
tion plan reserving half the slots in a skilled-craft training
program at the Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation
was legal. Moreover, in the 1980 Fullilove case the Court, by
a 6 to 3 vote, upheld the constitutionality of Congressional
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legislation establishing a federal public works program in
which 10 percent of spending was reserved for minority con
tractors. 10 Whether the Supreme Court will follow the same
reasoning embodied in the Weber and Fullilove decisions
with respect to questions of hiring, layoffs and promotion
remains unclear, but the widespread impact on affirmative
action policies of these two decisions will doubtless be mark
ed.
Even if the legal basis of such policies becomes firmly
established, their effectiveness as a means for reducing struc
tural unemployment would remain in doubt. Much would
depend on how much emphasis is placed on specific restric
tions and directives as against more positive, voluntary ac
tions. If it is concluded that existing job holders will have to
lose their positions to make way for minority workers, little
observable effect can be expected. If, on the other hand, em
phasis is placed on making sure that minority workers can
qualify for any future openings that might occur, a signifi
cant impact on the structural unemployment problem might
well occur. To the extent that legislation provides the general
framework within which employers, unions and local com
munities work out their employment problems, an
tidiscrimination laws are essential to effective action against
structural unemployment, but little contribution can be ex
pected if it means that existing job holders will be displaced.
A second issue leading to essentially the same result in
volves restructuring seniority systems to eliminate
discriminatory practices. In many firms, each department
has its own seniority roster and since entry to departments
with the better jobs was previously allocated along racial and
10 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 298 (1978), Steelworkers
Union v Weber, 443 U S. 193; Fullllove v Klutzmck, Secretary of Commerce, No. 78-1007
(July 2, 1980)
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sex lines, it becomes critically important whether departmen
tal seniority will be allowed to continue. This, however, is
just the first phase in what is frequently an extremely com
plicated restructuring process. If a firm or a firm and union
are required to shift to a plant-wide seniority system, should
provision be made for redressing past patterns of discrimina
tion? It could well be argued that simply permitting
previously excluded workers to gain places, presumably near
the bottom, in a broadened seniority system would not put
them on an equal footing in competing for available jobs; yet
how far should the courts go in ordering firms to give
preference to these workers over other more experienced
and, at least in an immediate sense, more qualified workers?
Thus far the courts have tried to follow a middle path
through this labyrinth. Thus, they have generally struck
down specific features of a seniority system that have the ef
fect of excluding particular groups from jobs because of race
or sex, e.g., unnecessarily long training periods or reductions
in wages as a condition for transfers. 11 On the other hand the
courts have held that no penalties can be imposed for
discriminatory acts committed before the Civil Rights Act of
1964. In what may prove to be a landmark decision, the U.S.
Supreme Court recently ruled that employees locked into in
ferior positions because of pre-Act discriminatory seniority
provisions could get no relief, but that for employees hired
after the Act, complete relief, including retroactive seniority
as far back as the effective date of the Act, is available. The
Court based this finding on Section 703(h) of Title VII which
it interpreted as meaning that Congress did not intend to
make it illegal for employees with vested seniority rights to

11. U.S. v. United Paper Makers, Local 189, 71 LRRM 2005 (1968) and Hicks v. Crown
Zellerback Corp , 69 LRRM 2005 (1968).
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continue to exercise those rights, even at the expense of preAct discriminatees. 12
However the question of segregated seniority rosters is ap
proached, it is evident that the process of resolving the
respective claims involved can only come slowly. No formula
is at hand for cutting through the various interests at stake in
any sweeping manner; a laborious and probably often
frustrating case-by-case approach seems inescapable. To
make this a major strategy for coping with structural
unemployment, therefore, would not seem promising.
A third issue to be considered is the development of
broader apprenticeship programs and (quite the opposite
consideration) a general attempt to deal with the "overcredential" problem in employer hiring and promotion pro
cedures. Both aspects of this issue bear on the role of educa
tion and training in structural unemployment, the subject of
the next section of this study. Here, attention is limited to
any discriminatory elements that may be involved.
Apprenticeship programs, whereby trainees work with ex
perienced journeymen for a stated period at lower wages
while they acquire the necessary "outside" training, have
largely been confined to construction, metal trades, printing
and such occupations as meat cutters and telephone linemen
and servicemen. As shown in table 6-2, the total number of
apprentices registered under government sponsorship has
come to a little under 300,000 in recent years as against about
160,000 in the mid-1950s. While numerically still unimpor
tant, apprenticeship training provides a clear-cut means for
inexperienced workers with limited education to gain access
12. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, U.S. Supreme Court, Nos
75-636 and 75-672, May 31, 1977 Section 703(h) reads in part. ". . . it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensa
tion, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide
seniority . . . system, provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to
or national origin ..."
discriminate because of race .
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to higher skilled, better paying jobs. Some progress has been
made in achieving greater minority worker participation in
such programs; according to the 1960 census, nonwhites ac
counted for only 2.5 percent of the total, but by 1975 they
made up about 17 percent. Women remained but a tiny por
tion, approximately 2 percent of the total. 13
Table 6-2
Training Status of Registered Apprentices, Selected Years, 1955-75
(in thousands)
159
1955
172
1960
171
1965
270
1970
251
1973*
285
1975
362
1977
Source: Employment and Training Report of the President, 1977, Table F-14, p 274, and
1979, pp. 56-57.
*New nationwide data system introduced January 1, 1973.

The reasons for the limited progress are clear enough: in
slack labor markets particularly, neither employers nor ex
isting journeyman groups are likely to be willing to extend
apprenticeship programs to new, hitherto excluded,
categories of workers. Nor, given the institutional limita
tions affecting their preparation and attitudes, are minority
applicants and women likely to have the qualifications for
entering such programs, assuming they even know of their
existence. A sustained government effort on both fronts
could yield significant results if job prospects become more
favorable.
A feature of apprentice and less formal recruitment pro
cedures that has become the center of much controversy is
13. Employment and Training Report of the President, 1977, pp. 67-68
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whether entrance or hiring qualifications in certain career
lines are kept unnecessarily high, with the effect of excluding
most minority and women applicants. Some apprentice plans
require as much as six years of training before journeyman
status is achieved, considerably longer than could con
ceivably be justified on grounds of skill acquisition. In cer
tain crafts where belonging to a union is a prerequisite for
entering a trade, training requirements are set in such a way
that membership is largely limited to relatives or personal
friends of existing members. Employers sometimes also
establish educational or intelligence test requirements which
largely rule out minority or women applicants for certain
jobs. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has gone a
long way toward prohibiting such barriers to job openings.
Whether more aggressive government action would have a
significantly greater impact is debatable. In the 1971 Griggs
case, the Supreme Court ruled that Title VII "proscribes not
only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in
form, but discriminatory in action." 14 Thus, preemployment tests that were not job related were ruled illegal,
since they were likely to exclude minority applicants; also
tests were barred that operaate to disqualify nonwhite ap
plicants at a substantially higher rate than white applicants
or tests relating to a job formerly filled only by white
employees as a matter of company policy.
This aspect of employer and union employment practices
is crucially important in any broad effort to reduce labor
market discrimination, but whether it could ever serve as a
major strategy in reducing structural unemployment is
doubtful. Except in extreme cases it is frequently very dif
ficult to show that failure to hire particular workers was not
based on differences in experience, ability or some other
"objective" hiring criterion. In view of the legal complex14. Griggs v. Duke Power Company, U.S. Supreme Court, No. 124, March 9, 1971.
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ities and pitfalls which have come to surround preemployment testing since the Civil Rights Act, many firms
have moved away from using formal test procedures
altogether. Whether legal limitations on such procedures
could be applied in such a way as to have an observable im
pact on structural unemployment is questionable. In any
event, the overcredentialing problem tends to disappear as
expansions broaden and labor supplies become tighter.

Chapter 7
Strengthening Educational Opportunities
In any discussion of barriers to employment confronting
certain groups in the working population, the role of public
education must be given central attention. It falls to the
country's elementary and secondary schools to provide the
basic skills that underlie all lines of work; since many
workers among the structurally unemployed do not possess
the essential skills needed to meet minimum employable
standards, the country's school system must play a central
role in any national effort to overcome their deficiencies.
The following discussion is addressed to the federal govern
ment's part in such an undertaking.

Strengthening Educational Opportunities
When attention was first drawn in the 1960s to the
paradox of high unemployment in periods of prosperity and
the persistence of poverty in an affluent society, the idea
gained wide currency that if basic education programs could
be fashioned to the particular needs of potentially hard-toemploy groups, the way would subsequently open to their
getting more and better work opportunities. This was in line
with the approach pursued by immigrant groups in earlier
decades to gain entry into the mainstream of American
economic life and it fitted well into the country's tradition of
education for all. Strong efforts were accordingly made dur115
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ing the decade of the 1960s to develop special educational
programs which would widen existing and future job oppor
tunities of the disadvantaged among youth, women, blacks
and nonblack minorities.
These special efforts grew out of the much more inclusive
educational systems that had been developed for the public
at large. While bearing many of the same characteristics, the
programs designed on behalf of disadvantaged groups were
heavily weighted on the side of career preparation or re
entry: acquisition of essential comprehensioncommunication abilities, development of at least some
rudimentary work skills, and personal help in discovering
and pursuing career interests. Special emphasis was placed
on providing the extra professional and personal attention
required to help these groups overcome the educational and
related barriers associated with their disadvantaged
backgrounds.
The high optimism with which this aspect of the War on
Poverty was undertaken in the early 1960s gave way to an
equally deep pessimism in the early 1970s. 1 Here again, the
disappointment felt towards these special programs for the
disadvantaged was paralleled by a disillusionment with
educational programs generally. While more dramatic and
tragic in its implications, the inability to deal effectively with
the educational deficiencies of the disadvantaged was match
ed by a mounting criticism of the nation's entire educational
1. The change in viewpoint regarding education was first spelled out in James Coleman et
al., Equality of Educational Opportunity (Washington- Government Printing Office,
1966) A most influential study in the same vein was Christopher Jencks et al., Inequality:
A Reassessment of the Effect of Family and Schooling in America (New York 1 Basic
Books, 1972) For an early critique of this viewpoint, see Charles S. Benson (director),
Final Report to the Senate Select Committee on School District Finance, Vol. 1 (Sacramen
to, CA: The Committee, 1972, processed). The most serious weakness of the Coleman
Report, one that Coleman himself has recognized, is that limitations of data obliged his
group to consider only physical resource differences among schools and not such things as
how teachers organize their classrooms.
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structure and practices its costs, methods and even overall
direction.
As for governmental efforts aimed at improving the
cognitive skills of disadvantaged students, particularly those
in inner-city ghettos, the major findings of investigators dur
ing the late 1960s and early 1970s, findings which continue to
have considerable influence today, were set forth by one
scholar in the following terms:
The most comprehensive review of the literature on
this subject concludes that [compensatory] education
programs on the average have not been successful in
improving the relative performance of disadvantaged
students, and studies of educational effectiveness offer
little basis for optimism that the schools can be used to
create such impacts. 2
Similarly with respect to special efforts to lengthen the
schooling period of disadvantaged students, the same
scholar concluded:
To summarize, the strategy of alleviating poverty
through programs that encourage disadvantaged per
sons to obtain more schooling seems to have been
characterized by two shortcomings. First, it does not ap
pear that the programs were very successful in raising
educational attainments [i.e., lengthening the schooling
of disadvantaged students]. Second, it does not seem
likely that increasing educational attainments of the ex
isting poor would have reduced the poverty class in a
society where there are simply an inadequate number of
jobs at wages above the poverty level to absorb all job
seekers. 3
2. Robert A. Haveman, ed., A Decade of Federal Antipoverty Programs (New York.
Academic Press, 1977), p. 158, citing Harvey A Averchetal , How Effective Is Schooling?
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Educational Technology Publications, 1974).
3. Ibid., p 170
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Promising Approaches

Contrary to the earlier investigations by Coleman and
others, a number of recent studies indicate that differences
among inner-city schools and, perhaps more significantly,
differences among individual classrooms, determine whether
disadvantaged students succeed or fail in acquiring fun
damental skills. The more important of these studies were
conducted by Ronald Edmonds and John Frederickson of
Harvard, George Weber, formerly of the Council for Basic
Education, and Michael Rutter of the University of London.
Current views about the federal government's Head Start
program illustrates this change in outlook. This program was
started in 1965 to provide a stimulating learning environment
for preschool children from low income families on the
assumption they would retain important long term educa
tional benefits from the experience. Following the highly
critical Westinghouse-Ohio Report issued in 1969, attitudes
toward Head Start changed radically; according to the
Report, any cognitive and affective gains from the program
largely disappeared by the time children reached second and
third grades.
More recent investigations, notably the 1974 HEW study,
Lasting Effects After Preschool, indicate that the benefits of
Head Start have proven much more lasting after all. This
study pooled the research efforts of twelve investigators who
had independently conducted experimental preschool studies
and covered the school careers on a longitudinal basis of par
ticipating and nonparticipating students who had reached
the ages of 10 to 19 years of age. This relatively long term
study concluded that the program did in fact yield longlasting benefits in that participants were less likely than nonparticipants to require placement in special remedial classes,
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to be retained in grade, or to score poorly in standardized
mathematics achievement tests compared to control groups. 4
A similar shift in viewpoint, though less clear-cut, has oc
curred more generally among research scholars who have
studied elementary and secondary compensatory educational
programs for disadvantaged students. For example, a report
to a presidential commission on school finance concluded
that where conditions in the school environment are essen
tially the same for disadvantaged as for nondisadvantaged
students, the comparative ratio of progress among the two
groups does not appear to be significantly different. 5 This
finding is particularly significant in view of the fact that the
school environment of disadvantaged students generally falls
far short of the school environment enjoyed by students
from nondisadvantaged backgrounds. Admitting the limita
tions of dollar expenditures as a measure of differences in
school conditions, it is nonetheless revealing that in a state
such as New York, school districts spend on the average
more than twice as much per student in elementary and
secondary public schools as the average district in nine other
states. More important, even after excluding a few of the
very highest spending districts, per pupil expenditures within
states vary even more widely. Furthermore:
. . . the districts with the highest expenditure levels in
any state tend to be found in the wealthiest suburban
areas. Central cities, which on the whole spend well
above the statewide average, normally exceed by a slight
amount the expenditure levels of the average district in
the suburbs. At the bottom of the spectrum are the
4 United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Consortium for
Longitudinal Studies, Lasting Effects After Preschool (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1976).
5. Harvey A. Averch et al , "How Effective Is Schooling? A Critical Review and Synthesis
of Research Findings," Final Report to the President's Commission on School Finance
(Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1971), pp. 100-108
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school districts in nonmetropolitan areas, which spend
considerably less per student that those in urbanized
regions. 6
Where expenditure per student is relatively high in central
cities, the result is more a reflection of relatively fewer
students than of higher expenditures as such; in metropolitan
areas like Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Chicago and San
Francisco, public school enrollment as a percentage of total
population is about 80 percent of its level in the surrounding
suburbs. 7
A related finding, which is as widely accepted though
harder to measure, is that the same educational outcomes
would require substantially higher expenditures per pupil in
central city districts and certain rural areas than in higher in
come districts. Inner-city schools, for example, have to
spend substantial sums just to protect themselves: vandalism
alone cost the New York City school system $3.7 million
even in 1971. The buildings in central cities tend to be much
older than in many of the more recently developed new
suburbs, and costs of maintenance and operation correspon
dingly higher. Children who require relatively expensive
special programs to achieve the same quality standards
prevailing elsewhere are often concentrated in central city
schools since they need special help to learn what middle
class children learn at home; they also require more expen
sive equipment since they have greater need of vocational
and technical training. Thus it has been estimated that, ad
justing for the quality factor alone, New York City would
have to spend $1,334 per pupil to provide the same schooling
that would cost $1,000 in the nearby affluent community of
Scarsdale. 8
6. Robert D Reischauer et al., Reforming School Finance (Washington- The Brookings In
stitution, 1973), pp. 65-67.
7. Ibid , p 68.
8. Ibid , p 64, quoting estimates based on the National Educational Finance Project
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The thrust of these findings is clear: vigorous additional
measures need to be taken to overcome the wide gap which is
still keeping young people of disadvantaged backgrounds
from getting an education that is anywhere near equivalent
to the education received by students from more favored
backgrounds. The argument that ''the poor deserve what
they get" is suspect enough when applied to adults; to use it
to explain why an inner-city elementary school child should
receive a substantially poorer educational opportunity than a
child of similar age in a nearby suburb seems patently il
logical. If there is genuine concern over the overall cost of
education, cutbacks should be confined to the upper income
areas when students are least in need of expensive-type pro
grams. Exactly where and how the relative increase in expen
ditures on low income area programs should be introduced is
admittedly unclear, but that the gap in "equivalent" dollar
expenditures should be narrowed much further is hardly contestable.
Estimates of the cost of overcoming such disparities vary
widely, depending on the assumptions used. The one thing
all such estimates have in common is that the dollar totals in
volved are quite astronomical. Just to bring each state up to
the median spending level of all states by means of a flat
federal grant of about $500 per student in 1972 would have
cost roughly $23 billion annually. To have gone further and
removed most intrastate disparities in 1972 would have cost
another $8-9 billion annually. 9 If the only groups involved
had been disadvantaged students in inner-city districts and
certain rural areas, the cost would have been considerably
less, but political realities would have made it difficult to
limit the grant system in this way. There is no denying that
effective action in this direction would place a heavy strain
9 Charles L. Schultze et al , Setting National Priorities: The 1973 Budget (Washington:
The Brookmgs Institution, 1972), pp. 348 and 351
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on the federal-state-local tax structure or, alternatively, on
the allocation of government expenditures to other public
needs.
Policy Proposals
Assuming substantial progress is made to equalize educa
tional opportunities along the above lines, what directions of
change would most likely contribute to more stable work
histories of disadvantaged students in their later careers? The
literature is replete with ad hoc insights and proposals for
change, but there does not appear to be any single strategy
commanding general support. The underlying difficulty, as
emphasized in the 1966 Coleman Report and repeatedly
stressed in subsequent investigations, is that many disadvan
taged students come from, and look forward to, en
vironments which destroy any motivation a student might
have to progress academically, to move towards a career
choice and develop the skills required to implement such a
choice. This is simply to say that a person from an unstable,
deprived home environment, living in an impoverished,
crime-ridden neighborhood, attending an overcrowded, in
adequately equipped school, who sees no likelihood of get
ting a good paying, stable job after finishing his or her
education or entering a worthwhile career of any sort, is very
apt to be scholastically unmotivated. The astounding fact is
how many students from this type of background complete
their programs successfully.
At the same time it is important to realize that students
from disadvantaged backgrounds vary widely with respect to
their educational interests, motivations and capabilities,
much more widely than between the disadvantaged and nondisadvantaged considered as two contrasting groups. The
same generalization holds for both: there is no single course
of study or philosophy of learning which can be said to be
most effective (however the latter term may be defined) for
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either group. The chief difference in practice is that the re
quisite degree of educational differentiation has been carried
considerably further for the nondisadvantaged than the
disadvantaged. The former are more likely to have the
necessary background to be able to choose among different
avenues of study; they have a better chance to translate their
study interests into long term careers; and their immediate
school environments are more likely to permit or encourage
this kind of selective choice and experimentation. Under
these conditions, the assumption that individual students can
move ahead as far as their motivation and ability will permit
is wholly appropriate, but where these conditions do not
hold, the assumption makes little or no sense. Again, if the
schools are to have any meaningful impact on structural
unemployment and related problems of the disadvantaged,
the characteristics and conditions of their programs must
parallel those available to the nondisadvantaged.
This is the major thrust of the recent report on the coun
try's high schools by the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies
in Higher Education. In the words of that report:
It is clear that many high school students and junior
high school students as well are getting little out of
school, because they simply do not see the relevance to
their future lives of what the school is attempting to
teach them. We believe that school might become more
meaningful to them if there were more options available
for combinations of school and work experience. 10
Given this important caveat, recent investigators have un
covered certain characteristics of compensatory educational
programs which appear to explain their relative effec
tiveness. The theme of their studies is that in a successful
compensatory program, the school's principal and teaching
10. Giving Youth a Better Chance (San Francisco- Jossey-Bass, 1979), p 107.
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staff have managed to develop a general atmosphere where
students have come to accept learning as the focus of their
school experience. According to Ronald Edmonds and John
Frederickson of Harvard University, the characteristics of
successful inner-city schools are:
1. Strong leadership by the principal.
2. Clearly understood teaching objectives.
3. A school climate that is safe, orderly, attractive and
serious.
4. High expectations for all students.
5. The use of standardized tests to measure progress and
to make plans for what to do next.
As Edmonds, who also is assistant to the New York City
Chancellor for instruction in the public schools,
acknowledges, these five characteristics could be more ef
fects rather than causes, but he asserts:
What we are claiming is that these schools as
organizations have consistent and observable dif
ferences. 11
This same position was expressed earlier in a Brookings In
stitution report:
For the most part these successful compensatory pro
grams featured tightly structured approaches with con
stant supervision and guidance from a staff that had
been trained well and had engaged in considerable plan
ning. 12
Another major finding of scholars working in this area is
that students from disadvantaged backgrounds are in special
need of bridging-type relationships between their school ex11. New York Times, December 26, 1979. Roughly similar findings have been reached by a
number of other scholars including Richard J Murnane of Yale, George Weber, formerly
of the Council for Basic Education, and Michael Rutter of the University of London
12. Schultze et al , Setting National Priorities. The 1973 Budget, p 358
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perience on the one hand and their home background, job
requirements and community environment on the other. In
any given case, one or more of these relationships may be
seriously crippling, rendering any meaningful school ex
perience quite impossible. Hence, close working relations
will have to be developed between home, school and com
munity to take account of this factor, whether to build on it,
alter it in some crucial respect or act to offset its negative im
pact.
Further, special procedures will have to be devised to link
the learning experience of disadvantaged students to dif
ferent job and career possibilities without cutting them off
from the more general aspects of educational preparation.
While account will need to be taken of different interests and
aptitudes, some direct exposure to work situations will be
essential for students from disadvantaged backgrounds and,
incidentally, for many nondisadvantaged students as well.
Finally, close ties will have to be established between schools
and major community institutions health, recreational,
correctional systems, churches, economic development agen
cies and the like so that community services can be drawn
on when and where required. Unless explicit provision is
made for carry-over procedures in all three of these relation
ships home, career and community the barrier which
schooling now poses for many of the disadvantaged will re
main largely unbreached.
No single set of procedures can be identified as the most
effective way to achieve this three-way linkage. The
availability of qualified and informed personnel is probably
the most crucial element, persons with the time and ability to
work closely together at both ends of each of these three rela
tionships and even more closely with those students who can
put such outside supportive relationships to good use. Ex
perience does not suggest that the schools should attempt to
take over the functions normally performed by the home or
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community institutions, but rather to provide the major
coordinating leadership with respect to students still in
school whereby the resources of such institutions can be
drawn on more effectively. Unless adequate provision is
made for qualified staff at each institutional base, little im
pact is to be expected.
In terms of the specific job and career needs of disadvantaged young people, the crucial institutional relation is apt to
be the tie between the schools and the federal-state Employ
ment Service offices. Other public and private bodies can
also be effective in helping such students find job and career
openings but chief emphasis needs to be placed on develop
ing close working relations with these offices. In some com
munities considerable progress has been made in this regard
but in many, probably most, little more than perfunctory ef
forts have been made along this line.
While current thinking among investigators of compen
satory school programs has shifted in the direction just
described, controversy continues over program specifics. Of
the various issues already noted, including development of
fundamental academic skills, improved study habits and
greater interest in school work, none is more important than
the question of how far should direct vocational training be
brought into the programs of the secondary schools, a ques
tion to which attention turns next. In discussing particular
compensatory programs, however, it is important to keep in
mind that before any special support measures are
withdrawn from students from disadvantaged backgrounds,
there must be convincing evidence that they have made
necessary progress in the first place. Proposals for putting
these students more on their own, holding them to essentially
the same standards as nondisadvantaged students, and
rewarding or penalizing them on basically the same terms,
contain much merit, but only as the conditions surrounding
the schooling and postschooling prospects of both groups of
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students come more closely together. The system of in
dividual incentive, skill acquisition and self development is
applicable to the disadvantaged only when the assumptions
of the system regarding opportunity to choose, plan, and
personally develop are at least remotely approximated. For
large numbers of students from disadvantaged backgrounds,
this crucial requirement is yet to be met.

The Role of Vocational Education
All the approaches to structural unemployment discussed
to this point policies to reduce mismatching in job markets,
wage and related cost barriers, nonwork incentives of in
come support programs, discriminatory employment prac
tices and basic educational deficiencies tend to be both
long term and roundabout in character. Each has a general
though ill-defined contribution to make with respect to this
problem and the need for more immediate and direct
measures is clear. Among the latter, vocational education
has long played a prominent, if rather disappointing, role.
The critical questions with respect to the structural
unemployment problem insofar as vocational education is
concerned are: first, what contribution can this branch of the
country's educational system be expected to make to resolv
ing this problem, and second, should federal funding for
vocational education be greatly increased? Historically,
training for specific skills in this country has largely been left
to private employer initiative. For workers already
employed, skills are still mostly acquired informally on the
job. Many larger firms, however, have established formal
training programs, especially with respect to jobs unique to a
given company. Similarly, apprentice programs have provid
ed training in various skilled occupations, notably in the
building trades. Private employer sponsorship and financial
support have also been crucially important to the numerous
private vocational schools and institutes which have been
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established to provide formal training in a number of special
fields such as electronics, printing, textiles and the various
clerical skills.
Government supported skill training programs have, until
recently, been extremely limited and such efforts as have
been made have been chiefly undertaken by state and local
governments. Thus the rise in vocational training associated
with the recent rapid expansion of community and junior
colleges is based only in very small part on federal funding.
The first significant support from the federal government
came in World War I, but until 1963 federal action was
largely limited to occupations in agriculture, home
economics, and a few other lines of work. Even in the midseventies more than 80 percent of total public expenditures
for vocational education came from state and local govern
ments. 13 The 1963 legislation broadened the range of occupa
tions for which federal training funds could be used and ap
propriations increased fivefold over the next three years, but
no widening in the range of occupations was stipulated, ex
penditures specifically directed to the disadvantaged were
miniscule, and the focus of vocational education, except for
the addition of office occupations, was still largely limited to
the same few fields as before.
In an effort to put vocational education on a broader
basis, Congress passed the Vocational Education Amend
ments of 1968. Provision was made for earmarking of
grants-in-aid funds designated by the Congress, specific ex
penditures for training the disadvantaged were allotted, sup
port for cooperative work-study programs was mandated
and the definition of vocational education was widened to
13 The total bill for all education in 1973-74 was $96 billion of which public education ac
counted for $79 billion; in 1972, $2 7 billion was spent on publicly supported vocational
education of which state and local governments accounted for 82.5 percent (Levitan,
Mangum, and Marshall, Human Resources and Labor Markets, p 233)
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include newly emerging, as well as already existing, occupa
tions. Again, much of the thrust of the new legislation has
been lost, this time because of the limited support provided
in the 1969 Johnson budget and the subsequent Nixon
budgets. True, the fiscal year 1971 and 1972 budgets ap
propriated nearly $500 million for vocational education,
nearly double that of 1968, but this was considerably below
the $870 million authorized for 1971. After 1975, federal ex
penditures on vocational education rose markedly and in the
1976-1978 period reached the $725 to $750 million range;
even so, the federal share in total public spending on voca
tional programs remained well below the 29 percent level
reached in 1966. 14

Assessments of Effects
Assessments of the effects of public-supported vocational
educational programs, whether viewed in terms of the needs
of broad sections of the population or, more narrowly, in
terms of the needs of seriously disadvantaged groups, have
yielded mixed to mildly positive results. In a careful review
of the best available studies comparing college preparatory,
vocational, and general curriculum graduates of secondary
schools, Michael E. Carbine concluded:
The conflicting findings are nonetheless sufficient to
indicate that, based on the national studies, vocational
education apparently yields positive returns to
students. . . . Thus, we would judge that vocational
education has a small effect on earnings vis-a-vis the
secondary academic and general curricula. With one ex14. Special Analyses, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1978
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 172 and U.S. Office of Education,
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Annual Reports of the Commissioner of
Education (Washington Government Printing Office, 1978 and 1979). For a general review
of the shifts in vocational education, see Levitan, Mangum, and Marshall, Human
Resources and Labor Markets, pp 230-243.
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ception, money benefits among the studies range from
over $200 to over $800 per year, with most estimates
centering around $400 to $600. 15
The same studies show somewhat higher rates of employ
ment, on average, among young men whose high school
background was in the vocational curriculum as compared
with those in the academic or general curriculum. One study
of three cities, for example, showed that high school
graduates from the vocational curriculum experienced 5 to
10 percentage points more time employed during a six-year
follow-up period than did the graduates of the academic pro
grams who did not attend college. 16
As to the effects of vocational education programs on
unemployment rates and earnings of disadvantaged, hardto-employ groups, the findings are less favorable or at least
more ambiguous. Historically, these programs were largely
built around farming and homemaking skills. The propor
tion of total enrollments in these two fields has declined
markedly as emerging occupations in fields like health,
distribution, and "trades and industries" have received more
attention. Since the early 1960s, however, the proportion of
total enrollments in these latter occupational lines, with the
notable exception of office occupations, has not increased
appreciably. Of more significance, considerable effort has
been expended in recent years to provide vocational educa
tion opportunities to disadvantaged groups. While accurate
data are unavailable, it appears that these groups accounted
15. Michael E Carbine, "Evaluations of Vocational Education," Ch 6 in Leonard A.
Lecht, ed., Evaluating Vocational Education: Policies and Plans for the 1970s (New York:
Praeger, 1974), pp. 79-80.
16 Lecht, ed., Evaluating Vocational Education, p. 7, citing Teh-wei Hu, et al., A Cost
Effective Study of Vocational Education: A Comparison of Vocational and Nonvocational
Education in Secondary Schools (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University,
1969)
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for only a little over 2 percent of all enrollments in 1967 as
against about 10 percent in 1974. 17 This shift in focus largely
resulted from the legislative requirement that states set aside
a minimum of 15 percent of their federal allotment for voca
tional education for the disadvantaged. In 1975, total
Federal Basic Grants to state and local governments came to
$428 million of which nearly 18 percent was spent on pro
grams for the disadvantaged; in addition $20 million was
made available by the federal government on a nonmatching
basis "to support programs and services for persons unable
to succeed in regular vocational programs because of poor
academic background, lack of motivation, or depressing en
vironmental factors."' 8
Do vocational educational programs significantly improve
the subsequent job market experience of disadvantaged
workers and, if so, is the improvement worth the higher cost
which, exclusive of home economics training, is about dou
ble the average costs of general education? Judging from the
few careful studies that have been made, the answer to both
questions is somewhat more negative than positive and, in
contrast to assessments of general compensatory educational
programs discussed earlier, recent investigations have mark
ed no shift from this view. True, the latter studies indicate
that vocational graduates initially do better in terms of
employment and earnings than nonvocational graduates, but
over a five- or six-year period the advantage largely disap
pears and in any event this finding does not bear directly on
the experience of disadvantaged vs. nondisadvantaged
17. Office of Education, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Annual Report of
the Commissioner of Education, Fiscal Year 1975. The proportion of blacks to total
enrollments in vocational education programs comes to about 20 percent, whereas the
percentage of blacks to the total population is about 12 percent.
18. Annual Report of the Commissioner of Education, Fiscal Year 1975, p 112. As in
dicated earlier, the definition of disadvantaged is unclear as is the identity of those who
benefit from these special-aid programs
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students. 19 A group of investigators attempted to deal with
this latter issue by allowing for differences in socioeconomic
status, IQ scores and other personal factors of vocational
and comprehensive education programs; their findings
showed clear short term, and even some long term, benefits
for vocational graduates but any long term gains have been
questioned. 20 Merely giving greater weight to vocational
education of disadvantaged students without strengthening
this aspect of secondary school programs would serve little
purpose. Thus, if the discussion were to end here the case for
a major expansion in federal government efforts to
strengthen vocational education as an approach to structural
unemployment would not seem compelling. However, there
are several considerations which give this proposal greater
strength.
First, the positive effects of these programs on the job
status of hard-to-employ groups show up most clearly in
periods of prosperity when job vacancies are on the rise.
Thus, the National Longitudinal Surveys (the Parnes study)
dealing with young men in the 14-26 age group found no
significant differences in the earnings of those graduating
from different high school curricula in late 1966 when the
unemployment rate was rising but significant differences in
favor of vocational program graduates in late 1968 when the
unemployment rate was falling and labor markets were
tightening. 21 This accords with the common sense view that
in periods of expanding business, vocational training
19. Michael K. Taussig, "An Economic Analysis of Vocational Education in the New York
City High Schools," Journal of Human Resources, 3 (Summer 1968), pp. 59-87; Teh-wei
Hu, Man Lin Lee, and Ernst W. Stromsdorfer, "Economic Returns to Vocational and
Comprehensive High School Graduates," Journal of Human Resources, 6 (Winter 1971),
pp. 25-47.
20. Haveman, ed., Decade of Antipoverty Programs, pp 173-175.
21. After controlling for a number of social and demographic factors, the study shows that
vocational program graduates earned about $400 more a year than the academic program
graduates who were in the labor force at the time of the survey. Lecht, Evaluating Voca
tional Education, p. 7.
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becomes increasingly important as a means of opening up
job opportunities for young people who would otherwise
lack saleable labor market skills.
Second, vocational programs have long established ties
with the nation's secondary school system and, in the form
of institutes, junior colleges and the like, constitute a major
element in the country's postsecondary educational system
as well. The "establishment" character of these programs
makes it difficult for vocational training to adapt to chang
ing needs; witness the continued emphasis on home
economics as but one example. Nonetheless, important
changes are occurring. While admittedly systematic evidence
is lacking that exposure to these programs encourages
students to remain in high school or go on to college,
nonetheless vocational education often does provide a foun
dation for further schooling, with over one-half of voca
tional high school graduates obtaining some additional
education after leaving school. 22
The crucial assumption is that as vocational programs are
extended to include a wider range of emerging occupations in
the computer, health and service fields, and the relative oversupply of graduates with four-year college degrees becomes
more apparent, the skill-training aspect of secondary and
postsecondary education will become more generally ac
cepted. This will doubtless induce more "advantaged"
students to participate in these programs, too, thereby
lessening the benefits in competitive terms accruing to
students from disadvantaged backgrounds. Participation
could be expected to be on a more equitable basis, however,
than in general academic programs, especially if appropriate
government safeguards are established.
Third, vocational training is the most effective bridge be
tween school and work available to many students. It is the
22. Lecht, ed , Evaluating Vocational Education, p. 9.
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one aspect of the secondary school system which most direct
ly concerns employers, as evidenced by the fact that a
number of programs are based on close collaboration be
tween employers and the schools. If carefully designed, these
programs can provide entree to job opportunities for a wide
variety of students, including those lacking in verbal or
quantitative skills. Even though previous efforts to help
students of the latter sort in this regard have been quite
limited, some positive results have been achieved. More
vigorous efforts, if carefully developed and implemented,
would seem eminently justified.
There are certain aspects of vocational training with
respect to reducing the amount of structural unemployment
which are more promising than others. One is to give more
weight to work-study arrangements which are carried out
with the cooperation of individual firms or employer groups.
Until recently, enrollments in these programs have hardly ex
ceeded 300,000, but a goal of over a million would not seem
excessive as broader acceptance by employers is achieved. In
this connection the Carnegie Council Report referred to
earlier recommended that:
Classroom vocational education at the high school
level should be deemphasized in favor of training con
ducted under employer auspices, apprenticeship, workexperience programs, cooperative [work-study] educa
tion, and other programs to take the student into the
community. 23
Following the lead of earlier work by Willard Wirtz and the
National Manpower Institute, the Carnegie group also sup
ported the establishment in major cities of community
education-work councils through which school officials,
23. Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, p. 141 The title of the
chapter dealing with this subject is Vocational Education: Change Everything, Including
the Name.
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employers, members of labor unions and members of the
public engage collaboratively in developing and administer
ing education-work programs. 24
Another proposal is to broaden the range of occupational
lines for which training is available still further, particularly
areas in which job opportunities are expected to multiply
over the next 10 to 20 years. Some progress, as already
noted, has been made in this direction, but much yet remains
to be done. Similarly, there is need for more systematic
screening, advising, and follow up of participants from the
point of initial entry in a training program to placement in a
job with at least some career potential. The lack of adequate
guidance and progress assessment is especially costly in the
case of students coming from disadvantaged backgrounds.
These considerations chiefly apply to students in secondary
schools and postsecondary schools offering other than
general academic work but, with some qualifications, they
apply to adults in vocational education programs as well.
Principal responsibility for moving vocational schools and
programs in these directions lies with the federal government
since it commands both the breadth of viewpoint and the
source of funds needed to mount an effective strategy.
Beyond the general lines noted above, there is little agree
ment on specific next steps, so an experimental approach
backed up by careful research and continuing appraisal
seems the only prudent course to follow. This is not to say
that vigorous federal efforts to strengthen and broaden voca
tional education are not called for; to the contrary, a pro
nounced increase in such efforts would mark an important
step in dealing with structural unemployment and related
problems.

24 Ibid , p 125.

Chapter 8
Public Service Employment Programs
Government efforts to deal with unemployment by direct
but selective job creation has a long history, but this aspect
of public policy was largely forgotten as Keynesian ideas
concerning aggregate demand management became more
widely accepted. Thus, in the early 1960s, attention centered
on expanding demand by such means as the 1962 investment
tax credit and the 1964 personal and corporate income tax
cuts. Subsequently, with preparation for the Vietnam War
inducing a sharp rise in aggregate demand, a few selective
measures were introduced which were aimed at providing not
only training but some limited forms of work experience and
public service employment. In 1967 the government launch
ed the Concentrated Employment Program (CEP) which
sought to provide "one-stop" training and other services to
disadvantaged workers in inner-city areas who were subject
to the worst employment and income conditions and, addi
tionally, to induce private employers to hire such workers
from these severely depressed areas.
In 1968 a still more ambitious effort, the Jobs Oppor
tunities in the Business Sector (JOBS), was undertaken to in
duce private industry to hire disadvantaged workers. Under
this program, which was administered by a group of national
business leaders, the government covered any training or
other special costs entailed in employing nonexperienced,
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nonskilled workers. Most of the employers participating in
this program were large corporations and approximately
two-thirds of the cooperating firms did so without any com
pensation from the government. By the end of the 1960s
there were nearly twenty federal programs, each constituting
an individual category administered from Washington but
all aimed primarily at the training and employment problems
of the disadvantaged. 1

Public Service Employment Programs
in the 1970s
After 1969 and the advent of the Nixon administration,
the federal government moved to shift major responsibility
for allocating funds among these diverse programs to state
and local government units and to "decategorize" most of
the programs. The basic legislation of this period was the
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA)
passed in December 1973. Under Titles I and II of this Act,
state and local governments were given federal financial
assistance to undertake a wide range of manpower services
including public service jobs for unemployed or
underemployed workers in areas of substantial unemploy
ment. Job creation was given little weight, however, until
unemployment began to increase with the onset of the
1973-1975 recession. In 1974, with the unemployment rate
above 8 percent, Congress added Title VI to CETA which
authorized a broad one-year countercyclical Public Service
Employment (PSE) program. Unemployment fell only
slightly in the subsequent recovery and, in passing the
Emergency Jobs Program Extension Act of 1976 (EJPEA),
Congress continued the Title VI public service job provision
1. William Mirengoff and Lester Rmdler, The Comprehensive Employment and Training
Act: Impact on People, Places, Programs. An Interim Report (Washington: National
Academy of Sciences, 1976), p. in
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along with Title II which was aimed more directly at struc
tural unemployment.
In designing the 1976 Act, Congress sought to resolve a
number of difficulties experienced under GETA. First and
most important, it was concluded that many of the workers
who were eligible for aid under Title VI and even under Title
II were from nondisadvantaged backgrounds. Second, there
was considerable evidence that local governments were sim
ply substituting CETA workers for regular employees to the
point where there was little or no overall net job creation.
Third, it was felt that many of the jobs secured under both
titles were of too long duration and provided little or no
chance of leading to regular employment in either the private
or public sector. Finally, it was concluded that under CETA
local sponsors enjoyed too wide a latitude with respect not
only to public service employment but to other aspects of
manpower training and development as well. Both on
grounds of more efficient organization and clearer direction
of policy it was decided that a move back towards greater
federal control was indicated.
The Emergency Jobs Program Extension Act of 1976 was
primarily aimed at the first of these four concerns. EJPEA
required that prime sponsors limit hirings to AFDC recip
ients, unemployment insurance beneficiaries and exhaustees,
and other low-income persons unemployed 15 weeks or
longer. This tightening of eligibility requirements reduced
the pool of potential applicants for most new PSE positions
from about 20 million to 4.5 million persons; as a result, the
proportion of those hired for projects from disadvantaged
backgrounds increased significantly. However, the tighter
eligibility requirements applied not to Title II positions, but
only to newly created positions under Title VI and to half of
the regular, so-called sustainment jobs under this title; sustainment jobs accounted for about 40 percent of all Title VI
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project positions. Moreover, in actual practice, many ineligibles were hired under the public service employment pro
grams. Emphasis was placed on speedy expansion of pro
grams and local sponsors were permitted to undertake pro
jects that simply extended activities already in existence. As a
result, little progress was made in reducing the substitution
of federal for local outlays and in increasing net job crea
tion. Nor were effective steps taken to shorten the duration
of jobs under EJPEA, establish projects entailing
transferable skills, or develop a more clear-cut set of policy
priorities.
The Reauthorization Act of 1978 which extended CETA
for four years was in large part addressed to these issues, but
the changes were relatively minor. The tighter eligibility re
quirements that had been limited to Title VI were extended
to what was now designated as Title II-D, the permanent
program combining public service employment with training
for the structurally unemployed. The 1978 Reauthorization
Act also lowered the average wage that could be paid par
ticipants, presumably on the assumption this would lessen
the substitution danger. Greater authority, in addition, was
given the Department of Labor to enforce eligibility rules
and prevent substitution. Under the new law, for example,
prime sponsors were made clearly accountable for any mis
spent funds. Finally, the reauthorization act required spon
sors to assess the employability of each participant and pro
vide employment counseling, training, or other services
wherever necessary; while the funds provided for this pur
pose are meager (5 percent of allotted funds received for
training under Title VI after fiscal 1979), this could prove to
be the single most important provision of the 1978 law. The
changing relationships between the government's public ser
vice employment and its various training programs during
the 1970s are shown in figure 8-1.
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Figure 8-1
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In a number of respects, however, the 1978 statute loosen
ed rather than tightened eligibility requirements and project
terms. Targeting rules under Title II-D were broadened to in
clude a long list of disadvantaged workers including women,
single parents, older workers and persons with limited educa
tion; eligibility requirements under Title VI were somewhat
reduced and the formula for allocating funds under this title,
in contrast to Title II-D, was made less restrictive in that it
did not combine income level with unemployment; only half
of new Title VI participants were to be employed on pro
jects, i.e., activities entailing newly created jobs, whereas
before all new Title VI participants were so required.
Moreover, the permissible duration of projects was
somewhat lengthened. The broad intent of the 1978
Reauthorization Act was to limit public service employment
programs almost entirely to the long term, disadvantaged
unemployed, but the specific provisions of the statute put
this outcome in considerable doubt. The foregoing aspects of
the 1973, 1976 and 1978 CETA legislation are summarized in
table 8-1.
This brief review of recent developments in public service
employment programs points to a number of specific
changes which would strengthen federal policies in this area.
For the most part these consist of proposals which would
simply implement the changes in CETA just reviewed. The
most important of these proposals are to (1) narrow the
focus of PSE still further on the most severely disadvantaged
workers, (2) give greater weight to jobs in these programs
which would subsequently lead to regular employment in the
private or public sector, (3) shorten the duration of such jobs
for the same reason, (4) put more emphasis on training in
skills and related work abilities as an aspect of PSE pro
grams, (5) focus these programs more completely on newly
created jobs so as to minimize the substitution of federal for
state and local funds, and (6) establish more effective
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monitoring and enforcement controls to insure projected
program results. On first consideration, changes along these
six lines appear quite straightforward and virtually
unassailable; on further examination, however, they pose a
number of important, still-to-be-answered questions which
warrant careful attention. These questions appear in quite a
different light depending on whether they are viewed in a
narrow or broad perspective.

Relationship to Other Types
of Unemployment
One major unresolved issue is how PSE programs for
dealing with structural unemployment can best be fitted into
broader federal efforts to deal with other types of unemploy
ment. In the various legislative phases for CETA, for exam
ple, no distinction was initially drawn between structural and
cyclical unemployment regarding PSE programs; next the at
tempt was made to draw a sharp line between the former and
the latter (Titles II and VI respectively); finally PSE was
limited to structural unemployment alone, or more
specifically to the severely disadvantaged unemployed or
underemployed as a separate and distinguishable group.
The difficulty with this last formulation is that the extent
and nature of structural unemployment varies with changes
in the general level of economic activity and limiting PSE
programs to a given group is likely to prove most difficult. It
is safe to say that if unemployment rises much above 6 per
cent, steps will be taken to provide public employment on a
broadened basis in any case; the issue, then, is how such an
expanded program can best be related to already ongoing
PSE programs. 2
2 In this discussion, public service employment refers only to government employment
programs aimed at providing jobs targeted on disadvantaged workers who face unusually
serious structural barriers to employment; public employment refers to other government
programs aimed at counteracting cyclical or longer term swings in employment on a nontargeted basis.
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The most promising approach is to distinguish between the
kind of unemployment which requires relatively intensive
support efforts and the kind that does not. As a practical
matter, the greater part of unemployment resulting from
marked cyclical declines or sustained downward trends in
business activity cannot be dealt with on anything ap
proaching an individual case basis; nor would this type of
unemployment in any event call for such selective treatment.
Adhering to a distinction of this sort would admittedly be no
easy task; determining who would qualify for the targeted
special support type of employment could not escape con
troversy. On both practical and conceptual grounds,
however, the distinction would seem altogether appropriate.
The same issue arises in even more extreme form regarding
the long term increase in youth unemployment. In fiscal year
1977, for example, federal aid providing jobs for young peo
ple came to about $2.5 billion in fiscal 1977; in fiscal 1979
the total (which included some training as well) came to over
$4.5 billion and even in the face of subsequent budget cutting
efforts this total is expected to increase sharply over the next
few years. 3 The sheer scale of this effort would make it
necessary to limit the more intensive, specially designed type
of government employment program to the neediest young
people confronting the most serious barriers to employment.
The important distinction underlying this approach to
Public Service Employment programs is not between struc
tural and nonstructural unemployment but within the struc
tural category itself. Many persons, particularly younger
workers, can properly be included among the structurally
unemployed but certainly could not be classified among the
most severely disadvantaged, no matter how broadly the
term is defined. How far the government should attempt to
3. The Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1981 (Washington: Govern
ment Printing Office, 1980), p 235
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go in providing public created jobs for such less disadvantaged workers and on what terms is a separate issue, depending
on what overall strategies are chosen for dealing with cyclical
declines or other sources of unemployment. The essential
point is that, to be effective, the type of public service
employment needed by the most seriously disadvantaged
among the structurally unemployed or underemployed
should be sharply differentiated from government-created
job opportunities for less needy workers.

Defining the Goal
and Devising a Strategy
Once it is agreed that Public Service Employment pro
grams, as opposed to other more general government job
creation efforts, should be limited to the most needy disad
vantaged workers, the requirements for effective public ac
tion in this area begin to fall into place. Like most other
measures designed to help those most in need, the aim of any
PSE program of this sort can be defined as providing the
most severely disadvantaged with practical, attainable op
portunities to find and keep permanent, regular jobs. While
differing in important respects from one individual and
situation to the next, the most promising strategy for achiev
ing this goal is to identify the steps which a person needs to
take to qualify for regular work and to make sure that the
steps are in fact made available. Persons would of course
come in at different levels, but since the program would be
limited to the severely disadvantaged, many would have to
start at a relatively general and fundamental level. Subse
quently, more advanced, specialized work experience and
training would be made available. Chief weight, however,
would need to be placed on giving every individual par
ticipating in the program a genuine, clear-cut opportunity to
move towards regular employment with definite incentives
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provided at each step in the process. Without the latter, the
essential element of motivation would almost surely be lack
ing.
The most ambitious effort that has been undertaken along
these lines is the five-year program known as the National
Supported Work Demonstration project which was launched
in 1975 at a cost of $82 million by the federal government
and the Ford Foundation. The project was aimed at helping
four groups facing long-standing employment problems find
stable jobs in regular work: long term recip
ients of AFDC, ex-addicts who had been in drug treatment,
ex-offenders who had been released from custody, and
young school dropouts, some of whom had also been delin
quents. The focus of the program was the assigning of par
ticipants to temporary unskilled but specially structured jobs
in such areas as housing rehabilitation, building maintenance
and clerical work. Participants were placed in crews of their
peers and were supervised by staff members who were
familiar with their backgrounds and work histories. Perfor
mance standards were gradually increased through the par
ticipation period until they matched conditions in the regular
labor market. Prompt and steady attendance as well as good
performance was rewarded by a system of bonuses.
A carefully designed cost-benefit analysis of the program's
effects in 10 of the 15 demonstration sites was carried out by
means of frequent interviews with 6,616 participants over
varying periods up to 3 years. The results of this analysis
were mixed. On the one hand, the program was found to be
successful in enabling a significant number of welfare
mothers find permanent employment after their subsidized
work periods were completed; in their cases, from the
perspective of society as a whole, long term benefits exceed
ed costs by over $8,000 per AFDC participant. The members
of the ex-addict group, while making less striking gains, also
received long term benefits relative to costs, particularly with
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respect to lowered participation in property and drug crimes.
With respect to the two other groups, however, the young
school dropouts and the ex-offenders, no major progress in
increasing employment was achieved. 4
The main policy implication of this project is that for cer
tain groups facing long-standing employment problems, a
carefully structured work experience resembling usual job
conditions and work standards as closely as possible can
mean the difference between unstable, low-level jobs and
persistent unemployment on the one hand, and on the other,
permanent jobs in the regular labor market. There is now
substantial evidence that many disadvantaged workers have
the necessary motivation and general qualities to meet nor
mal job requirements if they are given the means to do so.
For others, these same procedures do not suffice, but even in
their case further efforts in this direction deserve serious con
sideration.

The Demand Component
While the abilities and interests of participants are the major determinants of an approach to public service employ
ment programs along these lines, the requirements and op
portunities obtaining in the regular job market are hardly
less important. Except as a stopgap measure, and an ex
tremely expensive one at that, little would be gained from a
PSE program for the severely disadvantaged if work oppor
tunities adapted to the abilities and interests of participants
were not subsequently available. Precise projections of
regular job openings that would be available in a given
locality or region for a year or two ahead would of course
not be possible, but a rough matching of the future re4. New York Times, February 28, 1980 For details, see Peter Kemper et al., Manpower
Demonstration Research Corporation, Summary of Findings of the National Supported
Work Demonstration (Cambridge, MA: Ballmger Publishing Co., 1980)
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quirements of employers and the number of expected completers of PSE programs would be feasible.
If any serious effort were made of this nature, something
which for the most part has yet to be done, the implications
for the design and implementation of these programs would
be far reaching. In periods of strong business expansion, a
shift in emphasis to meeting the job requirements of
employers in the private and public sector as job oppor
tunities became more abundant would be especially impor
tant. Even in these circumstances, it is by no means certain
that specialized skilled training immediately demanded by
particular employers would be the proper focus for a given
PSE program if for no other reason than that the
backgrounds, abilities and interests of program participants
would vary so widely. Nonetheless, if finding regular work
remains the crucial test, the dependence of PSE on accep
tance by employers and therefore on their needs is evident.
Viewed in this light, a program of subsidized employment
which culminated in a apprentice training opportunity would
seem highly desirable. In this sense at least the job prepara
tion needs of severely disadvantaged workers are no dif
ferent from other long term but less disadvantaged
unemployed or underemployed persons.
Still another implication is that if the number of subsidiz
ed PSE job holders were limited by the number and composi
tion of regular job openings, public service employment
would presumably be sharply restricted in most localities.
Not only would this call for a further tightening in eligibility
requirements in determining who should be included in the
severely disadvantaged unemployed and underemployed
pool of workers, but local authorities would also need to be
able to set still tighter requirements if sufficient regular
market job opportunities are not expected. In periods of
strong business expansion this will be less of a problem than
if unemployment is generally rising or has become
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widespread. In the latter environment more sweeping types
of public employment programs would doubtless prove
necessary; programs appropriate to such an economic en
vironment, however, should be sharply distinguished from
the kind of PSE program outlined here.

The Substitution Issue
Despite continuing efforts to minimize the substitution of
federal for local dollars in public service employment pro
grams, the danger of this occurring still exists. Earlier studies
indicated that the substitution effect was quite high. In the
1976 investigation by Alan Fechter, for example, this effect
was said to be in the range of 50 percent; in the 1978 study by
the National Research Council, on the other hand, it was
estimated to average about 35 percent and in the 1979 survey
volume, Evaluating Manpower Training Programs, George
Johnson's estimate came to less than 20 percent. 5 While it is
evident that the initial estimates were too high, the substitu
tion question remains a serious one.
Both the Emergency Jobs Programs Act of 1976 and the
CETA Reauthorization Act of 1978 were aimed at reducing
the substitution effects of public service employment pro
grams. Under this legislation, most new hires were to be
employed in short-duration projects outside existing govern
ment services, prime sponsors were encouraged to make con
tracts with private nonprofit organizations and government
agencies on the understanding they would undertake new ac
tivities, the permissible average wage was set low enough
5. Alan Fechter, Public Employment Programs (Washington. The Urban Institute, 1976);
National Research Council, CETA: Manpower Programs Under Local Control
(Washington: National Academy of Sciences, 1978), p. 179; Farrell E. Bloch, ed.,
Evaluating Manpower Training Programs (Greenwich, CN* JAI Press, 1979), essay by
George E. Johnson, "The Labor Market Displacement Effect in the Analysis of the Net
Impact of Manpower Training Programs," pp. 227-254 It should be emphasized that the
Johnson essay is confined to the effects of manpower training programs alone.
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($7,200 in annual terms in 1979) to induce greater participa
tion by nonprofit organizations and, finally, the Department
of Labor was authorized to establish new controls and en
forcement procedures to prevent substitution by local prime
sponsors.
As noted earlier, the CETA legislation now on the books
undercuts these provisions in a number of ways, most
notably by providing that only half of Title VI funds be used
for projects as opposed to maintaining already existing ac
tivities and, what is more serious, the term "project" is
defined in such a way so as to include almost any kind of ac
tivity. 6 Still further tightening along lines already taken are
needed if the substitution danger is to be dealt with effective
ly.
There remains the question whether changes of this sort,
being limited to detailed features of the law and its ad
ministration, would in fact significantly reduce the substitu
tion effects of PSE programs. The chances are high they
would not. Even with these changes, the sheer size and scope
of these programs would almost certainly result in sponsors
stretching the rules and substituting federal for local funds.
The wider the range of skills and backgrounds of PSE par
ticipants, the greater would be the inducement to use the
federal monies in this way. This is but another example of
the difficulties that will persist as long as PSE programs are
aimed at groups other than those facing the most serious
economic and social barriers to employment.
The other basic requirement for minimizing the substitu
tion danger is to confine PSE to the kinds of work and train
ing experience for which demand prospects are most promis
ing and regular job openings most likely to exist. While the
existing legislation embraces this general objective, provision
6. National Research Council, CETA: Manpower Programs Under Local Control, p 26
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for effective implementation is lacking. Indeed, the 1978
Reauthorization Act marks a step backward in this regard in
that subsequent to fiscal 1979, only 5 percent of funds are
allotted to training as against the 10 percent limit that existed
before. Unless PSE programs can help participants develop
the specific and basic abilities required in job areas where
vacancies are likely to occur, the problem of substitution can
be expected to persist.
Individual Motivation
and Career Entry
Much controversy remains over the question whether PSE
enrollees generally lack the motivation necessary to find
regular jobs. Such evidence as exists does not provide a con
vincing answer to this question, the results being too mixed
to yield a firm conclusion. It is possible, however, to identify
some of the circumstances where individual motivation is
likeliest to be positive. Perhaps most important, there has to
be assurance that the PSE experience can be expected to yield
worthwhile benefits in a reasonably short period of time if
the individual meets performance standards satisfactorily. It
is wholly understandable why many participants, given their
prior backgrounds and experiences, would require more than
promises of long term and necessarily vague benefits. Not
even the likelihood of finding regular and satisfying work in
a year or so could always be counted on to provide the
necessary motivation to do well in a given PSE program. In
deed, it seems quite incontrovertible that, lacking this pro
spect, the necessary motivation will probably not be forth
coming. Unless the programs contain this element and do so
in ways that are convincing to the average enrollee, expen
ditures on the programs will be largely wasted.
The other side of the coin is that if participants cannot
meet the performance standards of the programs successful-
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ly, employers can hardly be expected to take them on as ac
tual or even potential regular employees. Just as these
workers need confidence that regular jobs are in prospect,
employers need confidence that in a reasonably short time
new hires can meet minimum standards of performance.
These considerations underscore the importance of a ma
jor theme of this study: workers facing serious barriers to
employment cannot be dealt with effectively in large
homogeneous groups; fully individualized treatment in all
cases is of course out of the question, but since account has
to be taken of differing needs and plans, reasonably close
track must be maintained of the progress of each worker.
Lacking this, neither current participants nor potential
employers are likely to have sufficient confidence in the pro
grams to keep them on a solid basis. Admittedly, not even
this approach will assure favorable results, but at least it will
heighten the chances for success.
The specific features of a possible approach to PSE along
these lines were outlined earlier in this chapter. The key con
sideration was to provide participants with a series of clearly
defined steps whereby they could qualify for regular, unsubsidized work in either the private or public sector. In this
way, emphasis would be placed on enlisting individual
worker effort to achieve regular job status—public policy
would provide the opportunity in successive phases but the
initiative at each level would be left to the individual. Any at
tempt to put a program along these lines on a mass basis
could hardly escape failure.
The principal element in an approach built along such
highly restrictive lines is the kind of training which should be
provided. Thus, the government's public service employ
ment programs have to be viewed in the context of its
broader responsibilities in the training area, the subject to
which attention now turns.

Chapter 9
Government Training Programs
The emergence of government training programs in the
1960s as the principal means for reducing structural
unemployment squared with both popular views and logical
analysis. In an environment of high employment, what bet
ter way to help the hard-to-employ than to equip them with
essential skills and sufficient work experience to enable them
to find worthwhile jobs?
The first major legislation of this period, the Manpower
Development and Training Act (MDTA) passed in 1962, was
primarily designed to retool workers who already had job ex
perience but whose skills had become obsolete. This focus
quickly shifted, however, when business conditions improv
ed and it became apparent that the unemployment problem
was largely confined to persons who lacked any marketable
skills or any sustained work experience, notably teenagers,
minority workers, and the "permanently" unemployed or
grossly underemployed. An early instance of this change in
emphasis came in 1963 when MDTA was amended to permit
the youth training category to increase from 5 percent to 25
percent of total enrollments. With some temporary shifts
and even reversals in policy, the government moved still fur
ther in this direction in the remainder of the 1960s and dur
ing the 1970s.
155
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Other trends in the development of government training
programs during these two decades were less clear-cut. As
long as business conditions remained buoyant, as during
much of the 1960s, emphasis centered almost exclusively on
training in specific skills as the means for opening up jobs to
the hard-to-employ. Even during this period, however, it
became evident that many workers faced major barriers in
the search for regular employment. As a consequence, ef
forts were made to couple training with related services such
as counseling, job placement and temporary work ex
perience. By the mid-1970s, as indicated in the preceding
chapter, more emphasis had come to be placed on providing
temporary jobs than on providing training, first as a way of
dealing with structural unemployment and then with cyclical
unemployment. At the end of the 1970s somewhat greater at
tention was once again being given to training in specific
skills, but this was primarily viewed as an element in sub
sidized work programs, with the chief emphasis still placed
on providing the disadvantaged among the unemployed with
temporary job opportunities.
The decline in support of training programs was largely
due to mounting skepticism about their effectiveness. While
the necessary data for definitive evaluations were not
available, most of the studies completed by the early 1970s
yielded quite unfavorable conclusions, with estimates of
benefit-cost ratios running close to zero. Ironically, as the
focus of public policy shifted from training to jobs, more
adequate data became available and later studies revealed
that the training programs of the 1960s resulted in a modest
but significant net increase in participants' earnings. 1 By the
end of the 1970s, interest in training as an approach to the
problem of hardcore unemployment somewhat revived.
1 Farrell E. Bloch, ed , Evaluating Manpower Training Programs, essay by George E.
Johnson, pp 227-254, citing studies for the U.S Department of Labor by Orley
Ashenfelter (1973) and Thomas F Cooley and Edward C. Prescott (1972)
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Looking to the 1980s, the principal questions confronting
public policymakers will be much the same regarding govern
ment training programs as those considered earlier regarding
public service employment: What are the effects on these
programs of changes in the overall level of business activity?
To what extent should such programs be targeted to the most
severely disadvantaged workers? Have the programs resulted
in the displacement of other workers to a significant degree
and if so, how can such displacement effects be minimized?
How can government training programs most effectively
promote entry of participants into regular work in the
private and public sector? Finally, how can the programs
most effectively contribute to improved motivation on the
part of participants?
Policy responses to these questions can be expected to be
hardly less tentative and controversial than in the case of
public service employment programs, since the government's
approach to training has shifted frequently over the past
twenty years and the amount of scientific evaluation of
results has been extremely limited. The few policy recom
mendations that emerge from this experience and these
studies, while differing in certain respects, follow the same
general lines in both sets of programs.

The Effects of High Employment
In accordance with generally accepted views, government
policy can be expected to shift from a job creation emphasis
in periods of low employment to a skill improvement em
phasis in periods of high employment. This follows from the
fact that expansions in public employment are called for
when the general level of unemployment is high but a
broadening of manpower training is needed as labor supplies
become scarcer. In good measure this was the story of the
1960s and the 1970s; in the earlier decade, the trend in
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unemployment was downward and emphasis was ap
propriately placed on training, whereas in the later decade
the opposite trend occurred and emphasis was quite rightly
shifted to job creation.
As a guide to policy, however, this distinction can easily be
carried too far. For one thing, total employment can rise
strongly but the unemployment rate remains too high to
justify any such marked change in policy direction. Even if
the overall jobless rate were to decline significantly, the job
picture for many disadvantaged workers may remain very
unfavorable and, for these workers, continuation of some
special type of public employment program would be essen
tial.
As to expanding government training efforts in periods of
strong business expansion, a similar skepticism would be
justified. To the exent such efforts were concentrated on the
severely disadvantaged, the increased emphasis on training
would be altogether appropriate since it is in these periods
that special training opportunities for the hard-to-employ
would be most likely to succeed. Responsibility for training
other workers in these circumstances, on the other hand,
could be largely shifted to private employers since, in periods
of expanding business, greater reliance can be placed on nor
mal market processes to fulfill the training and job place
ment needs of most workers. The further point also needs to
be kept in mind that government training programs, in large
part in contradistinction to public employment programs,
are designed to meet longer term requirements of workers
and employers; once in place, sharp reversals in their scope
and direction would not be desirable.

Training Program Links to Job Vacancies
The more relevant question to consider is whether there
are some types of government training activities which are
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better adapted to periods of high employment than others,
that is, to periods when job openings are multiplying and
career prospects are generally improving. In such periods,
training programs that are focused most explicitly on filling
the labor-upgrading needs and longer term career openings
of private and public employers are particularly appropriate.
Unfortunately, a few of the earlier programs and even fewer
of those in effect in the 1976-1979 upswing had this aim. On
ly two of the programs, Public Service Careers (PSC) and
Apprenticeship Outreach Program (AOP), were directly
aimed from their inception at getting enrollees into careerrelated positions. PSC was designed
... to relieve shortages of professional personnel in
human service activities [health, education,
neighborhood redevelopment, etc.] to meet the need of
the unemployed and underemployed for meaningful
jobs with career ladder possibilities. 2
At first this program, then known as New Careers, was
limited to human services jobs in the public sector, but in
1970 it was expanded to include a wide range of positions in
state and local government agencies. Under this program the
federal government undertook, through grants and other
means, to place disadvantaged adults and younger workers
in permanent jobs in the public sector. The aim was to get
them into positions with career potential and to this end
federal funds were made available to help defray extra train
ing costs of these workers.
The focus of AOP was on helping disadvantaged workers
meet requirements for entrance into apprenticeship pro
grams, chiefly in the construction trades. This has been
achieved by allocating federal funds to such groups as
2 Manpower Report of the President, 1968 (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1969), p. 102.
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building trades councils, the National Urban League and the
Workers' Defense League which have agreed to provide
guidance, training and other aids to minority group workers
who otherwise would not qualify for or even know about ap
prentice training opportunities. Such opportunities were
already generally available in the less skilled lines of work
such as the "trowel trades" in the construction field, but not
in lines requiring considerable technical preparation such as
the electrical, plumbing and mechanical trades. AOP, ac
cordingly, has given special emphasis to helping workers
from disadvantaged backgrounds gain access to these hardto-enter careers.
Several other programs have sought to provide direct entry
to jobs, chiefly in private industry, but they have placed little
weight on longer term career elements. The Manpower and
Development Act On-the-Job Training program (MDTAOJT) was something of an exception in the latter regard;
under this program, every participant has been given a job in
a private company with the assurance of some training and
at least the possibility of permanent employment. Other pro
grams have also provided placement in specific companies,
but in entry-level jobs only, with a bare modicum of training
and no assurance of permanence. Both the Work Incentive
Program (WIN, now known as Work Experience) and the
Job Opportunities in the Business Sector (JOBS) programs
have made explicit provision for giving employment and
training opportunities to disadvantaged workers but in
neither case has the relationship been effectively im
plemented.
In the case of WIN, beneficiaries under the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC) are re
quired to register for referral either to a job, to a training
program, or to some other supportive service. At first the ef
fort to combine work and welfare, which began in the early
1960s, emphasized voluntary job search and participation in
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training, but the state and local welfare agencies were illprepared to handle the undertaking and the incentives pro
vided enrollees to get off welfare and accept employment
proved generally ineffective. A more basic difficulty was that
job openings for these workers, even in the favorable en
vironment of the 1960s, were limited and the training pro
grams often did not qualify them for such openings. In the
1970s, especially after the Talmadge amendments of 1971,
the emphasis shifted from voluntary to required job finding
procedures and from training and related supportive services
to job placement and immediate job search aids. With this
shift in focus, in the words of one survey,
. . . public policy has virtually abandoned earlier
rhetoric about helping welfare recipients to achieve
financial independence, opting instead to move
beneficiaries into any job as soon as possible. 3
Viewed in short-run terms, this reorientation of WIN met
with some success: by 1978, registrants in the program had
risen to over 2 million and nearly 300,000 found jobs as
against 1.2 million registrants and 137,000 job finders in the
boom year of 1973. As an approach to the problem of struc
tural unemployment, however, the difficulty was and still is
that the unemployment-prone groups—blacks, young
workers, women and older workers—were less often
represented among job entrants than among program
registrants by substantial margins. In fiscal 1978, for exam
ple, there were 124,000 fewer job entrants among women,
and 140,000 fewer among blacks, than registrants whereas
job entrants exceeded registrants by substantial margins in
the cases of men and whites. Efforts to induce employers to
take on women and black registrants, much less the more
severely disadvantaged members among these groups, by tax
credits, intensive information campaigns, and the like, have
3. Levitan, Mangum, and Marshall, Human Resources and Labor Markets, p 337
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had few observable results. 4 Thus an effective approach to
combining work and welfare still remains to be found.
Though the initial orientation of JOBS was very different
from that of the WIN program, it too failed to establish ef
fective links for participants between employment and other
components of job placement. This occurred despite the fact
that, from its inception in 1968, one of the guiding principles
of JOBS was to integrate work opportunities for the disadvantaged with on-the-job training. Under the slogan "hire
now, train later," a much-publicized national effort was
launched to induce major employers to take on disadvantaged workers and provide them with the training necessary to
qualify for regular employment; firms signing appropriate
contracts were to be compensated for the special training
costs involved but only about one-third of the participating
companies chose this procedure.
While adequate data are lacking, investigations of the pro
gram reveal great variability among firms in the range of
training and supportive services. In summing up the findings
on this aspect of the JOBS program, the Wharton Industrial
Research Unit study concluded:
Overall, the quantity and quality of training and
other services appears to have been [relatively] superior
in the contract segment of the program, but [even] the
record of the contract participants in providing services
contracted and compensated for was far from good. 5
The study notes that prior to 1970 there was some tendency
among firms which signed JOBS contracts to provide a wider
range of career-oriented job opportunities for disadvantaged
4. Employment and Training Report of the President, 1977, pp. 58-63, and Employment
and Training Report of the President, 1979, pp. 53-54.
5. Charles R. Perry, The Impact of Government Manpower Programs in General and on
Minorities and Women (Philadelphia: Industrial Research Unit, The Wharton School,
University of Pennsylvania, 1975), p. 191.
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employees who would have been hired in any case but for
whom little in the way of prejob training or supportive ser
vices would have been provided; even among these
employers, however, the benefits on this score were ap
parently meager. 6
The factors leading to this generally unfavorable outcome
are not altogether clear, but two considerations deserve men
tion. First, since the JOBS program sought to provide mass
employment to large numbers of disadvantaged workers on
virtually a crash basis, the effort centered largely on entrylevel jobs, despite any career planning pronouncements to
the contrary. Second, the downswing in business and the
sharp rise in unemployment that occurred after 1969 induced
a number of key firms to withdraw from the JOBS program
while layoffs at other firms blocked further efforts to pro
vide even entry-level jobs to these workers.
Programs such as MDTA-Institutional and the Concen
trated Employment Program (CEP) also developed few ef
fective links with employment opportunities, much less
longer term career opportunities for disadvantaged par
ticipants; but since they provided specific skills they at least
increased the potential for these workers to find regular
employment. These programs operated on the assumption
that if disadvantaged workers could acquire the qualities
demanded by employers, additional job finding aids special
ly designed for such workers would generally be un
necessary; existing facilities provided by the Employment
Service and other agencies were deemed generally sufficient
once these workers had achieved job-readiness status. 7
Studies of the post-training experience of MDTA6. Ibid., p. 195.
7. The Opportunities Industrialization Centers program (QIC) has a similar training em
phasis but lack of data makes any generalization about its employment impact extremely
hazardous.
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Institutional participants indicate that the program has
helped enrollees, especially women, who were previously
unemployed find work, but has done less for those already
employed. Moreover, speaking particularly of disadvantaged participants, it is clear that the program has been largely
limited to entry-level jobs. 8
The CEP program placed heavy emphasis on inducing
employers to provide jobs for its participants, but its success
in this regard has been very limited.This program was
designed as a "one-stop" coordinating agency to help disadvantaged workers in severely depressed localities, chiefly
large inner-city areas, find job openings and secure the train
ing and related services to qualify for such openings. Actual
responsibility for meeting their training and other job find
ing needs was left to subcontracting agencies, with CEP serv
ing largely as a coordinating office. This organizational
structure militated against achieving quick or easily
demonstrable successes. Training was frequently not carried
to the point where enrollees could step into any but the very
lowest grade jobs and employers became increasingly reluc
tant to take on workers from the program. After 1969, most
of CEP's job placement and related functions were transfer
red to the federal-state Employment Service and attention
shifted to placing workers with more acceptable job
qualifications. Today, general responsibility in this regard is
vested in the local prime sponsors under the CETA legisla
tion while immediate implementation of whatever remains of
the "one-stop" system of referrals is largely performed by
the Employment Service offices.
The record shows that only a few of the government's
training programs are explicitly designed to promote a
career-entry type of job placement, the kind of training
8 The Job Corps program, which also has a training focus, is discussed at a later point in
this chapter.
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orientation that is best suited to a high employment environ
ment. In periods of strong business expansion a shift in em
phasis in this direction seems clearly warranted. However,
several other issues need to be considered before deciding
how such a shift can best be accomplished.
Career Entry and Worker Motivation
The two remaining questions that call for answers regard
ing government training programs are, first, what policies
would be most effective in making it possible for severely
disadvantaged workers to find regular, stable employment
and second, what policies would contribute most to improv
ing the motivation of such workers to find and pursue satis
fying careers? These two questions are so closely related they
can best be treated together.
The main thrust of the preceding chapter was that
policymakers should give equal emphasis to subsidized job
opportunities and subsidized job training in dealing with
severely disadvantaged workers—that both of these aspects
of the individual's development need to be kept in focus, if
not simultaneously then certainly sequentially. The finding
of the present chapter, especially in the opening section, was
that this joint work-and-training conception has received lit
tle more than lip service by officials and as such constitutes
the most serious gap in the government's efforts to deal ef
fectively with the hardcore unemployed.
One of the most difficult aspects of developing stronger
policies along these lines is that of reconciling the needs and
expectations of the workers and employers involved, the
recurring issue touched on at many points in earlier chapters.
It can be safely assumed that many of the hardest-to-employ
workers are those least ready to accept the discipline and
standards of even entry-level jobs, much less of higher level
positions. On the other hand, the reluctance on the part of
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even the most community spirited employers to take on
workers with such serious deficiencies is to be expected
whether they are subsidized or not. Experience with efforts
to break through this economic-social stalemate by means of
government training programs has yielded little in the way of
specific guides for policymakers, but a few recommenda
tions deserve mention.
In considering how government training programs can
best be fitted into the job finding, career-development needs
of workers facing the most serious barriers to steady employ
ment, the experience under public service employment pro
grams reviewed in the previous chapter highlights the
policymaking issues involved: sorting out the individual
worker's immediate job and longer term career interests;
identifying the specific steps the individual would need to
take to realize them; offering the training and related ser
vices required; providing the subsidized employment oppor
tunity most likely to contribute to this outcome; and
strengthening the worker's motivation by providing rewards
at frequent intervals during subsidized employment.
This is obviously an idealized view of how the problem
posed by severely disadvantaged workers can best be ap
proached but its use lies in indicating the general direction
government training programs will need to follow. One of
the key considerations is to make sure workers engage in
training that has meaning in terms of their particular in
terests and prospects. Training for the sake of training may
provide a temporary kind of support but can hardly lay the
basis for longer term benefits; the training has to be part of
some career plan, however modest and limited, to enlist a
worker's genuine involvement. At the same time, the train
ing has to be structured in such a way that the individual sees
quite immediate and concrete advantages in performing
satisfactorily. This would mean breaking up the training into

Government Training

167

a series of well-defined steps with periodic evaluations and
income adjustments at each stage.
On first consideration, an approach to government train
ing programs along these individualized, intensive lines
would seem hopelessly impractical. It is important to
remember, however, that the most severely disadvantaged
group, as defined in this study, comes to no more than
500,000 to 750,000 workers in the country as a whole, so in
any given locality, the number would be comparatively
small. More important, within this group a considerable por
tion could doubtless be assigned to relatively specific, short
term training opportunities. Even narrowly defined, the
severely disadvantaged constitute a wide diversity of
abilities, motivations and outlooks, and for a significant
number, a relatively brief period of training supplemented
by only one or two related services could well prove suffi
cient.
The other key consideration is the response on the part of
employers to this type of government training, not only dur
ing the period of subsidization but afterwards as well. As
emphasized earlier, the active cooperation of both private
and public employers is essential to the success of any such
program, but their cooperation cannot be expected unless
they have adequate knowledge about the abilities and related
qualities of workers in the program. No set of procedures
can fully provide this information in every instance, but a
system of periodic evaluations of each participant's progress
would surely help. Such a system, if properly designed, could
be extremely useful in enlisting the active support of
employers as well as providing a continuing incentive to the
workers to move ahead in the program.
This view of the role of government training programs
parallels the approach to public service employment
developed in the preceding chapter with the two functions
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closely integrated with one another. Whether in a given in
stance, training or job experience should receive major em
phasis would depend on such factors as the participant's
prior work history, educational level, degree of job readiness
and general background. In most cases a rough kind of
balancing would probably be appropriate with somewhat
greater emphasis on one or the other at different phases of
an individual's work and training.
Two national programs present striking contrasts in this
regard: the Supported Work Demonstration project, which
is primarily limited to work experience, and the Job Corps
program, which is primarily limited to job training. 9 On
average, the Supported Work participants spend slightly
over 80 percent of their program days on work projects while
Corps members spend somewhat less than 27 percent of their
time on work activities. The other major difference between
the two programs is that the Job Corps is largely a residential
program and involves placing severely disadvantaged young
men and women age 14-21 in urban and rural training
centers away from their home and neighborhood en
vironments. Both programs, nonetheless, follow the same
approach in that participants receive comprehensive services
on an intensive basis which it is hoped will subsequently
enable them to find steady jobs in the regular labor market.
Experience under these two ambitious programs does not
point unequivocally to one being superior to the other. With
respect to young participants alone, the age groups which
make up all those served by Job Corps but which constitutes
only one of the four groups in the Supported Work project,
neither program can be said to be a clear success. As in9. Manpower Research Demonstration Corporation, Summary of Findings of the National
Supported Work Demonstration and Mathematica Policy Research, A Comparative
Evaluation of the Benefits and Costs of the Job Corps After Seven Months of Postprogram
Follow-Up, Office of Youth Programs Report No. 10 (Washington: U.S. Department of
Labor, February, 1979).
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dicated in the preceding chapter, the sampling of the youth
target group in the Supported Work program was no more
successful in subsequently finding jobs than their control
group counterparts. Participants in the Job Corps, on the
other hand, were achieving roughly 10 percent higher earn
ings seven months after leaving the program than nonenrollees. The principal difficulty confronting Job Corps is
its poor retention rate: the average length of stay is only a lit
tle over 5.5 months, with the rate declining from 5.9 months
in 1977 to 5.6 months in 1978. The economic and
noneconomic benefits of the Job Corps experience are
directly related to the length of time an enrollee remains in
the Corps. Thus only 65.6 percent of terminees who were in
the Job Corps 4 to 6 months found jobs in fiscal 1978 and
their starting wage was $3.06 per hour, while the employ
ment rate for those in the program over 15 months was 79.5
percent and their starting wage was $3.47 per hour. A closely
related problem is the poor record with respect to placement
of terminees in jobs; in fiscal 1978, only 27 percent had full
time jobs seven months after leaving the program, though 68
percent reported they had entered some kind of employment
that year. More disturbing still, the record shows that only
one of seven Corps members who enters the vocational train
ing program ends up completing it and being placed, upon
termination, in a job in the same cluster. 10
As in the case of the Job Corps the Supported Work pro
gram achieved its greatest success with those participants
who saw specific gains from doing well in the program and
placed high value on realizing those gains. It was AFDC
mothers with family responsibilities who had the best
postprogram record in finding jobs in the study of the four
10 Employment and Training Report of the President, 1979, pp. 120-174 and 179-182;
Mathematica Policy Research, A Comparative Evaluation of the Benefits and Costs of the
Job Corps After Seven Months of Postprogram Follow-Up, Office of Youth Programs
Report No 10 (Washington: U.S. Department of Labor, February 1979).
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Supported Work groups noted in the preceding chapter,
followed by the ex-addict group. The two remaining groups,
young school dropouts and ex-offenders released from
custody, had the poorest postprogram employment ex
periences. Both of these groups, it is worth noting,
represented a relatively broad spectrum of work attitudes
and general outlooks. Viewed in these terms, it appears that
the most serious impediment to effective government action
in dealing with unemployment among severely disadvantaged workers is the inability to establish adequate incentives
that would induce the steps necessary to qualify for work in
the regular market.
This leaves the critical question of employer response and
cooperation still to be considered. Put in terms of incentives,
the answer to this question turns on what inducements and
circumstances would prove most effective in gaining
employer participation. As developed earlier, formidable
barriers stand in the way of achieving employer acceptance
of workers from severely disadvantaged backgrounds, bar
riers that are just as much the product of long-standing
social attitudes as more strictly economic considerations.
One of the most promising approaches to stronger employer
participation is to provide monetary incentives which will at
the very least give added strength to other inducements
working in this direction. Unfortunately, little is known of a
systematic nature about this issue, but whatever route is
taken, it seems likely that some type of wage subsidy system
will be adopted. A review of the general principles that
would underlie such a system would therefore seem ap
propriate.

Chapter 10
Wage Subsidies and Employment
James R. Knickman*
A particularly disturbing component of unemployment is
that found among low wage, unskilled workers. This
unemployment, which is significantly more common than
joblessness among higher wage workers, is especially serious
because of the chronic difficulty of effectively decreasing the
permanent rate of unemployment experienced by this sector
of the labor market.'
In 1977 Congress passed legislation designed to increase
private employment of low paid workers by providing tax
credits over the following two years to employers who hired
more of such workers. 2 This was to be achieved by granting
*Assistant Professor, Graduate School of Public Administration, New York University.
1. One method for determining unemployment rates for low wage workers versus high
wage workers is to compare unemployment rates for demographic groups that are known
to have varying average wage rates. For instance, in the third quarter of 1977, when the
overall unemployment rate was 10 percent, the unemployment rates for adult blacks,
teenage blacks, and white teenagers, three groups with lower than average wage rates were
11 1 percent, 39.5 percent, and 15 percent, respectively. White males, between 25 and 55,
by contrast, had an unemployment rate of 3.7 percent. These figures are from Lester
Thurow, "Inequality, Inflation and Growth in The American Economy," The Economist
(December 24, 1977).
2 The summary of existing legislation is based on the testimony of Arnold H. Packer,
Assistant Secretary for Policy, Evaluation and Research, U.S. Department of Labor,
before the Subcommittee on Administration of the Internal Revenue Code, Committee on
Finance and the Select Committee on Small Business, U S. Senate, July 18, 1978.
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employers credits equal to 50 percent of any increase in a
firm's federal unemployment tax wage base over 102 percent
of the previous year's base. Thus, a firm hiring an additional
worker could receive 50 percent of the worker's first $4,200
of earnings as a tax credit. The legislation set a ceiling of
$100,000 on the amount of tax credits that could be received
by any one firm in a given year. Limiting the credits to the
first $4,200 of earnings meant that the percentage subsidy
would be higher for low wage than for high wage workers.
Earlier, in 1971, Congress had passed similar legislation,
subsequently amended in 1975, 1976 and 1977, providing tax
credits to employers who hired enrollees in the Work Incen
tive (WIN) and other welfare programs. Under this legisla
tion employers could claim 20 percent of the first year wages
of eligible workers. Both the WIN and welfare credits re
quired minimum duration periods of employment.
Employers also were restricted from laying off or reducing
the hours of other workers eligible for the credits, and the
maximum an employer could claim for any one tax year was
$50,000 plus one-half of tax liability over $50,000.
The chief policy question posed by any tax credit or sub
sidy scheme is how much reliance should be placed on this
approach to reducing unemployment among low wage
workers. If the goal is to increase employment among such
workers by a million or more, a very substantial liberaliza
tion of the tax credit and eligibility provisions of the 1977
legislation would be required. A program along these lines
suggested by Robert Eisner, for example, could be expected
to incur a gross tax cost to the Treasury of as much as $20
billion compared to $2.4 billion projected for 1978 under the
present program. 3 An effort of this dimension would mean
3 Robert Eisner, "A Direct Attack on Unemployment and Inflation," Challenge (JulyAugust 1978), pp 49-51. Allowance for savings on unemployment benefits and other in
come maintenance expenditures as well as for increases in tax receipts from the increased
employment would cut the gross tax cost by as much as a half.
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that the government has shifted from broad expansionary
measures such as across-the-board tax cuts to a selective ex
pansionary program aimed primarily at creating jobs for low
wage workers in the private sector. The Carter administra
tion has favored some action along the latter lines but not to
the point of supplanting or even materially reducing broad
expansionary measures; in fact, it has proposed to narrow
the focus of the job tax credit program sharply by limiting it
largely to disadvantaged youth between 18 and 24 years of
age. 4
In this chapter, a general analysis of the likely labor
market impacts of a wage subsidy is presented. The impacts
that could be expected on the supply of low wage labor, the
demand for low wage labor, and the rates of employment
and unemployment are each discussed.

Types and Effects
Wage subsidies can take two forms: a subsidy paid directly
to the employer based on the number of hours worked by
low wage employees or a subsidy paid directly to the
employee. In the latter case, a target wage is selected and
then the government pays a subsidy that equals some percen
tage of the difference between the earned wage of the worker
and the target wage. This subsidy is paid on each hour work
ed by the individual. 5
Kesselman has shown that the two forms of the wage sub
sidy have identical labor market effects if the subsidy is paid
to or for every worker earning less than the preset target
wage. 6 If the subsidy is categorical in that only a subset of
4. See Packer, testimony before the Subcommittee on Administration.
5. For example, if a target wage of $4 is set and the wage subsidy is to pay 50 percent of the
difference between earned wage and the $4 target wage, then an individual who earns $3 per
hour would receive a subsidy of $.50 per hour (50 percent x [$4-$3] = $.50). Similarly a per
son earning $2 per hour would receive a $1 per hour subsidy.
6. Jonathan Kesselman, "Labor Supply Effects of Income, Income-Work, and Wage Sub
sidies," Journal of Human Resources (Summer 1969).
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low wage workers is eligible for the subsidy, then the two
forms of the subsidy can have very different labor market ef
fects. For example, a categorical wage subsidy paid to
employers would likely cause employers to substitute eligible
workers for ineligible workers (if their skills were the same)
whereas this response is not as likely if the subsidy is paid to
the employee directly.
Studies of wage subsidies in the past have focused
predominantly on the antipoverty effects of this public
policy. 7 To the extent that total wages (earned wage plus sub
sidy) increase for subsidy recipients, a wage subsidy program
would increase the income of the working poor, a group
largely ignored by the current income support system.
In the following pages we focus on the potential employ
ment and unemployment effects of a wage subsidy.
Specifically, we are interested in whether or not a wage sub
sidy would create more jobs for low wage, unskilled workers
and how such a program would likely affect the measured
rate of unemployment. A wage subsidy paid to workers will
be considered first, followed by a short discussion of the
likely effects of a wage subsidy paid to employers.

The Effect of Subsidies Paid to Employees
on the Aggregate Level of Employment
To determine a wage subsidy's effects on employment, it is
necessary to determine both its impact on the supply of labor
and on the demand for labor. If the subsidy is paid to the
employee, demand can be affected only if the subsidy first
changes the total amount of labor supplied.

7. For examples of this literature, see Kesselman, "Labor Supply Effects" and John
Bishop, The General Equilibrium Impact of Alternative Antipoverty Strategies, Institute
for Research on Poverty Discussion Paper No. 386-77, February 1977.
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The labor supply response is likely to differ across varying
subgroups of the low wage labor market. Specifically, the
labor supply of teenagers and women has been found to be
more responsive to wage changes than the labor supply of
prime age males. 8
In estimating the labor supply effects for prime age males,
it is important to distinguish between aggregate and micro
effects. Econometric studies have added weight to the
hypothesis that employed, prime age males decrease their
work effort, on average, as their wages increase. 9 Effective
ly, the studies show that men who have jobs use the extra in
come resulting from a wage increase to "buy" extra leisure
time. They can earn as much (or perhaps more) income after
the wage increase even if they work fewer total hours. 10
These studies use disaggregated cross section data in con
firming the existence of a "backward bending" individual
labor supply curve.
The results do not imply, however, that the total amount
of labor supplied at a given wage by all males in that wage
class will decrease if the wage rate increases. An influx of
former nonworkers into the labor force and the employment
of workers formerly unemployed could more than make up
for the decrease in annual hours among those actually work
ing before the wage increases. In three studies which ac
counted for changes in labor force participation along with
changes in annual hours by those working, positive total

8. See Glen Cam and Harold Watts, eds., Income Maintenance and Labor Supply (New
York: Academic Press, 1973)
9. Ibid
10. Wage changes cause both price (or substitution) effects and income effects on work
hours. Labor supply studies indicate that the negative income effect is larger than the
positive substitution effect for males.
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labor supply curves resulted from cross section disaggregated
estimation.''
If males who have jobs reduce their total hours of work in
response to a wage increase, jobs in the low wage labor
market may be created just to keep aggregate labor supply as
high as it was before the wage subsidy. Thus one wage sub
sidy result, even if aggregate demand was unaffected, would
be more individuals working with work hours per male lower
than before the implementation of the wage subsidy.
Studies of labor supply among women and teenagers
generally find a positive effect of wage increases on labor
supplied by these groups at both the individual and aggregate
level. Women and teenagers who hold jobs tend to increase
their work hours when wage rates increase and, in addition,
some nonworkers accept employment when wages increase.
Thus, a wage subsidy would unambiguously increase the ag
gregate labor supply of women and teenagers.
From a supply perspective, therefore, the likely impact of
a wage subsidy paid to employees would be:
(1) an increase in the total number of workers offering
labor services in the low wage labor market,
(2) a decrease in the average hours worked among male
workers who held jobs prior to the wage subsidy, and
(3) an increase in average work hours among women and
teenagers who held jobs prior to the wage subsidy.
The net impact of these three supply responses would be
an increase in aggregate labor supply among low wage
workers. This increase would likely cause the market wage
11. See Edward Kalacheck and Frederic Raines, "Labor Supply of Low Income Workers,"
Technical Studies, The President's Commission on Income Maintenance Programs
(Washington- Government Printing Office, 1970); Robert Hall, "Wages, Income, and
Hours of Work in the U.S. Labor Force," in Cain and Watts, eds., Income Maintenance
and Labor Supply; and C Russell Hill, "The Determinants of Labor Supply for the Work
ing Urban Poor," in Cam and Watts, eds., Income Maintenance and Labor Supply.
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rate to fall and, therefore, the demand for labor to increase.
This assumes that the elasticity of demand for low wage
labor is negative as has been documented in most studies of
labor demand. 12
Earth has simulated the impact of a wage subsidy on
employment demand and supply with a simple three equa
tion supply and demand model. 13 For various possible values
of aggregate supply and demand elasticities, he computes the
employment effects of a program with a target wage of $3.00
per hour and a subsidy rate of 50 percent. 14 His results in
dicate that employment would increase by 3.05 percent if the
demand elasticity is -.4 and the supply elasticity is + .2. This
employment effect is larger if either the actual supply or de
mand elasticity is in fact larger than -.4 or + .2.
Bishop designed a more complex simulation model that
accounts for substitutability of low and high wage labor in
the production process and allows for occupational mobility
among workers. 15 Although his results are not reported in
the same form as those of Earth, Bishop does note that his
results indicate that Earth's simpler model understates the
employment effects of a wage subsidy.
These results suggest that a wage subsidy policy would in
crease employment in the low wage labor market. The results
do not determine, however, whether this increased employ12. See Daniel Hamermesh, "Econometric Studies of Labor Demand and Their Applica
tion to Policy Analysis," Journal of Human Resources (Fall 1976) for a review of these de
mand studies
13 Michael Barth, "Market Effects of a Wage Subsidy," Industrial and Labor Relations
Review, Vol 27, 1974 The three equations in Earth's model are a demand equation, a sup
ply equation, and an identity that sets demand equal to supply.
14. Barth uses data from the 1967 Survey of Economic Opportunity. A wage subsidy, if im
plemented in 1980, would obviously have a substantially higher target wage than $3 per
hour reflecting high price and wage levels.
15 John Bishop, "Impact of Antipoverty Strategies."
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ment would come from those who are unemployed during a
period of full employment or from those who are not in the
labor force prior to the wage subsidy. It seems likely,
however, that at least part of the employment increase would
be composed of formerly unemployed workers and formerly
"discouraged" workers who had given up looking for work
and thus were not counted as being unemployed.

Effects of a Wage Subsidy Paid to Employers
on Aggregate Level of Employment
Rather than paying subsidies directly to employees, a wage
subsidy program could make payments to low wage
employers. This type of program is often called a wage bill
subsidy. In essence, such a program would be analogous to
investment credit programs that use tax credits to subsidize
the use of capital. A significant advantage of a program that
pays subsidies to employers is that the subsidies could be
targeted at specific demographic groups that are characteriz
ed by high unemployment rates. Thus, for example, the pro
gram could be designed to pay subsidies only if teenagers
were hired or, alternatively, only if household heads were
hired.
Thurow argues that such a wage bill subsidy strategy is the
most viable approach to decreasing unemployment rates
among low skilled workers in an economy where unemploy
ment rates differ across demographic and skill groups. 16
Most other unemployment strategies cause a good deal of in
flation in such an economy, according to Thurow.
A subsidy paid only to employers of selected demographic
and skill groups would likely lead to increased employment
among these groups for two reasons: first, the cost of this
type of labor would decrease, thus making it efficient to pro16. Lester Thurow, "Inequality, Inflation, and Growth."
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duce more output using extra amounts of the subsidized
labor; and second, subsidized labor would be substituted for
unsubsidized labor because of the change in the relative
prices of the two categories of labor.
It is not clear that the substitution of subsidized labor for
unsubsidized labor would increase aggregate employment
levels. It is likely that unemployment would merely decrease
among groups of individuals eligible for a subsidy while
unemployment would increase for nonsubsidized workers.
To the extent that output increases and labor demand in
creases due to a wage bill subsidy, however, employment
should increase in the low wage labor market. The
magnitude of employment effects due to the decreased cost
of subsidized labor depend on labor supply and labor de
mand elasticities in the same manner as does the magnitude
of employment effects related to wage subsidies paid directly
to workers. The total increase in employment due to a wage
bill subsidy will be smaller than the estimate presented in the
last section to the extent that the wage bill subsidy is
categorical and pays subsidies only to a portion of the low
wage labor market. As mentioned before, if a wage bill sub
sidy applies to all low wage workers, then the employment
effects of subsidies paid to employers are identical to the ef
fects of subsidies paid to employees.

Effects of a Wage Subsidy on the
Measured Rate of Permanent Unemployment
Besides expanding the number of low wage jobs, a wage
subsidy paid to the employee or the employer may also have
an impact on the number of unemployment spells that the
average low wage worker experiences. To predict a wage sub
sidy's effect on the measured rate of unemployment,
however, the causes of unemployment in the low wage labor
market must be identified.
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One hypothesis for the cause of low wage unemployment
is offered by the dual or segmented labor market theory
which suggests that much of low wage joblessness in times of
full employment can be viewed as a type of frictional
unemployment. 17 Low wage workers change jobs frequently
because their low wage makes the cost of job search
minimal. 18 The existence of various welfare programs and
nonlegal or other nonreported work opportunities reduces
further the costs of taking time off.
As a result of this low return on labor, workers quit their
jobs frequently, continually moving into and out of the labor
force. At any point in time a certain number of individuals
are attempting to move back into the labor force or to find
jobs, having recently left other low wage jobs. These job
seekers are counted as unemployed. Evidence indicates that
the average duration of an unemployment spell is shorter for
low wage than high wage workers, 19 and that in times of full
employment jobs are available although they might not be
desirable opportunities. 20
These unemployment spells, therefore, cannot be traced to
deficient demand but rather are caused by a divergence of
the wage return offered by available jobs and the wage
return desired by the unemployed individual. If the wage of
fer reflects the actual marginal productivity of the "search
ing" worker, then the worker, after a finite, unsuccessful
search, will either accept the low wage offer or leave the
17. See Peter Doennger and Michael J. Piore, Internal Labor Markets and Manpower
Analysis (Lexmgton, MA: D.C Heath , 1971) for a good survey of the segmented labor
market theory See especially ch. 8.
18 Modern Job Search Theory emphasizes the need to take a spell of joblessness in order
to look for a better job. See Microeconomic Foundations of Employment and Inflation
Theory (New York: Norton, 1970), edited by Edmund S. Phelps et al.
19 See George Perry, "Unemployment Flows in the Labor Market."
20 See Peter Doennger, ed., Low Income Labor Markets and Urban Manpower Programs
(Springfield, VA: National Technical Information Service, 1969).
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labor force in favor of public assistance or nonlegal earning
opportunities. 21
Segmented labor market theorists argue that this instabili
ty of labor supply has caused employers to structure jobs to
accommodate frequent turnover. Low wage jobs are design
ed so that little or no training is necessary, few work respon
sibilities are given to the workers, and the normal incentives
of advancement through an "internal labor market" are not
offered to these workers. This structuring of jobs, in turn,
results in boring, unappealing work conditions and causes
even more quitting and instability of labor supply.
The process is dynamic, with the chain of causation often
blurred. It seems clear, however, that an important link in
this circular chain is the high quit rate prevalent in the low
wage labor market. To the extent that the wage subsidy
reduces the quit rate and increases stability of supply, the
other characteristics of the low wage labor market should
improve.
Numerous studies have shown that quit rates are negative
ly related to wage rates. Ulman has shown that quit rates in
low wage industries are significantly higher than in high
wage industries. 22 Severn23 and Armknecht and Early24 came
21 An implied assumption in this analysis is that the desirability of a job is completely
reflected in the wage rate of the job This is a standard assumption in economic theory, but
not so clear from surveying actual jobs Besides work conditions, however, the wage also
reflects the training, education, and skills required of the job The fact that low wage jobs
look so unattractive can be explained by the fact that the amount of training or skills re
quired for a job seems to be positively correlated with the perceived attractiveness of jobs.
This does not contradict the assumption that undesirable or more difficult jobs within the
unskilled class of jobs have higher wages than more desirable jobs
22 Lloyd Ulman, "Labor Mobility and the Industrial Wage," Quarterly Journal of
Economics, Vol. 79, 1965
23. Alan Severn, "Upward Labor Mobility" Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 82,
1968.
24. Paul Armknecht and John Early, "Quits in Manufacturing. A Study of Their Causes,"
Monthly Labor Review, November 1972.
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to similar conclusions, showing that the relation between an
individual's quit rate and the interindustrial relative wage is
negative. Hall argues that the frequency of low wage
unemployment is due to high turnover among unskilled
workers. 25
Thus, one can tentatively expect that a wage subsidy,
which increases the net wage paid to individuals, will result
in less frequent turnover in the low wage labor market. 26 Ef
fectively, the wage subsidy increases the wage return to a
level that is closer to that desired by the low wage worker
while leaving unchanged the wage paid by the employer. As a
result, search becomes more costly and the return on search
decreases because the relative wage differences between low
wage and higher wage jobs tightens.
Any reduction in the quit rate among low wage workers
could be expected to have numerous beneficial effects on the
employment situation in this market. Primary among these
improvements is that the increased stability of the low wage
labor market should lead employers to invest in training and
to restructure the work done by low wage workers so that the
jobs are a part of the primary labor market. These changes
could reverse the dynamic process in that a better structuring
of jobs would have an independent negative effect on the
quit rate and lead to further employment improvements in
this labor market.

25. Robert Hall, Why is the Unemployment Rate So High at Full Employment, Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, 3 (1970).
26. The prediction must be tentative because the empirical results were obtained with ag
gregated, industry-wide data. A micro study of the quit rate-wage relation has never been
reported, probably due to the scarcity of longitudinal survey data with accurate measures
of voluntary separations. A micro study would allow for more control of other
socioeconomic factors that may affect quit ratesv. It is possible that such factors are cor
related with wage rates, and that the aggregate studies may therefore overestimate the
negative wage effect on quit rates.
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The above conclusions are based on a specific theory of
low wage labor market processes. This theory is a segmented
labor market theory which emphasizes characteristics of
labor supply as the cause of the undesirable labor market
structure in full employment periods. In contrast, other ex
planations of low wage unemployment have emphasized de
mand factors in this labor market. It may be argued that de
mand for low wage labor is very unstable, either due to
seasonality of work or the importance of favorable (and
often cyclical) market conditions for profits in many low
wage industries. It may also be true that the nature of the
work is such that no training is necessary. One other possible
explanation of the secondary labor market is based on racial
discrimination. Minority groups, according to this theory,
are largely restricted to the secondary labor market because
other groups do not want to work with them.
To the extent that the structure of the low wage labor
market is the result of unstable demand and racial
discrimination, wage subsidies cannot be expected to change
the structure of jobs. Unfortunately, neither empirical
studies nor informed opinions have pinpointed the amount
of accountability for the structure of the secondary labor
market attributable to each of the three causal factors
discussed above.
One final explanation for chronically high unemployment
rates in the low wage labor market is the existence of social
minimum wages and the development of varying wages
among different firms for jobs requiring the same skill
level. 27 Social minimum wages are wages that are above the
level required to ensure needed labor supplies. Some
27. Wage differentials within the unskilled labor market may also result from differences in
wages paid by competitive and noncompetitive firms. For a recent formulation of this wage
differential hypothesis, see Steven Ross and Michael Wachter, "Wage Determination, In
flation, and the Industrial Structure," American Economic Review (September 1973)
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employers pay this "above equilibrium" wage because of
their desire to pay a "fair" wage and to avoid accusations
that they pay "slave wages." If social minimum wages are
paid by some but not all low wage employers, a wage dif
ferential within the unskilled labor market develops. This
differential increases the return on job search. Thus, for in
stance, workers may quit a low paying unskilled job to find a
"premium" wage unskilled job, such as a construction
laborer, a mail carrier, or a garbage collector. Many such
jobs, which require no special skills, exist and pay better
than other less attractive, unskilled jobs.
As long as the social minimum wage exceeds the subsidiz
ed wage, a wage subsidy should not alter these social
minimum wage levels. The wage subsidy, however, would
narrow the gap between the wages paid by competitive firms
and those paid by social minimum wage firms. This would
decrease the return on job search and should result in less
voluntary turnover and, therefore, less measured unemploy
ment in the low wage labor market.

Potential Problems of the Wage Subsidy
The predominant wage effect of a wage subsidy will be to
homogenize the level of wages paid to unskilled workers
earning less than the target wage. Postsubsidy wages will
vary less than presubsidy wages. This homogenization of low
wages might act to discourage job advancement. Just as the
return for job search is decreased, the return on training and
education will decrease because a $1.00 increase in market
wage will result in a ($l.-r) increase in net wage, where r is
the subsidy rate. This argument is valid only if job advance
ment is determined by the actual net wage differential.
If it is valid to view the labor market as a ladder of increas
ingly higher paying jobs and if passage to the highest paying
jobs is only possible by proceeding one rung at a time, then
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the return on advancing from one job to another is not only
the actual net wage differential but also the long term poten
tial gains of moving further up the job ladder.
Also, if we consider jobs paying below the target wage to
be exclusively in the "secondary" labor market, no advance
ment disincentives will occur in the primary internal labor
markets where most job advancement actually occurs. Thus,
although the wage subsidy does have a negative effect on job
improvement incentives, it is not clear how disruptive this ef
fect, which is limited only to the relative wages in the lowest
wage category, will be on overall advancement incentives.
The homogenization of low wages also may lead to some
undesirable market results. Firms operating in expanding
product markets signal their needs for additional labor by
paying a higher than equilibrium wage. Labor flows from
firms in other markets to the expanding firms until the
nonexpanding firms reestablish the equality of wages. This
process ensures efficient flows of labor from declining to ex
panding industries. With the presence of wage subsidies, an
expanding firm would have to raise the market wage by a
larger amount than in the absence of wage subsidies in order
to significantly change the net wage of workers so that they
will change jobs and so that additional labor supply will be
forthcoming. This may result in a less adaptable and,
therefore, more inefficient economy.
A third shortcoming of the wage supplement program is
the possibility that low wage labor will be used in place of
higher paid skilled labor. If the market wage in the low wage
market decreases, the relative price of labor will change
while the relative efficiency of low versus high wage labor
will remain the same. According to competitive economic
theory, this should lead to a redistribution of labor inputs in
favor of low wage, unskilled labor. The result would be
counter to the general manpower policy goal of upgrading
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the level of jobs held by workers at the lower end of the wage
distribution.
Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the likely market effects of a
wage subsidy program that would subsidize low wage in
dividuals' wage rates either directly or indirectly through
employers. In general, a wage subsidy would have favorable
employment and unemployment effects. More individuals
would supply labor to the low wage labor market, more in
dividuals would likely find employment due to the effects of
the program on labor demand, and the measured rate of
unemployment might decrease if the program made low
wage labor supply more stable. Potential problems of a wage
subsidy program include the possibility that the homogenization of wage rates in the low wage market will impede labor
mobility and the likelihood that the program would weaken
the demand for skilled labor due to the substitution of sub
sidized manpower for nonsubsidized manpower.

Chapter 11
Conclusion
This study has focused on the role of government in reduc
ing the level of unemployment in periods of high employ
ment. While differing in degree, the same three aspects of
unemployment—cyclical, frictional and structural—must be
addressed in periods of high as in periods of low employ
ment. In both environments the most difficult issue to
resolve is how to mesh short-run and long-run goals for the
economy in choosing among public policy alternatives.
When labor markets are generally loose, major emphasis
shifts to short-run expansionary measures in aggregate de
mand. Even then, however, account has to be taken of possi
ble longer run destablizing consequences of such measures.
Moreover, despite the shift in emphasis, the need to deal
with both the frictional and structural aspects of unemploy
ment is still present in periods of general slack and, con
sidered in this light, essentially the same policy measures are
called for as in periods of high employment.
Similar considerations apply in periods of prosperity. The
unemployment which persists into such periods is
predominantly frictional and structural in nature and calls
for greater emphasis on longer run policies pertaining to sup
ply allocation issues than when labor markets are looser.
Nonetheless, there are important differences between in
dividual periods of prosperity, as recent experience makes
187
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clear, so short-run shifts in demand management must still
be held in readiness. Moreover, not all aspects of frictional
and structural unemployment call for long term policy ac
tions; shorter run measures, particularly with respect to de
mand conditions for the structurally unemployed, are clearly
needed even when the economy is getting close to its full
employment potential.
A profile of the unemployed by the usual demographic
characteristics is also frequently viewed in terms of these
same three categories of unemployment—cyclical, frictional
and structural—with white adult males predominantly af
fected by cyclical influences, white youth and women by fric
tional influences, and nonwhites generally by structural in
fluences. While containing some validity, this view is a
dangerous oversimplification. It would be closer to the facts
to treat the nonwhite workers as vulnerable to all three types
of influences, with white youth and women only somewhat
less so, and adult white males subject largely to cyclical in
fluences alone.
As a consequence, any shift from a sluggish to a buoyant
economy results in major changes in the jobless status and
prospects of these demographic groups, but the degree and
even the nature of the change vary among the three groups.
Adult white males face increasingly active bidding for their
services as vacancies multiply; substantial numbers of white
youth and women begin to move into stable job oppor
tunities and away from high turnover, structurally limited
lines of work; and nonwhites begin a similar movement
though to a markedly less degree.
These considerations have a direct bearing on the dimen
sions of the problem of prosperity unemployment as outlin
ed in the opening chapter of this study and on the choice of
public policies for dealing with the issues involved. While
short-run shifts in aggregate demand management will con-
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tinue to be critically important in determining how low the
level of unemployment can be pushed in periods of high
employment, the aggregate fiscal and monetary approach
has been severely undercut in recent years by the fact that in
flationary outbursts can occur at relatively high as well as at
relatively low levels of unemployment. Moreover, longer
term trends in economic conditions, notably the rate of
growth in productivity, the pace of technological develop
ment and investment, shifts in international markets and ex
pectations regarding the rate of increase in prices and wages,
now dominate aggregate demand management. Overheating
in the early phase of an expansion is quite as dangerous as
overkilling later on. In today's environment, any changes in
monetary and fiscal policies, barring wartime or similar
shocks, will need to be kept within narrow limits.
The record of the 1970s, however, does not point to any
precise nonaccelerating inflation level of unemployment to
which a policy of aggregate demand expansion can be car
ried. All that can be said with a fair degree of assurance is
that the use of such a policy to go as low as the 5 percent level
might well induce serious inflationary consequences. In these
circumstances, a rise in government expenditures limited to
certain targeted unemployed groups would not prove
unstabilizing if it were matched by an offsetting decline in
some other category of spending and/or by a rise in tax
revenues. This, however, would mark a shift from aggregate
demand to selective measures as the route to follow.
Whether the government should decide under these condi
tions to push unemployment below 5 percent would be as
much a political as an economic choice.
The other dimension of the problem—frequent movement
among unskilled, dead-end occupations, inability to secure
career-oriented jobs particularly in the private sector, and
lack of visible incentives to gain skills essential to more
meaningful work—call for a sustained, coordinated public
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effort to give the hard-to-employ the means to find stable
work opportunities. This would require in turn the careful
tailoring of such an effort to the specific requirements of
these groups, with the greatest concentration on the severely
disadvantaged among the hard-to-employ. It would likewise
require the careful tailoring of a system of strong in
ducements to employers, especially in the private sector, to
give these workers initial access to career ladder jobs. While
the difficulties facing both undertakings are formidable,
they would be materially lessened in periods of general
business expansion.
In such periods the nature of frictional unemployment
undergoes considerable change as more workers, including
nonwhites as well as whites and lesser as well as more skilled
workers, enjoy wider latitude in choosing among job open
ings. For these workers, the job information facilities of the
federal-state Employment Service and private employment
offices, if put on a fuller, more detailed basis, should
generally prove sufficient. With the step-up in business ac
tivity, employers would find it increasingly to their advan
tage to do more of their hiring through the Employment Ser
vice, especially if the Service's referral system could be put
on a more informative, i.e., detailed, and objective basis.
For a limited group of job seekers, however, the movement
between jobs would remain at a bare, limited-skill level even
in periods of prosperity and for these hardcore unemployed
or underemployed a much more intensive, carefully designed
structure of job finding aids would be essential.
Workers subject to such structural as opposed to frictional
unemployment confront one or more of the following im
pediments: noncompetitive wages or other cost barriers,
welfare assistance and other work disincentives,
discriminatory hiring and promotion practices, deficiencies
in basic educational and vocational preparation, and lack of
any regular job experience or specific skill training.

Conclusion

191

Each of these barriers has generated public policy
responses of varying degrees of intensity and effectiveness.
The review of these responses in the preceding chapters
underscores the need to put the different policies towards the
structurally unemployed into a single, integrated framework
with a view to adapting the various policy responses to the
particular needs of each subgroup within the structurally
unemployed and to make sure that successive-stage linkups
between schools, employers and community are in place as
needed by individual workers. While the underlying purpose
of these policies is to make it possible for structurally
unemployed workers to find and hold stable jobs, dif
ferences among such workers require distinctly different,
though closely interrelated, policy approaches.
A critical element in an integrated policy framework along
these lines would continue to be the government's training
programs, but these programs need to be tied in much more
closely than they are now with actual job experience in
private firms or government agencies. Admittedly, for many
workers merely providing relatively brief training and work
experience opportunities of this sort has proven inadequate,
but for those who have achieved a certain job-readiness
status, this approach has proven highly successful; while
reliable data are lacking, it seems likely that if the economy
achieves a 6 percent level of unemployment, there would be
as many as a million workers who, though still structurally
unemployed, would be in this job-ready category. Two re
quirements, however, would have to be met: first, the level
of training and job experience would have to be high enough
to be seen as likely to lead to permanent jobs and longer term
careers; and second, the inducements to both the par
ticipating workers and employers would have to be great
enough to make sure that career entry and progression can
occur. The single most serious weakness in existing govern
ment and public service employment sponsored programs
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appears to be the low rates of post-training program
placements in regular, stable jobs.
Viewed in broader and more long-run terms, major
changes in the nation's public school system are needed if the
structural unemployment problem is to be effectively attack
ed. Of the various conditions that call for redress, two bear
most directly on the issue of structural unemployment. The
first is the gross difference that exists in terms of per student
dollar outlay and comparative quality of programs between
upper and lower income communities or districts. The sec
ond is the failure of the schools, notably in the latter areas,
to provide meaningful work experience opportunities to
students who desire them and could put them to good use. In
many institutions, particularly in our inner-cities, large
numbers of students find themselves on a mechanical, boring
and deadening treadmill which leads away from, rather than
toward, any worthwhile job or meaningful career.
For structurally unemployed workers who are less jobready, and the more severely disadvantaged, elements other
than specific skill training and work experience would also
have to be provided. While primarily affecting younger
workers, adult workers can be subject to essentially similar
deficiencies too. These more seriously disadvantaged
workers form a far smaller group, perhaps between 500,000
to 750,000 in total number, than those in the job-ready
category, and thus add only about a half of a percentage
point to the nation's overall unemployment rate.
A much broader, and at the same time much more inten
sive, effort than has been expended to date would be
necessary if any significant progress is to be made in their
case. Training periods would have to be lengthened, work
support assignments would have to be more carefully design
ed and monitored, more individual counseling and help with
personal needs would have to be made available, and during
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initial job assignments, much fuller, even daily, cooperation
of supervisors and fellow workers would have to be secured.
Even if such an intensive effort could be carried through,
however, only limited results would probably be achieved,
with numerous outright failures occurring since for many
such workers these aids would not reach the fundamental
difficulties involved. In their case, in addition to these direct,
individualized measures, much broader and more costly
measures would have to be undertaken including, in some in
stances at least, greatly improved housing conditions, far
better crime control, more adequate recreational facilities
and other like measures essential to viable neighborhood and
community environments. As already indicated, a key ele
ment in any such far-reaching effort would be to adapt the
country's primary and secondary school system more fully to
the needs of disadvantaged students generally and, through a
parallel program in work experience education, to give them
some kind of a future career foothold. This would be
especially important for students from the most severely
disadvantaged backgrounds. Lacking a sustained effort
along these lines, the many opportunities which high
employment conditions afford even workers of severely
disadvantaged backgrounds are likely to be largely lost.
The other major barriers involve even more difficult and
intractable issues, so much so that insofar as structural
unemployment is concerned they can only be approached in
very long range terms. Noncompetitive wages, including
government determined federal minimum wages and other
market interferences, potentially pose real threats to job
seekers among the hard-to-employ but, practicalities aside,
whether a concerted move to break down these market bar
riers would have an observable effect on the employment of
such workers seems doubtful. Similarly, it is important to
take steps to prevent a weakening of work incentives of
lower paid, lower skilled groups as a result of the spread of
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welfare programs and other income support systems, but
there is little evidence that any such tightening would
materially affect the extent of unemployment, structural or
otherwise. Finally, there is wide agreement that
discriminatory practices, many rooted in long-established
mores and institutional patterns, lie behind many of the
more specific barriers confronting the structurally
unemployed. There is no less widespread agreement that the
task of breaking down these practices will be long and ar
duous. Ultimately, any solution of the structural unemploy
ment problem will require unremitting efforts in this direc
tion; meanwhile, the more direct attacks already discussed
give greater promise of success.
Can the level of unemployment that persists into periods
of prosperity be reduced to minimal proportions, as low
perhaps as 5 percent or less, in the next five or ten years? No
one can speak with assurance on this question; if substantial
progress is made, however, it seems likely that it will come as
a result of public policy actions along the general lines
recommended in this study.
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